# THE UNWELCOME NEIGHBOUR

TURKEY'S KURDISH POLICY

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I.B.TAURIS

The Unwelcome Neighbour

Culture and Society in Western and Central Asia

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The Unwelcome Neighbour

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1

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, a state-like Kurdish entity began to gradually establish itself on Turkey's southeast border. On a delimited territory which was more or less cut off from the rest of country, the Iraqi Kurds set up self-rule and built *de facto* independent political institutions. An Iraqi journalist visiting the city of Erbil in northern Iraq in 2002, reported: 'This is supposedly [...] Iraqi land but no one utters the name "Iraq". Here they use cellular phones called Kurdistell, they watch a Kurd TV (sic). In officials' bureaus large maps hang on the wall with Kurdistan inscribed in large letters, large enough to arouse the ire of the neighbouring countries'.[1] This situation created a dilemma for the Turkish state. On the one hand, Ankara had to interact with the Kurdish entity in order to protect what were considered vital national interests and, most importantly, to make sure that this self-rule did not develop into an independent state. Aborting all potential plans for Kurdish statehood is paramount for Ankara. On the other hand, the formal and regular relations that were established reproduced, maybe even reinforced, a reality that Turkey wanted to avoid more than anything else. An independent Kurdish state on its own border would be a nightmare for Ankara. Turkey's foreign policy towards northern Iraq is an example of how an actor is sometimes forced to participate in spinning a web in which it eventually gets caught itself.

Turkey's anxiety about developments in northern Iraq is a reminder of the fact that even when a territorial nation-state is forcefully established, it can still be contested. States are not set in stone. They are created by people and can, at any moment, be challenged. Following WW1 and the collapse of the Ottoman

Empire, governments in the Middle East were faced with the challenge of creating a political community in their newly demarcated national territories. International boundaries were established to separate 'the domestic realm from the exterior, the world of (supposed) social solidarity from the world of Leviathan'.[2] The successor state of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic, founded in 1923, was no exception. The endeavour to replace a multinational, multiethnic empire with a territorial nation-state is still an on-going and open-ended project. The borders of the new state corresponded, more or less, with the positions that the Turkish army had managed to secure through military battle. In this territory, inhabited by people of mixed ethnic backgrounds, a nation was to be created. The newly-founded nation-state had to find a unifying principle which could embrace Turks and Kurds as well as a number of other ethnic groups. The state-building core chose a definition of the nation that was not based on ethnicity but on the territorial principle. Everyone living in the territory of the Turkish Republic, that is, within its borders, was a Turk. The borders were thus crucial both for delimiting the territory and for defining the nation.

Civic nationalism became the official ideology. As early as the 1920s, however, policies and practices began to depart from the official declarations and the nation-building project became increasingly ethnified. The potential for creating a truly civic form of national identity (if there is such a thing) was thus undermined and throughout the history of the Republic, the definition of the Turkish nation has been a highly controversial issue. Any questioning of the official definition of this national identity has been treated as a threat to the survival of the state. Any emphasis of any kind on ethnic identity other than Turkishness has been considered threatening and likely to open a Pandora's box full of dangerous, centrifugal forces: One ethnic group that demands more autonomy will lead to all other groups raising the same demands and the final result will be the disintegration of the state. What would the world look like, asks a Turkish diplomat rhetorically, if we were 'to create small mini-states, mosaics, on the basis of ethnicity or language?'.[3] A strong fear of disintegration has always permeated the security thinking of the Turkish state and no

compromises are made when it comes to the unity of state, nation and territory.

Since the definition of the Turkish nation is contested, the territory has taken on a special meaning and security has become closely linked to foreign policy and the protection of territorial integrity. As in so many other cases, nation building has been a violent process which is not yet completed. Only by looking closely at the Turkish nation-building project is it possible to understand why the mere idea of a Kurdish state is such a nightmare for Ankara, even though it is not a matter of giving up part of its own territory, but only about the possible establishment of a Kurdish state *outside* of Turkey's border, on the territory of another state. A crucial factor in this context is that neither the Turkish nor the Iraqi territory is unchallenged. People living on either side of the border may or may not identify with existing territorial demarcations and with the states to which they are connected by citizenship. 'The absolute principle of respect for territorial and political sovereignty, as claimed by the Turkish state' does not necessarily correspond with the conditions on the ground.[4] The Republic was founded on a territory that is, in part, included in Kurdish national aspirations. Thus, fragility was built into the Turkish-Iraqi border from the very beginning. Today, this fragility is a reminder of the artificiality of the distinction between domestic and foreign. What is happening in northern Iraq is not an external issue for Ankara. It is closely connected with domestic politics. References to the so-called 'domino effect', meaning that events in one state automatically spread to surrounding states, reflect the fact that borders, territories and states are man-made. World maps present us with an image of a world carved up into distinct and mutually exclusive entities. In reality, nations do not come to an abrupt stop at the border. On every ordinary world map it would be possible to add layers of alternative and overlapping maps. The mere existence of a different map may, however, constitute an implicit questioning of a border or a territory. Such a seemingly innocent thing as a map can be perceived as a threat, simply by presenting a different way of imagining a certain piece of land. That is why a map depicting an entity called Kurdistan is bound to trigger a strong reaction from defenders of the Turkish state. A map is a powerful tool for

making a population identify with a certain territorial space and because of that it demands a monopoly. 'Only maps are able to communicate a precise image of the limits of the state and the territorial shapes of states as presented on maps remain strongly imprinted upon the mental images of states in our spatial imaginations.'[5] In the battle over the population's national identification, the state does not tolerate competitors. While the Turkish-Iraqi border divides Turkey and Iraq from each other, it also runs right through a population that has only been partly assimilated into the Turkish or the Iraqi nations. As long as ambiguity persists concerning peoples' identification, the Turkish and Iraqi nation-state projects will remain uncompleted.

Foreign policy and nation-building are the subjects of this book. It aims to describe how Turkey's foreign policy towards Kurdish self-rule in northern Iraq is an extension of domestic politics and of the continuously ongoing endeavour to build and consolidate a Turkish nation. The next chapter will outline the theoretical framework, which is based on the interconnectedness of nation-building, foreign policy and national security. The argument is that foreign policy practice and discourse as well as danger, are instrumental in the building and reproduction of nations and states. Chapter 3 describes how the Turkish state has defined the ideological foundations of the Turkish nation, Turkish foreign policy and perceptions of threat to the nation. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Kurdish question and the securitization of Kurdish identity. Chapter 5 is a study of Turkish foreign policy discourse, aiming at showing how, in this kind of discourse, an important element is to reproduce the state by affirming its identity and the domestic-foreign dichotomy. Chapter 6 describes Ankara's relations with northern Iraq during the twelve years of Kurdish self-rule prior to the fall of the Ba'ath regime. It shows how Turkey felt compelled to maintain a military presence in northern Iraq and to establish relations with the leaders of the *de facto* Kurdish state and how this created a dilemma since, at the same time, Ankara was highly concerned about the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of Iraq. Ankara painted itself into a corner, whereby it was simultaneously violating and defending Iraqi sovereignty. The situation which had prevailed in Iraq for 12 years came to an end with the US-led invasion in March 2003.

Chapter 7 describes Turkey's policy under these new conditions and explores whether its basic principles changed or remained the same. Finally, chapter 8 presents some concluding remarks.

2

NATION-BUILDING
AND FOREIGN POLICY

A simplified, but yet popular and persuasive image of the present global order, presumes that the nation precedes the state which, in turn, precedes foreign policy. A nation can be defined as a collective of individuals who, by some imaginary agreement, have decided that they constitute 'a people' which wants to rule itself. If history and circumstances have been benevolent, a nation might have achieved independence, i.e. statehood.[1] The state then, in order to protect the interests and, ultimately, the security and the survival of the nation, pursues foreign policy.

Even if there are states which fit quite well with this image of the ideal-type nation-state, it is much easier to find examples of states which do not. The opposite ideal-type of the *nation-staat* described above, is the *staat-nation,* in which a state is established on a given territory while the creation of a nation, or a demos, comes later.

This chapter aims at problematizing the order and relationship between nation, state and foreign policy. Some 30 years ago, the Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth stated that it is the border that creates the group, rather than the other way around. By the same token, the essentialist idea that there are objectively existing nations which, ideally, create their own states, is more of a myth than a reality. There are of course people who, at a certain point in time, may define themselves as a nation and who want to rule themselves within the framework of a recognized state. Usually, however, the definition of, and belonging to, a nation is highly arbitrary and more often than not the state precedes the nation and

is involved in a constant reproduction both of itself and the nation it supposedly embodies. The state often comes first and is instrumental in constructing the nation. A great deal of research has been carried out on how nations have been created through a homogenization of people living within the borders of a certain state. A nation is often a result of the enforcement of a mythical common history, the standardization of language, of oppression, violence or sometimes of voluntary assimilation.

A successful nation-building is considered crucial for the survival of the state. The state has to justify its claim to obedience and allegiance. Only when the citizens identify with the nation-state can they accept the political institutions and the state's right to rule.[2] Power politics alone might be enough for the initial establishment of a state, but the *continuation* of a nation-state requires that the citizens acknowledge the legitimacy of state jurisdiction and of the demands which are placed upon them. Once the state has been created, the nation – a community of solidarity – has to be built within it.[3] The state is dependent on some degree of internal cohesion:

> The real problem in political development is [...] the extent to which the socialization process of a people provides them with the necessary associational sentiments so that they can have considerable conflict without destroying the stability of the system. When these sentiments are lacking, a polity cannot even endure moderate levels of controversy. In short, it is associational sentiments which make it possible for organizations to endure, and even thrive upon, many forms of controversy.[4]

Associational sentiments and loyalty have to be based on something more substantial than legal citizenship or living on the same territory. Being part of a nation and having a national identity can have different meanings for different people, but to most it means something more than simply possessing a passport. In some cases national identity is founded on a romantic idea about common descent traced deep into the past. In other cases, national identity is based on certain values that the members of the nation supposedly share. The often-used analytical distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms presupposes that a nation is based

either on ethnicity or on certain political principles. An 'ethnic nation' would be a nation based on a common culture and its members would be united by some 'thicker' values and by sharing the same language, religion, history, traditions and/or origin. By contrast, a civic nation would be founded on a commitment to the constitution and the political institutions. The notion of civic nationalism implies that everyone living on the territory of the state belongs to the nation, independently of descent or religious or cultural belonging. What holds a civic nation together is an imaginary social contract of consent signed by the citizens with the state.

It is difficult, however, to imagine a state in which membership in the nation is defined in purely civic terms. Belonging to a civic nation also involve at least some degree of participation in a common culture. According to Will Kymlicka, the idea of a civic nationalism without any cultural components whatsoever is not credible. Immigrants to the USA, a state which is usually presented as an example of civic nationalism, are not only supposed to plead their allegiance to the constitution but also to learn the language and the history of their new country. Kymlicka argues that what distinguishes a civic nation from an ethnic one is not that the former lacks a cultural component, but that anyone, independent of background and skin colour, can integrate into the common culture.[5]

Nations are thus founded on at least some degree of shared culture. A national culture entails a perception of some shared values and a shared identity. That does not mean that there cannot be different and conflicting values within a nation, but some values are beyond questioning. Basic definitions of what the nation is, and the premises on which it is based, cannot be challenged without challenging the nation-state itself. The basic identity of a state could be that it is a liberal democracy, or a theocracy; that it is founded on the principle of market economy, apartheid or secularism. These are examples of values that cannot be questioned without threatening the very foundation of the state, so that even if it were to survive physically, it would be as a 'new' state.

Whatever the glue is that holds a nation together – 'thick' ethnic values or political and civic solidarity – the modern nation-state is

justified by the existence of a *demos*, a people. Within the territorial boundaries of a state, there has to exist some kind of community, and not just an arbitrary collection of individuals. The fact that, in most cases, state and territory are established prior to the existence of the nation has resulted in a rich flora of research on processes of nation-building. This discourse has developed mainly within the field of Comparative Politics among researchers more interested in domestic politics than inter-state relations. In International Relations theory it took longer for the relation between state and nation to be problematized in a similar way. IR theory continued to treat states as pre-existing entities with fixed and secure identities. Increased interest in Constructivism and identity-issues has, however, changed this, and IR scholars have become more interested in the construction of national identities. Thus a change of perspective has taken place. Instead of treating foreign policy as an activity which protects the interests of the nation, it has become more common to analyze foreign policy as an activity which actually produces and maintains the nation in whose name it operates.

In a much-quoted work from 1990, William Bloom describes foreign policy as a 'tool for nation-building'. Bloom is interested in how foreign policy can be used to reproduce the nation and consolidate national community. When a nation-building project has been successful, there is, he says, a general identification with the nation among the citizens. There is also a tendency among the citizens to defend and enhance the shared national identity. Bloom emphasizes that a nation is never finally settled. Nation-building is an 'ongoing necessity' for all states. Foreign policy can be used to create a situation in which the mass of people can perceive a threat to their common identity and, furthermore, a situation in which the *whole* national community feel that they share the same experience in relation to a foreign actor. The government then acts as the parental or symbolic figure that protects and enhances the national identity. Government, state and national community become entwined as one bundle of symbols representing national identity. In those situations, any anti-government behaviour may often be interpreted as unpatriotic and treacherous.[6] Since the modern international system, according to Bloom, provides ever-present images of competition and threat, nation-building does not

require explicit conflict and threat. Conflicts, or at least competition, are in fact inherent in the international environment. Historical and contemporary realities, from warfare to sport, demonstrate a scenario of competition.[7] One of Bloom's examples of how foreign policy has been used to enhance national identity is the Cold War. One way of interpreting the Cold War, according to Bloom, is that both the USA and the Soviet Union were suffering severe internal contradictions, so successive governments played up the Cold War in order to mobilize national sentiment and ensure internal coherence.[8]

A stronger focus on identity has been accompanied by increased interest in borders. Identity pre-supposes borders. The idea that was introduced by Barth when he argued that it is the border that creates the group inside it, rather than the other way around, has been taken up by many writers on inter-state relations. Borders define the nation inside and by homogenizing national identity the state also tries to fix and secure its borders.[9] This interest in the way identities and borders are interrelated emanates from the questioning of the present Westphalian order, in which the world is carved up into precisely delimited and mutually exclusive entities. Mainstream International Relations theory (mainly neo-liberalism and neo-realism) has been criticized for treating the international order as if it were fixed and pre-given.[10] To treat the international order as an axiom rather than as an object of analysis might have made more sense before the end of the Cold War when, on the one hand, the Westphalian state system had been established on a global scale while, on the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union had not yet taken place. At that time the world order seemed stable and unchangeable. Since 1989 we have witnessed how states have been broken up and how new states have emerged, notably in the former Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia. The emergence of a global economy has also questioned the idea about the nation state as some kind of self-contained entity.

The 'Constructivist turn' in studies of International Relations has led to a stronger focus on how states constitute themselves or are being constituted.[11] They are no longer simply taken for granted as fixed variables. Obviously, the world *is* divided into states – states that in some respects are mutually exclusive. The

implication of the constructivist approach is not that that the existence of states should or could be denied. It merely acknowledges the fact that key elements of the international system are inter-subjective rather than objective. Constructivism comes in many different versions. A general definition would be that constructivism 'maintains that the sociopolitical world is constructed by human practice, and seeks to explain how this construction takes place'.[12] The inter-state system and the parts that it is made up of (states, nations, territories, borders etc) constitute a social reality which has to be practiced in order to continue to exist. It is emphasized, in the constructivist discourse, that identity is about difference. Identity only exists in relation to other possible identities and makes no sense in any other way. There can be no *us* without a conception of *them*. Against this background, borders are crucial because they maintain the difference upon which national identity is based. Borders tells us where one state ends and another begins. They differentiate compatriots from foreigners. The point of departure in this book is that states exist only in relationship to each other. 'States are established, maintained and reproduced in an effective OR ideological confrontation and comparison with other states.'[13] Obviously foreign policy would not make sense if there were no 'foreign' countries or 'foreign' people. They are foreign because they reside on the other side of the border, and it is only in relation to them that a nation inside the borders exists.

That the international system is created by human practice is, in a sense, a trivial statement, but taken seriously it will have implications for how we interpret relations between states. Foreign policy is commonly understood to be an activity aiming at promoting and protecting the interests of the state and enhancing its security. The states *per se* are treated as if they were part of a material reality, and their interests are taken as *a priori* and exogenously given. Within such a framework, foreign policy is regarded 'as simply the external orientation of pre-established states'.[14] With a different and more constructivist approach, foreign policy can be understood as a political practice that serves to maintain and reproduce the state. While, at one level, states 'make' foreign policy, it is, on another level, foreign policy that 'makes' the state. Foreign policy creates and recreates the state by a

continuously ongoing inscription of the boundary between the domestic inside and the foreign outside. Foreign-policy makers represent the inside towards the outside. The inside-outside boundary is in fact a precondition for their activity. While foreign policy is an activity *across* state borders, towards those who are on the other side, it is also an activity that confirms and reproduces those borders or, to put it differently, foreign policy is a *boundary-producing political activity*.[15] When a foreign-policy maker, for example a diplomat, represents his state and acts in the name of its interests and values, he is at the same time involved in the creation and consolidation of the state and its identity.

In constructivist IR theory, foreign policy is regarded as a practice of representation.[16] Representation can be defined as our understanding of reality as expressed in language and practices. Representations are constituted by convictions, concepts and knowledge developed collectively and shared through communication.[17] This position does not deny that there are basic facts. The point is rather that we impose certain meanings and values on the world and that these meanings and values are not decided simply by our immediate and objective observations. Thus the assumption that there is an external reality independent of those who are observing it is rejected. It is impossible to make observations that simply reflect the world *as it is*. Our observations are 'creatures of our own making'.[18]

Since there are neither states nor an international system beyond human practice, foreign policy does in fact produce the reality in whose name it operates. The international system presupposes the continuation of all the practices of representation that actually constitute its reality.[19] Thus the study of foreign policy is not only about how a pre-existing entity relates to other states, it is also about how the state is being produced and reproduced, through its foreign policy.

If 'normal' foreign policy practice contributes to the reproduction of nations and states, security policy is even more conducive to the process of nation-building. Many scholars have emphasized the importance of danger and threat for nation-building. Through a discourse of danger, the 'safe inside' is juxtaposed against the 'anarchic outside', and the state is represented as the main guarantor of its citizens' safety. The

ultimate *raison d'être* for a state is to provide its citizens with safety, so it serves the state to interpret reality in such a way that order and community exist within the state and threats come from the anarchy outside.[20] States justify their existence by claiming to be the provider of order and security for their populations. Security is a concern for every state. If there are no explicit threats, there are always latent and potential ones. National security could be about the survival of the citizens, about protecting the territory or about defending the value-base upon which the nation-state is built.

The concept of 'national security' serves to subsume the security of the individual in the security of the nation and identifies the state as the prime provider of security. A perceived danger to the nation has a tendency to elicit the citizen's loyalty towards the state. The individual citizens pledge allegiance to the state, which, in return, provides its citizens with security. According to Bill McSweeney, the meaning of security is expressed in the practices of the state. The reproduction of what he calls 'the paradox of "national security"' is procured through state practices:

> The state ritual of remembering the sacrifices of the dead remembers also the danger of others and the centrality of the state in confronting it, and, in the process, re-members the individuals in the community.[21]

In times of threats, whether well-founded or not, patriotism usually becomes imperative and tolerance for domestic diversity decreases. Some even claim that the inter-state system, composed of sovereign states surrounded by anarchy, needs danger as a condition for its existence. The *safe inside* as well as the *anarchic outside* exist only in relation to each other.[22] According to the same logic, the power of the state is usually strengthened in times of perceived danger. That could be because the loyalty of the citizens increases, resulting in stronger popular support, non-acceptance of opposition against the state and its policies, and increased acceptance of the state taking extraordinary measures. The power of the state also increases because the invocation of security means that an issue is located beyond the rules of normal politics. When something is presented as an existential threat to the nation-state,

the state claims its right to use whatever methods necessary in order to 'save the nation'.

The concept 'securitization' implies that security or danger are not regarded as objective conditions. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that any public issue can be placed on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized, through politicized, to securitized. When an issue is politicized, it means that it is made part of public policy, requiring government decision or some other form of communal governance. The next move, securitization, can be seen as a more extreme version of politicization since it justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.[23] From a constructivist perspective, the question of what constitutes a threat depends on how an issue is interpreted and on who is doing the interpretation. Something that is considered threatening by one state may be considered harmless by another, depending on their respective identities and vulnerabilities. Few, however, would go so far as to argue that there are no real dangers in the world. When a hostile and militarily superior neighbour invades a smaller state to annex it, it would be absurd to claim that the question of whether this is a threat or not to the survival of the invaded state is a matter of definition and interpretation. There is, indeed, an abundance of 'real' dangers in the world: earthquakes, military attacks, bomb explosions, viruses, ethnic cleansing, genocides, poverty, traffic accidents, pollution etc. There are also a good many other phenomena which are considered threatening by some states, although it is not always obvious how, and sometimes even if, they threaten national security: immigration, emigration, declining birthrates, the use of drugs, religious symbols, corruption, ethnic identity, social unrest, economic inequality, communism, capitalism, moral decay, smuggling etc. Issues like these may or may not be securitized, depending on the social context. And even among the previously-mentioned phenomena which are dangerous in a more clear-cut and unambiguous way, only some are interpreted as threats to national security. In order to 'fight terrorism', many states are prepared to venture far outside the boundaries of normal politics and even violate basic civil rights, whereas environmental pollution, traffic and poverty, although killing many more people, are treated within the boundaries of normal political procedures. Very often this difference cannot be

explained by references to the actual danger at hand as measured, for example, in loss of human life. Traffic kills far more people than terrorism, but it is only the latter that is securitized, that is, presented as an existential threat, thus justifying extraordinary measures.

To say that security is not an objective condition, and that any issue, potentially, can become a security issue, does not mean that what is and is not defined as an existential threat is completely arbitrary. Basque separatism could not be turned into a security issue in Finland and militant Hinduism could not be securitized in Turkey. The argument is a different one, namely that, whether or not something is perceived as a threat to national security depends on a combination of objective conditions and inter-subjective interpretation. Usually the state has a privileged position as the interpreter of what threatens the state and the nation. But the state's interpretation has to make sense to its citizens. Sometimes the state may take advantage of people's fear of something by drumming up the image of a threat and presenting itself as the provider of safety. But the state has no monopoly on defining danger. Different interpretations often exist. The US government may define terrorism as one of the main threats to national security. Others will argue that an even bigger threat to US citizens are the measures, such as the Patriot Act, which the state has taken for the purpose of combating terrorism. Most often, however, states, at least if they are democratic, would not try to turn an issue into a security matter unless they can count on the support from the majority of the population.

Like the idea of 'national interests', the concept of 'national security' pre-supposes the existence of a nation. When the members of a 'we' feel a threat to themselves, it could be about their physical survival or about their control over a territory. But often it is the identity, values, life-style, culture of the 'we' that are considered to be under threat. Therefore, the phenomena that are defined as threatening depend on the self-definition of a nation. A nation that defines itself in religious terms may feel threatened by secularism while a nation that defines itself as secular is prone to see religion as a threat. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde give a number of other examples: If national identity is tied to specific cultural habits, a 'global' culture such as the US/Western/Coca-

Cola/McDonalds imperialism will be threatening, as in the case of, among others, Bhutan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. If language is central to national identity, the emergence of English as the global *lingua franca* will be problematic (e.g., France). If a nation is built on a melting-pot ideology, national identity will be vulnerable to a reassertion of racial and cultural distinctiveness and incommensurability, for example multiculturalism in the United States.[24] Since nations are constructed entities, so are the threats to them.

> Threats to identity are [...] always a question of the construction of something as threatening some "we" – and often thereby actually contributing to the construction or reproduction of "us".[25]

Obviously, there are always conflicting ideas about how the nation should be defined, what the national interest is and what it is that threatens it. How much heterogeneity that is accepted varies over time and from one nation-state to another. In cases where state institutions enjoy a basic level of legitimacy and support, that loyalty and support is likely to increase during times of perceived danger. The same may, however, not be true in states where a majority of the population feels unrepresented or even oppressed by the political power holders. Generally, however, as discussed earlier in this chapter, states require at least a basic level of internal cohesion; therefore, attempts to create unity or to homogenize the nation are an integral part of state-building and state maintenance.

Since the end of the Cold War, the narrow definition of security, limited mainly to military-political issues, has been extended to include other areas as well. As one of the first 'wideners' of the security concept, Buzan divided security into sectors: the military, the environmental, the economic, the societal and the political sector. The two most relevant sectors for this book are the societal and political sectors, which are closely interrelated but nonetheless distinct from each other. Societal security, which can also be called 'identity security', is defined as 'the sustainability, within acceptable conditions, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom'. Political security is about 'the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy'.[26] Buzan argues that societal

security should be distinguished from political security since the boundaries of society (the nation) are usually not coterminous with the boundaries of the state. And even when they are, they are still two different things. Society is about identity and about the self-conception of a nation (or some other community). This identity is entangled with yet distinct from the state and its political institutions.[27]

This widening of the security concept has helped us to see that states are not identical units. They have different vulnerabilities. That is why different issues are more or less relevant to different states. Some states define their security predominantly in military terms, others states are more pre-occupied with economic, societal or some other issue. A state with powerful military capabilities but which lacks domestic social cohesion has different vulnerabilities than a state with strong domestic cohesion but weak military capabilities. The foreign and security policies of any state must therefore be interpreted in the light of the specific conditions of the state that is being studied. If the focus is on societal security or political security, then the domestic identity and state-carrying political ideologies have to be examined.

The increased interest in identity issues within IR research has led to many valuable insights into the understanding of foreign policy and state behaviour. There are, however, reasons to be cautious about over-stressing the constructed nature of the state and about focusing solely on identity building. Foreign policy cannot be reduced to identity reproduction alone. Wilson and Donnan remind us that the institutions and the agents of the state 'see themselves as objective entities with concrete, bounded and unilinear goals'.[28] It is important therefore to keep in mind that two processes are taking place at the same time when foreign policy is conducted. At one level, foreign policy is a political practice that is central to the constant reproduction of the state. States would cease to exist if they were not maintained through human practice. At another level, although states are socially constructed, they do exist, and they pursue foreign policy to protect their interests and ultimately their survival. As Wilson and Donnan argue:

[T]he state is an object whose reality will be denied if we focus exclusively on deconstructed representations of it [...]. Nations and their individuated members may be in a perpetual condition of becoming, but this is only partially true of the state. The state exists.[29]

Bearing this in mind, this empirical study of Turkey's foreign policy towards northern Iraq will take into account that the reproduction of the state is taking place alongside the protection of national interests – interests which, by the state and foreign-policy makers, are seen as both objective and real. To claim that foreign policy is an identity-building activity does not exclude it from being a rational and interest-maximizing activity at the same time. The protection of national interests and the reproduction of national identity can, however, under certain circumstances, pull a state's foreign policy in opposite directions. While the Turkish state has defended its security and its interests in northern Iraq, national identity has, at the same time and by the same policy, been challenged rather than affirmed. Turkey's foreign policy will, in the chapters that follow, be interpreted as a balancing act in which the state is trying to avoid the undermining effects on state identity caused by its own policy.

National identity does not, in this book, refer to the self-conception of the collective of Turkish citizens. It is Turkish national identity *as defined by the state* that is the central object of analysis. The extent to which people actually identify themselves in the way that is 'prescribed' by the state is not being explored, neither are the various alternative ideas about how the Turkish nation should be defined. It is the official definition of national identity and how it is related to foreign policy that will be investigated. National identity as defined by the state amounts to the same thing as state ideology or state-carrying ideology. As will be shown in the next chapter, the Turkish state is based on a set of clearly defined ideas about the identity of the 'Turkish nation'. This state-defined national identity is the ideological foundation of the state and maintaining it is regarded as a matter of state survival.

In order to understand Turkish foreign policy, it is important to know the values and the principles on which the republic is based. The purpose of the next chapter is to describe the basic principles

of the Turkish nation-building project and to show how these are related to foreign policy and to the security concerns of the Turkish state.

3

DEFINING AND DEFENDING
THE TURKISH NATION

Securing the Territory

One of the most sacred values for Turkish state-builders is the absolute integrity of the territory and the existing borders. The present constitution reflects, according to one political scientist, 'an excessive concern with the unity of the state and the nation together with its territory'.[1] As a consequence, national security thinking in Turkey is imbued with a strong fear of territorial loss and disintegration. Sometimes this fear results in reactions and statements that are difficult to understand for an outside observer. One example is the indignation expressed so vehemently by Turkey every time parliaments in Western Europe and the USA discuss whether or not to define the mass killing of Armenians in 1915–16 as genocide. One reason for this indignation is a conviction that the ultimate goal for those who are pressing for recognition of an Armenian genocide is to obtain territorial compensation from Turkey.[2] Another example is the fact that even a mention of the word Kurdistan usually evokes an outcry from the Turkish state. In a discussion of the strategic importance of the Kurdish region located at the interception of Turkey, Iraq and Iran, McDowall concludes that:

> Turkey's attitude to its frontiers in Kurdistan is special. It has an emotional and ideological view that its frontiers (except with Iraq) cannot be changed without threatening the foundation of the republic. [...] The integrity of Turkey within its present borders has acquired an almost mystical quality for those faithful to the legacy

of modern Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk. As a result, the loss of Kurdistan, despite its great poverty, would be perceived as a grievous blow to the spatial identity of Turkey.[3]

The fear of territorial disintegration is usually referred to as the 'Sèvres syndrome', which refers to a suspicion that Western powers nourish intentions of dismantling the Turkish territory.[4] This suspicion has its roots in the support from the European powers to the nationalist movements which emerged among the Christian populations in the Balkans in the early 19th century. This wave of nationalism led to a chain of revolts and to the gradual territorial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, culminating in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. The events following the end of the First World War are a source of deep distrust of European states among many Turks. The Ottoman Empire entered the war as an ally of Germany. When, in 1918, the Empire was finally defeated, the Allied powers seemed intent on dividing up most of the remaining territories, including Anatolia, among themselves. In 1920, these plans were formulated in the Sèvres Treaty (which, however, was never ratified and was later replaced by the treaty of Lausanne). In this treaty, apart from the claims on Anatolia by Britain, France, Greece and Italy, Armenians were also promised a state of their own in eastern Anatolia and the Kurds were to be given local autonomy, possibly leading to full independence. What was left for a future Turkish state was nothing but 'a rump including only Istanbul and central and northern Anatolia'.[5] Mümtaz Soysal, a former Foreign Minister, has described how the image of this diminished territory has been imprinted on people's minds:

> We all have a Sèvres obsession. All of us, from those in the Foreign Ministry to those at the top echelons of the military, from our elementary school education, we have been introduced to the Sèvres map. We can never forget that map.[6]

In response to the threats of division a national resistance movement was formed which managed to force the European powers to retreat from Anatolia. Despite this success, the events that took place immediately after the war have left a legacy in the

form of what sometimes amounts to an obsession with the indivisibility of the state. To argue for the separation of any part of the country is a crime in Turkey.[7] The sanctity of the territory is beyond discussion. So, according to the official discourse, is the sanctity of other state's territories. The Foreign Ministry repeatedly states that respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states is one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy. A former president of the constitutional court declared in a speech that 'The Turkish Republic [...] does not covet an inch of any country's territory'.[8] It is also common to claim that Turkey does not have a pebble stone to give away. The inviolability of present territorial demarcations stretches, at least symbolically, all the way down to inches and pebble stones.

Many Turks fear that any change in the territorial status quo, however minor, might lead to continuous loss of territory and ever increasing disintegration. Or, as one scholar puts it: 'Loss of territory is seen as comparable to the loss of an arm or a leg, as an amputation of part of the body of the nation itself. Because of Turkey's several ethnic and religious minorities, the Turks have been worried that the loss of one "limb" could be followed by a loss of another, ending up with a state body bleeding to death.'[9]

Building the Nation

The Turkish state was built on a state ideology which differed considerably from that of the Ottoman state. While the Republic has tried to integrate its citizens into a common Turkish national identity, the Ottoman state was non-assimilative and supra-ethnic. The subjects of the Empire were divided into different religiously defined communities (*millets*) such as Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish and Muslim. Even though non-Moslems were second-class citizens in the sense that they had to pay a special tax and could not serve in the army, they enjoyed freedom of worship and some degree of autonomy. Educational, religious and cultural affairs were the domains of the millets and non-Moslems even administered there own courts for personal law.[10]

This organization along religious lines did not exclude the existence of other loyalties such as attachment to one's place of origin and language. These attachments did not, however, carry

any political significance until late in the eighteenth century, when ideas of ethnic nationalism began to surface among the Christians on the Balkans.[11] These ideas, combined with the influence of the French Revolution, were transformed into demands for national independence. This was the onset of a process that led to the disintegration of the religious communities into ethnic units and, eventually, the creation of nation states.

The Empire had become weakened long before the emergence of ethnic nationalism as a political force. From the end of the 16th century it had gradually been surpassed, economically, technologically and militarily by the European powers, whose territorial expansion had become a major threat to its survival.[12] The Ottoman state also suffered from fragmentation of the power of the central government. It had lost much of its control over the periphery and even over its own army.[13] From the beginning of the nineteenth century and onwards it was, however, the spread of nationalism in the Balkans, supported by European powers, which became the most decisive factor in the disintegration of the Ottoman state.[14]

In order to stop the process of decline and fragmentation, a number of major reforms were undertaken. A period of reorganization began in the 1820s, lasting for about 50 years. In 1839, the Gülhane decree was proclaimed and this marks the beginning of the period which is usually referred to as the Tanzimat era, although the reform process had actually begun long before that and the Gülhane decree was rather the legal and political recognition of changes that had already occurred.[15] The main goal of the reforms was to strengthen the state by increasing its military might which, in turn, required a more efficient bureaucracy and system of taxation. Thus, the army was expanded and reorganized. It was given modern equipment and conscription was introduced. Other reforms aimed at restoring the power of the central government over the provinces and at increasing tax revenues through changes in the provincial administration and the tax system.[16] To these reforms were added cultural changes aimed at creating a more rational, progressive and modern way of life. A secular system of education was adopted and familiarity with Europe and European languages became a valuable asset for the new elite.

In order to stop the spread of separatism, the reformers promised equality between Christians and Moslems. The central government hoped that it would thereby regain the allegiance of its Christian subjects and appease the European powers, which were demanding rights for the Ottoman Christians.[17] The state adopted Ottomanism as an official ideology, hoping that this would provide a basis for integration.[18] Ottomanism promoted an identity based on patriotism and individual equality, regardless of religion or ethnic affiliation.[19] Thus, what was introduced was the idea of modern citizenship and equality before the law.

Despite the intentions behind the reforms, they did very little to prevent the spread of separatism among the Christians. On the contrary, they actually added to the process of disintegration:

> Indeed, the centralization policy pursued through the Tanzimat reforms started as a search for means to create one unified Ottoman nation and ended by stimulating the national awakening of all religious and ethnic groups, including the Turks and Arabs.[20]

Ottoman citizenship created a new status for the individual that superseded membership of the millet. The result was that the millets were reduced to mere religious congregations as the state took over their legal, cultural and educational responsibilities. Further reforms of the millet system led to its gradual disintegration into ethnic-linguistic units.[21] The Orthodox millet was divided when a Greek church was established, following the foundation of a Greek state. A separate Serbian Church emerged, following the independence of Serbia and, later on, a Bulgarian and a Romanian church were created. These churches then reinforced separate ethnic identities.[22] Eventually, the *millet* system was undermined. This opened the door for individuals to seek identity in the nation rather than in his or her religious community. From the mid-nineteenth century there was a difference both in they way people identified themselves and in they way they were classified by the state. In the first censuses that were made in 1831 and 1844, the population was classified according to religious affiliation. After 1870–71, the population tended to be classified according to religious, linguistic and ethnic affiliations.[23]

With nationalism came new ideas about how state and society should be organized. In the Ottoman Empire there was a separation between political allegiance on the one hand and ethnic and religious identity and loyalty on the other. The citizens' political allegiance belonged to the state, but their religious, ethnic or whatever other loyalties they felt was with their respective groups. The new ideal, imported from Europe, was that political allegiance and ethnic identity should coincide.[24] The creation of an 'Ottoman nation' was an attempt to achieve a transition from an empire to a modern state, but it did not halt separatist struggles. Internal separatism and foreign imperialism continued to fuel the ongoing process of disintegration and territorial loss.[25] Rebellions broke out, first among the Greeks and the Serbs, which then spread to the Romanians, Bulgarian and Macedonian Slavs, and Armenians.[26] Eventually, most of these struggles resulted in the creation of nation states. The independence of Greece was recognized in 1829. In 1878, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent states and Bulgaria gained autonomy.[27]

The Tanzimat reforms reached a peak in 1876–77 with the adoption of a constitution and the inauguration of an elected parliament. The constitution turned out to be short-lived. It was suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878 and so was the parliament, only a year after it had been installed. During the following 30 years, the Sultan ruled the Empire as an absolute monarch. During this time, discontent with the autocratic rule grew within the young generation of officers and bureaucrats who had been trained in the Civil Service Academy and War Academy. They were the new Ottoman intelligentsia who, ironically, had been produced by Sultan Abdulhamid's own expanded and improved educational system. These young officers and bureaucrats wanted to reinstate the constitution and the parliament and embraced secular and liberal ideals, as opposed to the traditional and Islamic values held by the Sultan. In 1889, they founded a secret society in Istanbul. Some of them were arrested and some escaped to Paris, where they began calling themselves the 'Young Turks' and where they founded the 'Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP). They continued to attract followers both inside and outside the Empire. In 1908, the movement had gained enough momentum and unity to bring about a revolution,

which resulted in the restoration of constitutional rule and the inauguration of a new parliament.[28]

As with the earlier reformers of the nineteenth century, the goal of the Young Turks was first and foremost to save the Ottoman state. For that purpose, they needed to foster a common identification with the state and a sense of solidarity among all the different ethnic and religious groups that made up the Empire. As a result of the reform process which had begun in the early nineteenth century, a new system of government had emerged. The tradition of non-interference by the state in the affairs of local communities had been broken. The state had taken on a wide range of new responsibilities, thus depriving the different religious and ethnic communities of the autonomy they had previously enjoyed. In the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman state had transformed itself into a modern, centralized state. This new political structure, however, lacked social and cultural cohesion, ideological unity and a common political identity shared by all citizens.[29]

Sultan Abdulhamid II had used Pan-Islamism to legitimize his rule. He had emphasized his role as Caliph and the Islamic character of the Empire. This was, in a sense, an acknowledgment of the demographic changes that had taken place as a result of territorial losses in the Balkans and the following mass-migration of Moslems from the new Balkan states to Ottoman lands. These events had significantly increased the proportion of Moslems in the Empire, while the percentage of Christians had shrunk. The Islamist policy helped the government to win the loyalty of the non-Turkish Moslem population, not least the Arabs.[30]

The Young Turks and the CUP needed to find another basis for identification with the state. To use religion as a foundation for unity was not an option for them. They had little or no respect for Islam and wanted to replace religion with science. They thought, however, that it would be impossible to mobilize the masses without reference to Islam, so they dressed their own political ideas in Islamic garments and used religious rhetoric to promote their modernization policy.[31]

In the formative years of the movement, the Young Turks were influenced by popular biological theories on race. Up until 1907, CUP publications were filled with articles about the Turkish race.

Ideologically, most of the Young Turks believed in Turkism and emphasized the Turkish aspect of the Empire. In their journals, they regularly replaced the term 'Ottoman' with the term 'Turk' and there was, among the CUP leaders, great disappointment over the lack of 'national sentiment' among the Turkish people. Turkism was, however, controversial since some of the CUP members were not Turks. Moreover, to promote a dominant role for Turks was not a viable way to create unity and solidarity in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state. Thus, in 1907, in the build up to the revolution, the Turkic ideology was downplayed while Ottomanism was emphasized.[32] As an ideology, Ottomanism excluded neither non-Turks nor non-Moslems, so it had the potential, at least theoretically, to bridge ethnic and religious differences. The CUP hoped to unite all citizens of the Empire behind the principles of equality and constitutional rule.

But even though Ottomanism was the official ideology of the Young Turks, they were first and foremost pragmatic and would employ Turkist, Ottomanist and Pan-Islamist policies, often simultaneously, in order to fulfill the goal of saving the Empire. Moreover, even if Ottomanism, in theory, did not make any distinctions based on ethnicity, the CUP version of it gave a dominant role to the Turks. Not surprisingly, many non-Turks opposed the idea of an Ottoman state under Turkish leadership, and although the CUP leadership claimed that they represented all Ottomans, non-Turkish organizations saw them as representing only the Turks. That there were non-Turkish members in the CUP did not make any difference to the nationalists since they regarded these members as lackeys of the Turks.[33]

Although the CUP leaders saw language as a criterion defining a nation, they still argued that there was such a thing as an 'Ottoman nation'. They described this nation as 'a body created by the incorporation of various peoples such as Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Jews'. Despite the fact that all these peoples had separate languages of their own, they still, according to the CUP, belonged to the same Ottoman nation since 'their official languages is the same. It is the Ottoman language'. The problem, however, was, as Hanioğlu points out, that the Ottoman language was essentially Turkish.[34] In other words, the 'Young Turks tried to maintain the existing Ottoman

multinational state and to turkify it by universalizing the usage of Turkish.'[35]

Not surprisingly then, the attempt to unite all citizens behind the CUP version of Ottomanism was not successful. Maybe it would not have been a successful strategy even if equal status actually had been given to all groups. By this time, many non-Turkish organizations in the Balkans had already come to see their own communities as distinct nationalities and were more interested in independence, or at least autonomy, than in belonging to a civic Ottoman state. The opponents of the kind of Ottomanism advocated by the CUP tried to push for federalism and increased autonomy, but all such demands were rejected by the CUP leaders.[36] In the early 20th century, nationalism spread to Moslems as well. In 1910, a resurrection broke out among the Albanians. Initially, they wanted autonomy rather than complete separation, but the CUP was not willing to make any concessions. Ottoman rule in the Balkans came to a definite end with the Balkan Wars. In 1912, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro launched a united attack on the Ottoman state which, at the end of the war, was left with almost no territory in Europe. The new western border was fixed along its present line and the Empire lost Macedonia, Thrace and Albania. These areas had been at the core of the Empire for 500 years and most of the CUP leadership had their roots there. Albania became an independent state in 1912.[37]

Among all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were the last to develop a national identity. Turkish nationalism began as cultural movement in the late 19th and early 20th century. One important source of inspiration consisted of European scholars, the first Turcologists, who had begun to study the language and the history of pre-Islamic Turks. Their ideas were picked up by Ottoman students, who went to study at European universities. The works of these early Turcologists contributed to budding Turkish self-awareness and national consciousness. Turkist clubs and publications were established as a result of increased interest in the languages, folklore, history and literature of Turkish-speaking people.[38]

As mentioned above, Young Turk intellectuals were strongly influenced by Turkism although this ideology was pushed into the background as their movement changed from an intellectual into a

political-pragmatic one.[39] Turkism gained momentum, however, as it became increasingly obvious that Ottomanism had failed to win support among the population. The dissent among the Moslem Albanians, and later the Ottoman Arabs, both encouraged, and was encouraged by, growing national consciousness among the Turks.[40]

By the time the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed, a Turkish identity had developed among a large segment of Anatolian Turks. But this national identification was not yet connected with a defined territory. Turkism was a non-territorial ideology that concerned Turks as an ethnic group. Around the time of WWI, another brand of Turkish nationalism developed which cultivated an attachment to Anatolia as the home of the Turks.[41]

Thus, the territorialization of Turkish nationalism coincided with the loss of what remained of the Empire outside Anatolia and eastern Thrace. By the time of the Mondros Armistice in 1918, which marked the total surrender of the Empire, all the Arab-populated provinces in the Middle East had been occupied by the British and the French. But the disintegration did not stop at this. Western powers continued to expand and started to take action in order to secure good bargaining positions for themselves ahead of the coming peace negotiations. Thus, even Anatolia was being carved up and divided. In 1918, British, French and Italian warships anchored in Istanbul, and the year after, the city was officially occupied by the Allied powers. In 1919, Greek troops began to occupy Izmir and the Aegean region. Italian troops landed in Antalya. The French occupied the province of Adana (Cilicia) in southeastern Anatolia. British forces entered Antep, Birecik, Maras and Urfa in the southeast, Batum and Kars in the northeast and Samsun on the Black Sea coast.[42]

These new conditions on the ground were formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the entente states. According to this treaty, all the Empire's Arab provinces were to be ceded to Great Britain and France. But the losses did not stop at that. Eastern Thrace was to be given to Greece. Izmir and its surroundings would be administered by Greece for five years and thereafter attached to Greece, subject to a plebiscite. An Armenian state was to be established in eastern Anatolia in the provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis. An

autonomous Kurdish region would be established in southeastern Anatolia with the right to appeal for independence to the League of Nations within a year. Italy received western Anatolia as its sphere of influence and France was given control over parts of southern Anatolia.[43]

It was only by taking up arms against the occupying forces that the Turks, together with other Moslem groups in Anatolia, managed to gain control over the territory which makes up present-day Turkey. A nationalist resistance movement, 'the Committee for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli', was formed in 1919 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. In 1920, this resistance movement set up an alternative government in Ankara, thus challenging the legitimacy of the Ottoman government in Istanbul. By 1923, the resistance movement had successfully expelled all occupying forces and taken control of Anatolia. With the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in July the same year, the government in Ankara obtained international recognition of an independent Turkish state. In October, the Republic was proclaimed with Mustafa Kemal as president.[44]

The next step for the new state-building core was to build a nation on the new territory. The state borders did not coincide with either linguistic or religious boundaries. The challenge was how to define a Turkish nation and how to gain the support and loyalty of the population living within the borders. The political elite was faced with the task of moulding the citizens into a Turkish nation and delimiting them from people living on the other sides of the borders and who were, or were to become, part of other nation-building projects. The nationalism that was adopted by the new Republic has been described as a 'state-founding nationalism'.[45] A nationalism had to be defined that could constitute a foundation for the state. The territory was inhabited by many different ethnic groups. By declaring that the new state was based on the principle of civic nationalism, the leadership hoped to achieve unity despite ethnic diversity. Even today, it is laid down in the constitution that '[e]veryone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk'. A Kurd is as much a Turk as any ethnic Turk, while a Turkish Cypriot or a Turkoman from Iraq is, by definition, not a Turk.

National identity, supposedly, stops at the borders and the Turkish state coincides with the Turkish nation.

Ziya Gökalp, one of the ideologists of the nation-building project, wrote in *The Principle of Turkism* in 1920 that nationality had nothing to do with race, ethnicity or consanguinity. It should be noted, however, that Gökalp did not define an ethnic group as a group sharing the same culture. He uses ethnicity to refer to 'a group of cognates descended from a common ancestor and free from any mixture of foreign blood'.[46] If, however, an ethnic nation is defined as a group which shares a common culture (language, literature, traditions, rituals, religion etc.) then Gökalp's definition of a nation would be ethnic rather than civic. A nation, according to Gökalp, is 'composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality and aesthetics'.[47] Since these values are acquired by individuals through education, anyone who has been educated as a Turk belongs to the Turkish nation. We have to 'recognize as a Turk every individual who says "I am a Turk"',[48] concludes Gökalp.

It is often argued that the Turkish nation-building project initially aimed at defining the nation in civic terms, but that ethnic ideas soon came to prevail. There are still divergent ideas on whether Turkishness is an ethnic identity or not.[49] It is clear that Turkish nationalism does not correspond with the idea of a nation defined in civic terms if that is taken to mean that it is culturally neutral. Since the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish language and culture have been imposed on all citizens, maybe with the exception of the non-Moslem minorities. Attempts to homogenize the population have led to marginalization and suppression of other cultural identities than the Turkish. Concerning the role of religion in defining the nation, there is the same discrepancy between official doctrine and practice. Officially, secularism is one of the founding principles of the Republic. Nevertheless, non-Moslems are not considered part of the nation, even if they are Turkish citizens. Thus, both ethnicity and Islam are, in different ways, relevant for marking who belongs to the nation and who does not: 'The new and artificially constructed or "manufactured" Turkish culture was, therefore, open to non-Turkish Muslim groups, who were accepted as members of the

nation and state so long as they were willing to integrate or assimilate culturally and linguistically into Turkish culture.'[50]

Basically, one has to be a Turk and a Moslem to belong to the nation. Non-Turks can, however, become Turks – *provided* that they adopt the Turkish language, identity and culture. Turkish nationalism aims at homogenizing, not by exclusion but by forced inclusion. Non-Turkish Moslems are considered part of the Turkish nation – but only as long as they are willing to assimilate and embrace Turkishness. In practice, ethnicity is thus an important component in the definition of the Turkish nation. Nevertheless, the official state ideology is still that ethnicity is irrelevant in the political landscape of Turkey.[51]

Foreign Policy as Nation-building

During the transformation from Empire to Republic, Ottomanism and pan-Islamism were replaced by nationalism and secularism. The new state identity and the new definition of the nation re-shaped the foreign policy as well. Domestically, the main challenge throughout the history of the Republic has been to unite the large number of different ethnic groups into one nation and create a sense of commonness among them. Turkish foreign policy can be understood as an integral part of that same internal nation-building project. In its external policies, Turkey has been committed to the same principles as those which, domestically, are regarded as constituting the foundation of the state. Turkish foreign policy can be characterized as a continuous reinforcement of the distinction between, on the one hand, Turks, defined as everybody who lives within the borders of the Turkish state and who are Turkish citizens, and on the other hand, non-Turks, that is, people living outside the Turkish borders. A constant reproduction of the domestic-foreign dichotomy is an intrinsic element of every state's foreign policy. But the degree of challenge to this dichotomy varies from state to state as well as over time. In the case of Turkey, the distinction between domestic and foreign is contested because the territorial borders of the state do no coincide with language, ethnicity and possibly not even with feelings of national belonging. Ethnic Turks live in most of Turkey's neighbour states. Bulgaria and Greece have Turkish-speaking minorities. There are the

Turkish Cypriots on Cyprus. In the Caucasus and Central Asia Turkey 'rediscovered' a vast Turkic speaking region after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Iran has a large population of Azeri Turks and a Turkoman minority lives in northern Iraq. In this context, the role of foreign policy practice as a constant maintainer of difference between the citizens of Turkey, and Turkish-speaking populations on the other side of the borders, takes on a greater significance. The framing of the nation in civic-political terms (even if only in theory) is the most obvious way to try to delimit a domestic 'us' in a very mixed ethnical landscape. Apart from the Turkish-speaking populations outside Turkey's borders, there are over 30 different ethnic groups in Turkey.[52] A majority of them might have been fully or partly assimilated into a Turkish identity. The Kurds, however, are still posing a challenge to the official melting-pot ideology. In the east and south east parts of the territory, the majority of the population are Kurds, and Turkey's borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria cut right through a region where the majority of the population are Kurds. This, too, calls for a reinforcement of the existing state borders as dividing lines between nations. The presence of alternative ideas about national belonging gives urgency to the role of foreign policy as a 'boundary-producing political behaviour'.

In order not to blur the distinction between Turks (citizens of the Turkish republic) and non-Turks (citizens of other states), Turkey has usually refrained from supporting Turkish-speaking or Moslem minorities in other countries when they have been in conflict with their governments and/or when public opinion in Turkey has put pressure on the government to act. When, in 1991, Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, there was intense domestic pressure on the government to intervene to protect Bosnia. Many Turks feel cultural, ethnic, historical and religious ties with Bosnia. The government, however, supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and changed its position only when the conflict turned into a war. But even then, Turkey only acted in coordination with the international community and within a multi-lateral framework. When the Soviet Union disintegrated and the question of recognition of what was regarded as the Turkic states in Central Asia became a political issue, Turkey decided to coordinate the recognition process of those states in close cooperation with

Moscow. Both in the Bosnian and in the Central Asian case, Turgut Özal, who was President at the time, tried to appeal to popular feelings of 'ethnic solidarity'. He attempted, for example, to organize a large demonstration to protest against Western policies on Bosnia. He did not, however, gain support for his more ethnically-based policy preferences from the Foreign Ministry and the rest of the government.[53] On the contrary, Turkey remained a supporter of the status quo in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union virtually until they began to collapse. After that, Ankara went on to defend the territorial integrity of successor states.[54]

Some low-key policies have been employed in support of 'ethnic kins' abroad. Humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and to the Turkomans in Iraq, as well as verbal complaints against the treatment of the Turkish-speaking minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, are examples of such policies. In the late 1980s, for example, Turkish officials criticized Bulgaria for denying the ethnic Turks in that country the right to identify themselves as Turks or use their language.[55] By and large, however, Turkish foreign policy has put the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states above the support to people with whom many Turks feel a kinship affinity. This foreign policy is a reflection of the internal ambition to build a homogeneous nation. If ethnicity is dismissed as a politically relevant factor domestically, it can hardly be presented as a guiding principle of external policies. Since foreign policy serves to maintain the nation and the state by reaffirming a difference between the Turkish nation and other nations, foreign policy practices cannot be allowed to contradict the domestic definition of the nation.

As argued above, foreign policy is policy towards what is outside of the state border. This is a less ambiguous task if those who are the foreigners speak a different language, have a different religion, a different identity or if there are any other markers which differentiate them from those inside the border. But if there is as much, or more, difference *within* the state than there is *between* one's own state and the foreign state, it becomes more challenging to reinforce the status of the border as a divider between compatriots and foreigners. Within such a context, an anti-irredentist and status-quo oriented foreign policy has been considered to be in the interest of the Turkish state.

The border separating Turkey from Iraq, and thereby the 'Turkish nation' from the 'Iraqi nation' has a somewhat ambiguous status. It is fragile because of the existence of Kurdish nationalist ambitions. For Kurdish nationalists, it is a border dividing northern Kurdistan from southern Kurdistan, rather than Turkey from Iraq. Its fragility also stems from the way it was established, which has resulted in lingering suspicions about hidden irredentist dreams on the part of Turkey. Today, the Turkish state affirms and defends this border as part of the domestic struggle to make the citizens in the southeastern part of the country identify themselves as members of a Turkish nation, and not as members of a Kurdish nation. In the 1920s, however, when the border was drawn, Turkey disputed its location and the fact that it separated Mosul (today's northern Iraq) from the Turkish republic. According to the National Pact,[56] those parts of the Ottoman Empire in which Turks and Kurds were in a majority formed a whole that should not be divided. When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled following its defeat in World War I, the new leaders accepted the loss of the Arab parts of the Ottoman state and declared that it had no intention of trying to re-build Turkish power in the Middle East. The budding republic was, however, determined to include the province of Mosul as well as the Sanjak of Alexandretta and Antakya (Hatay) into the new nation-state. This aspiration led to a dispute with Britain. The British were determined to make Mosul a part of Iraq. During the peace negotiations in Lausanne, the chief Turkish delegate, Ismet Inönü, refused to abandon the Turkish claim to Mosul and when the peace treaty was signed in 1923 the question was left unsettled. For Turkey, giving up Mosul could have been seen as a failure to achieve the objectives of the National Pact, and between 1923 and 1926 the Mosul question was the dominant issue in Turkish foreign policy. Bilateral negotiations between Turkey and Britain to settle the issue took place in 1924 but failed. Britain referred the question to the League of Nations. In 1925, the Council of the League awarded the province to Iraq. Turkey, which was not a member of the League, did not accept this decision and opposed the Council's right of jurisdiction. The question was then referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which decided that a decision by the Council should be binding. In 1925, the

Council made a unanimous decision in favour of Britain. In the re-opened bilateral negotiations that took place in 1926, Turkey accepted the League's decision. Mosul was given to Iraq. As compensation, Turkey was to receive ten per cent of the oil royalties from the province for the next 25 years. Turkey's only alternative to accepting the deal with Britain would have been to go to war and that was not an option for the war-weary young state.[57] Nevertheless, Mosul had been included in Atatürk's conception of the territory of the Turkish nation-state and it was only reluctantly that Turkey gave it up.[58]

Since the issue was finally settled, Turkey has, at least officially, given up all aspirations to 'reclaim' Mosul. From the Turkish state, it is repeatedly stated that respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring states is the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy, a description which many researchers agree upon as well.[59] But there are also, from time to time, signs of an undercurrent of irredentism in Turkish foreign policy. After the Gulf War in 1991, for example, President Turgut Özal, as well as his successor to the post, Süleyman Demirel, hinted that the border was 'to some extent artificial' and that Mosul and Kirkuk had been taken away from Turkey unjustly.[60] On occasions like these one can discern 'the fragility of the officially proclaimed "defensive nationalism" and the potential for the rise of an offensive nationalism in its stead'.[61] So far, however, the official policy has remained unchanged and the traditional cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy, territorial *status quo*, is still firmly in place.

Danger and Nation-building

Turkey can be described as a state preoccupied with threats to national security. There are fears, more or less well founded, that governments in the West are conspiring to undermine Turkey's territorial integrity, that some neighbours support the PKK,[62] that others, like Armenia, are just awaiting an opportunity to raise territorial claims to Turkish territory or that the US government, despite its reassurances to the contrary, supports Kurdish statehood. Until the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was considered the paramount threat to Turkish security. The end of

the Cold War brought another threat; that in the absence of the Soviet threat, Turkey would lose its strategic value to the West.

The image of constant dangers facing the nation is cultivated by both the military and the political leadership. The perception that Turkey is a nation surrounded by enemies is conveyed to every school child and is a central component of the national curriculum of both primary and secondary education. Since the 1930s, Turkish textbooks have repeatedly said that 'Turks have no friends but other Turks', thus teaching students that they have reason to feel insecure, that they live in a world that is hostile to them, and that they have to be aware of multifold threats, internal as well as external. In the 1980s, 'threat' was introduced as a separate subject matter in fourth and fifth-grade schoolbooks and students are now taught that 'Turkey's geopolitical location' and the world's 'dislike of a strong Turkey' are the main causes of threats to their country. In secondary education, a special course on the role of the military in Turkish history and contemporary politics has been mandatory for high-school students since 1926 (since 1937 for female students) and remains so even today. This course is designed by the General Staff and taught exclusively by military officers. It has had different names in different periods. At present, it is called 'National Security Knowledge'. This course teaches high-school students that they need to be ready to defend Turkey against threats from outside. They also need to defend the 'unity' of Turkey against its enemies, that is, '"divisive" elements that claim to belong to a different "race"'.[63]

In the political and general public discourse, there is a preoccupation with threat, danger and security. In 2001, Turkish newspapers reported that the Turkish General Staff had prepared a new National Security Policy Document, replacing the previous one from 1997. This document came out in the middle of a debate between the then Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz and the military. Yılmaz accused the military of busying itself with internal threats rather than defending the nation against outside threats and argued that the development of democracy and human rights was being held up by 'the national security syndrome'.[64] So what were the main threats to national security? In the public debate, there were suggestions that the severe economic crisis at the time entailed a risk of a social explosion. It was also suggested that

corruption was a major threat: 'Those who are concerned about the preservation of the Republic and the system should realize that under the current corrupt and deficient system everything could fall apart', wrote one journalist.[65] According to the General Staff, however, Islamic fundamentalism and separatism were the two most imminent internal threats to national security.[66].

This debate can serve as an illustration to Buzan's, Waever's and de Wilde's discussion, referred to in the previous chapter, of how a certain issue becomes a security issue. To securitize a phenomenon means to present it as an existential threat to the nation. When that has been done, one can also justify the use of extraordinary measures to handle it. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde also argue that securitization is an inter-subjective process. For something to become a security matter, it is not enough to simply present it as an existential threat; there has to be at least some degree of acceptance as well. If there is not, all that has happened is that a *securitizing move* has been made. Acceptance, according to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, does not necessarily mean that there is no coercion whatsoever. What they claim is that 'the existential threat has to be argued and gain just enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures'.[67] It is not obvious how one could know whether a securitizing move has actually been accepted and whether there is 'enough resonance' or not, at least not in authoritarian states ruled by force. We can assume, however, that if a government tries to present an issue as an existential threat, but the vast majority of the population regard the same issue as harmless, it will be difficult for the government to justify the need for extraordinary measures.

In the domestic debate in Turkey about the new policy document on national security, there were, as we saw, several securitizing moves made. One such move was made by the General Staff, which argued that separatism and Islamic fundamentalism were threats to national security. Another was made by some journalists who wanted to securitize corruption and the prevalent economic crisis. It is not exactly clear whether the Deputy Prime Minister saw the blocking of democratic reforms as a national security threat in itself or if he just saw it as a political problem. Although there are always competing discourses over how to define national identity and over the definition of threats to

the nation, this book focuses on *state* discourse. Even if some degree of consent from the citizens is necessary, state actors argue from a position of strength when it comes to defining security threats. Representatives of the state are thus more likely to be successful in their securitizing moves than other domestic actors. Moreover, as argued in the previous chapter, the international system rests on an assumption about states as safe compounds in an anarchic system in which a 'state-less' person is a person with no belonging in the world. Even if the distinction between a supposedly safe inside and the anarchy outside does not hold up for closer scrutiny, danger is nevertheless instrumental for the reproduction of nation-states. In relation to external threats, the state is usually given the role of the protector of the nation and its individual citizens. When faced with challenges to its identity and the values on which it is based, the state can dismiss alternative values as disruptive threats to domestic stability and, ultimately, to national security, and thus justify its own claim for hegemony.

In Turkey, different values and ideologies such as left-wing radicalism, ethnic Turkish nationalism, separatism and Islamism have been treated as threats to national security. Since the 1980s it is the latter two that have been regarded as the most urgent ones. The separatist threat has different dimensions. One is the military threat to territorial integrity and to the physical safety of Turkish citizens. From the early 1980s to the late 1990s, the armed struggle for an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey resulted in the death of over 30,000 people. Separatism is, however, given a much wider definition in official security discourse than violence and the loss of human life. Non-violent expression of Kurdish identity has also been treated as a state security issue. Kurdish identity is seen as a challenge to the state since, officially, the national identity is non-ethnic and therefore all sub-national identities have been considered divisive. Although, as is often pointed out, many Kurds have been able to reach the highest positions within the state and have, especially after the 1960s, enjoyed significant upward socio-economic mobility, Turkish nationalism has, at the same time, been 'exclusionary toward the Kurdish identity and assimilationist towards the Kurds'.[68]

The reason why Kurdish national identity is treated as a threat to national security is that it presents an alternative to the ideology on

which the state is founded, thereby relativizing this ideology and depriving it of its status of being beyond question. That is also why not only violent acts, but any kind of assertive expression of Kurdish identity, are deemed as dangerous. Kurdish nationalism is not simply an expression of discontent, it is 'a challenge to the very premises on which the Turkish nation-state has been built'.[69]

It is not obvious why the idea of a Kurdish state in what is now northern Iraq is such a threatening prospect unless it is placed in this domestic context. It is by no means inevitable that an independent Kurdish state in the region would increase the likelihood of Turkey's Kurds declaring independence. It has been suggested that the negative ramifications for Turkey of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq might be very limited. If such a state were to get control of the oil wealth in the region (something that Turkey is strongly opposed to), it could become an economically strong actor, which might actually have positive effects on economic development in southeast Turkey. Moreover, the Iraqi Kurds would probably be eager to have good relations with Turkey, which is a powerful neighbour on the doorstep of Europe.[70] The fear of an independent Kurdish state outside Turkey cannot, however, be separated from the fear of 'centrifugal forces' domestically. Or, as one Turkish journalist puts it, in the security perceptions of Turkish state actors, 'there is no real separation between northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey: they are the geographic and ethno-cultural extension of each other'.[71]

4

KURDISH IDENTITY IN THE
TURKISH REPUBLIC

It is the domestic conflict over Kurdish identity that is the main reason for Turkey's involvement in northern Iraq and in the affairs of the Iraqi Kurds. Kurdish resistance and discontent inside Turkey lies behind Ankara's fear of Kurdish self-rule across the border. This chapter describes the tensions and clashes between state ideology and Kurdish identity since the establishment of the Republic. The purpose is to provide a background to the following chapters on Turkish foreign policy towards the Kurdish entity in Iraq in the 1990s and onwards.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the question of whether a Kurdish state will or will not be established is once again on the agenda. When the Ottoman state was disintegrating about a century ago, several options were surfacing concerning the drawing of borders and the making of states. The creation of a Kurdish state in Anatolia was one of the options. Another was to integrate the Kurdish region in southeastern Anatolia (Turkish Kurdistan) with Persia. With the establishment of the Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi states, the discussion of state entities and international boundaries was closed. A century later, the future of the Iraqi state is uncertain and the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq can not be excluded.

In the Ottoman Empire, Iraqi Kurdistan made up the *vilayet* (province) of Mosul. The *vilayets* of Baghdad and of Basra were also part of the Ottoman Empire but were never included in Turkish nationalist aspirations since they were predominantly inhabited by Arabs. In the *vilayet* of Mosel, however, Kurds and

Turkomans formed a majority of the population. Mosul was thus, from the viewpoint of Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish government, a natural part of the lands they aimed to include in the successor state of the Ottoman Empire. Until the dispute between Turkey and Britain over the border between Turkey and Iraq was settled in June 1926, major uncertainty prevailed concerning the future of Mosul. Both the British and the Turks sought to win the support of the Kurds, who were deeply divided amongst themselves. A commission sent to the region by the League of Nations in 1925 concluded that the Kurds in the north of the Mosul *vilayet* (north of the river Greater Zab) were closely connected, in terms of language as well as personal and economic relations, with the Kurds of the *vilayets* of Hakkiyari and Mardin in Turkey. The Kurds living in the southern part of the *vilayet* were, according to the commission, closer to the Kurds of Persia.[1]

Nevertheless, with the establishment of the new border between Turkey and Iraq, the Kurds of Mosul and the Kurds of southeast Turkey ended up in different states and became part of different and separate nation-building projects. However, that did not imply a total cut-off of long-existing links between people in southern Turkey and northern Iraq in terms of economic relations, and feelings of kinship and mutual interest. Events in Iraq have repeatedly affected people north of the border. Expressions of Kurdish nationalism or political gains made by the Iraqi Kurds have encouraged Kurds in Turkey and disturbed Turkish state actors. One of the reasons why the Kemalists were so unwilling to give up Mosul in the 1920s was the fear that Kurdish national feelings across the border would undermine their own policy of Turcification.[2] When talking to journalists in 1923, Kemal Atatürk said that if the British were to set up a Kurdish government in Mosul, the idea might spread to the Kurds in Turkey.[3]

Both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism were born out of the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, Middle Eastern societies were divided along religious and social-economic, rather than ethnic lines. Kurds, as well as Turks, were thought of not as ethnic categories but rather as uneducated, rural people.[4] When the commission from the League of Nations, in 1925, explored ethnic belongings and national identifications in Mosul, its conclusion was that Kurdish

national feelings were not very prevalent. People were divided between nomads and peasants and between different tribes or factions within tribes. Nationalist feelings were only expressed in opposition to external interference or among Kurds in Istanbul or elsewhere, who were no longer in touch with the Kurds in eastern Anatolia.[5]

Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms developed along parallel lines and were shaped by each other and in the same political context. While the construction of an official Turkish nationalism was an integral part of the endeavour to establish and consolidate the nation-state, Kurdish nationalism (among the Kurds in Turkey) was constructed in relation to the oppressive and homogenizing policies of this state. During the twentieth century, the two ideologies developed in relation and often in opposition to one another. The ideology of the Kemalists, built on the concept of unity and indivisibility: 'One state – one nation – one language' became the backbone of official Turkish nationalism. Although this was a strategy for creating a sense of commonness among the ethnically-divided population, the intended result was not achieved. Instead, a series of Kurdish rebellions took place in the 1920s and 1930s.

The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 was the crucial event behind the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925. At this time, there was no clear distinction between Kurdish and Islamic aspects of the resistance to the Kemalist state. Sheikh Said, who was a leader of the Naqshbandi order, was approached by a group of Kurdish nationalists. Being sympathetic to their cause, Sheikh Said blended their national aspirations with Islam and led a rebellion which was framed as a 'holy war', demanding the restoration of the Caliphate. The rebel forces, under the command of Sheikh Said, managed to take control of an area north of Diyarbakir but were soon defeated. Sheikh Said and 47 of the other leaders were executed.[6]

Altogether around 30 Kurdish rebellions took place during the first 15 years of the Republic. The last major uprising was in Dersim in 1937. The people in Dersim were Alevi Kurds. The 60 or so tribes in the region had always resisted control by central authorities. The government in Ankara described the region as lawless and anarchic, ruled by bandits and criminals and thus in need of 'reform'. In 1934, the Resettlement Law had been adopted

by the Parliament. This law aimed at relocating people according to their ethnicity and with the purpose of building a homogeneous nation. The country was divided into three zones and Dersim was placed in the third zone, which comprised regions that were to be evacuated. The Resettlement Law was followed in 1935 by the Tunceli law (Dersim was officially renamed Tunceli in 1935). The Tunceli law gave extraordinary powers to the governor-general to deport and arrest people. A stage of siege was declared a year later. Military units moved into the area. Authorities began collecting guns. Boarding schools were established to educate young people into Turkishness. Local officials who were Kurdish or pro-Kurdish were forcibly moved out of the region.[7]

These measures were not met with a coordinated response from the population of Dersim. The different tribes were deeply divided over how to cope with the state's interventions and reacted separately. Half a dozen of Dersim's tribes decided to put up resistance. The uprising was, like all the previous ones, unsuccessful. In 1937, the leaders of the rebellion were executed. That was, however not the end of the 'cleansing' of Dersim. The following year, another military operation took place in order to impose state authority once and for all. In this operation, 7,954 people were 'removed', most of them killed, and 3,500 were forced to move to other parts of the country.[8] After Dersim, no more rebellions followed. By the late 1930s, it looked as if the state had managed to crush all resistance and establish its presence on the entire territory.

In a case study of the Dersim uprising, Nicole Watts stresses the variable nature of Kurdish rebellions and argues that Kurdish resistance to Turkish state policies should be seen, not so much as a static conflict between two distinctly bounded ethnic groups, but rather as a series of confrontations between a variety of Kurdish groups and an evolving state. While many of the previous Kurdish uprisings had taken place in the borderlands of the Republic, thus potentially challenging the state's territorial integrity, Dersim was different in that is was located well inside Anatolia. Moreover, the Dersim revolt also took place in a different phase of Turkish state-building. While the Republic in the 1920s was a state-in-formation, recovering from more than a decade of war, the Republic of the 1930s was more stable. The 1930s was a time for consolidating the

state and the nation and the authorities turned their attention 'toward the establishment of an "internal border" that would delineate the new nation as cleanly and clearly as the lines that separated it from its neighbours on the map."[9]

Eradicating Backwardness

The builders of the Republic emphasized notions such as science, modern education, rationality and secularism.[10] To them, eastern Anatolia and the Kurds represented tribalism, backwardness and banditry. In order to create the new state, the Kurdish regions had to be cleansed from social structures and individuals who resisted the state's modernizing efforts. In this sense, as McDowall points out, the visions and ideas of the Kemalists were not so different from those of some governments and intellectuals in Europe in the 1930s.[11]

Similar perceptions about the southeast as those prevalent in the early days of state-building are still reflected in official discourse. In 2001, the then Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, linked backwardness, Kurdishness and 'separatist terror' to each other in the following way:

> On the other hand, the link between separatist terror and the backward feudal structures present in South-East Turkey should be taken into consideration. Separatist terror draws its strength mainly from feudal landlords of Kurdish origin. At first glance, this may seem as a contradiction. One might wonder what these extremely wealthy feudal landlords who own tens of villages and exploit landless peasants have in common with separatists and terrorists. However, sharing the same values and concepts, the feudal system and the separatist terror organization have become de facto allies. In order to maintain their existence, both have to protect, preserve and promote feudal values such as "race", "kinship" and "tribal links". In essence, the terrorist movement is based on the principle of race. It is a racist movement; racist, just like the feudal system, like the guardians, beneficiaries of this system.[12]

It has been argued that the denial and exclusion of Kurdish identity was an outcome of the project of building a modern, centralized and secular nation-state, rather than a goal in itself.

According to Andrew Mango, Atatürk directed his energy towards his cultural revolution and had little time for the Kurds.[13] In order to create a 'civilized' and modern state, a number of radical reforms were implemented during Kemal Atatürk's 15-year presidency. The Caliphate was abolished. The religious courts, the dervish orders and the Islamic schools were dissolved. New secular law codes were enforced. Religious brotherhoods, convents and other places of worship were closed. The Gregorian calendar was introduced and the Latin alphabet was adopted in place of the Arabic script. Sunday became the official holiday instead of the Muslim Friday. The traditional head-gear for men, the fez, was prohibited since, according to Atatürk, it was a sign of 'ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred of progress and civilization'.[14] Mesut Yeğen argues that the repression by the central government of Islam, tribal politics and the periphery did not *aim at*, but *led to*, the exclusion of Kurdish identity. In order to enforce the principle of secularism, religious traditions and institutions were abolished and banned and since Kurdish nationalism and the religion of Islam were closely intertwined, the exclusion of Islam resulted in an exclusion of Kurdish national identity. The 'peripheral' economy is another case in point, according to Yeğen. The Republic tried to create a national economy. The new borders between Turkey, Iraq and Syria destroyed the traditional economic networks which had existed in Ottoman Kurdistan and turned 'normal' economic activity into 'smuggling', that is, an illegal act. Yeğen concludes that smuggling conditioned the ethnic identity of the Kurds and that the project of centralization therefore got an ethnic-national content.[15]

From the mid-1920s until the end of the 1980s, the Turkish state acted as if there was no Kurdish element on Turkish territory. But the attempts to erase Kurdish identity were futile. Kurds, as well as other groups who resisted the authoritarian policies emanating from the centre, continued to challenge the state and the Kemalist ideology. A domestic community of solidarity had stubbornly refused to emerge. The clearest sign of the persistence of opposition (whether ethnic, religious, right- or left-wing) is the three military interventions which took place in 1960, 1971 and 1980 respectively. The military coup in 1980 was a response to the political turmoil that erupted in the 1970s when extremist groups

on the left and the Grey Wolves and fundamentalists on the right fought in the streets and on campuses. In 1979, between 1,200 and 1,500 people had been killed.[16]

The Southeast Becomes a Battleground

After the military coup in 1980, the suppressions of the Kurds intensified. Obviously, the draconian measures introduced after the coup affected everyone. As soon as the armed forces had taken over political power, they declared a state of emergency throughout the country. Leaders of the political parties were arrested. The parliament was dissolved. Even mayors and municipal councils were dismissed. Over a hundred thousand people were arrested.[17] The Kurdish population was particularly targeted by new laws that banned the use of Kurdish. It was prohibited to give children names which 'contradict the national culture, morality and traditions and insult the public', that is, Kurdish names.[18] Despite, or maybe because of the increased oppression, Kurdish nationalism grew in strength in eastern Anatolia in the early 1980s and the PKK gradually expanded from a small group of activists and sympathizers into a mass movement. It was when he was a student at Ankara University during the turbulent years of the 1970s that Abdullah Öcalan, inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology, developed his ideas about a struggle for an independent, socialist Kurdistan. In 1978, after having returned to the southeast from where he came, Öcalan founded the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).[19] In 1980, he and other PKK leaders managed to escape the military rule in Turkey and move to Syria, where, with help of the Syrian government, they set up camps to train guerilla fighters. When the Iraq-Iran War started in 1982, Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gave permission to the PKK to operate in northern Iraq as well. The PKK thus had two routes of infiltration into Turkey, one direct from Syria and one from northern Iraq.[20] In 1984, the PKK started its attacks in the southeast, and during the 15 years that followed, until Öcalan was captured in 1999, the PKK and the Turkish armed forces were involved in a violent conflict that left around 30,000 people dead.

One of the first tactics used by the state against the insurgents was to arm and pay villagers to fight against the PKK. In the villages along the Iraqi border, the village guard system was used to cut off PKK access and supply routes. The logistical problems of defending this remote and mountainous area spoke in favour of equipping the villagers with weapons and letting them defend themselves. This system, however, led to escalated violence. The PKK tried to intimidate the villagers by ruthless massacres, not only of the village guards themselves but often of their whole families, children included. The village guards found themselves in a situation in which keeping their weapons would make them targets for PKK killings while, on the other hand, to surrender them was not a guarantee against PKK reprisals. Also, those who refused to join the systems were often suspected by the state of being loyal to the PKK. To prevent the PKK from using villages near to the borders with Iraq and Iran, the military began evacuating and burning many of them. By 1996, around 3,000 villages had been evacuated.[21]

Even if the state tried to keep up the fiction that Turkey was attacked from across the border, it became increasingly clear that the PKK had strong support among the local population and was recruiting from inside Turkey. According to Erik Zürcher, the army was then faced with the classic guerrilla situation and, like many armies in this position, it vented its anger and frustration on the local civilians.[22] Mass arrests, beatings and torture became commonplace and targeted not only PKK guerillas but anyone who was suspected of being a collaborator. It has been argued, and it seems undeniable, that this hard-line policy and the cruelties committed were counter productive and only served to radicalize the Kurdish population and fuel Kurdish nationalism.[23]

Despite the lack of success in combating the PKK, successive governments continued to seek a military solution and declared repeatedly that a political solution could not be contemplated until the PKK was crushed by military force. The only major politician who advocated a more liberal policy was Turgut Özal (Prime Minister 1983–1989; President 1989–1993). Özal tried to reform the rigid attitude of the state and to introduce a radical political change. In 1991, he lifted the ban on the Kurdish language and made it legal to speak Kurdish. He was also open to finding a

political (instead of a military) solution to the conflict in the southeast and believed in a dialogue with the PKK and other pro-Kurdish parties.[24] When, in 1991, Abdullah Öcalan declared that he was willing to give up the goal of an independent state and favour a federal solution instead, Özal responded by saying that he was willing to at least talk about a federal system. He also argued that the PKK should be recognized as a political actor and be allowed to participate in the political system.[25] Özal's sudden death of a heart-attack in 1993 put an end to the attempts at a more liberal policy, since neither Süleyman Demirel who replaced him as President, nor other political leaders were prepared to take any major steps in the direction pointed out by Özal. There were, from time to time, statements from leading politicians such as Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz and Süleyman Demirel, advocating cultural rights for Kurds and a political solution to the violence in the southeast. These few and temporary deviations from the official line were always opposed by the military, other state actors and hardliners within their own political parties.

Recognition of the 'Kurdish Reality'

Nevertheless, in the 1990s it became clear that a change was taking place on a discursive level. A complete denial of Kurdish identity was no longer possible. Until the early 1990s, all references to Kurds were avoided in official documents or in the media. It was unusual to use even such terms as 'Turk of Kurdish origin' or 'Turkish Kurd'. A study carried out by Murat Somer of a mainstream Turkish daily has shown how a change took place mainly during 1991 and 1992. In 1984 and 1985, a total of 25 articles were published that related to ethnic Kurds in Turkey. Of these, only three used the word Kurd. In 1991 and 1992, 658 articles were published that related to Kurds and 304 of them used the word Kurds. At this time, the 'Kurdish reality' began to be recognized. Prior to the 1990s, the term Kurd was, however, used relatively freely in reference to Kurds outside Turkey, such as 'Iraqi Kurdish leaders'. The question is how such a change could take place in such a short time. One of the conclusions of Somer's study is that it could take place because people accepted Kurdishness on a private and individual level. What had previously

prevented the recognition of the Kurdish category were norms against expressing Kurdish identity on a political level, on the grounds that it could lead to a 'stirring up of ethnic-religious divisions', but the Gulf war and the development in Iraq in 1991–92 had made it impossible to ignore the Kurdish category.[26]

The violence in the Kurdish region seemed to have come to an end after Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999. In October 1998, a crisis erupted between Turkey and Syria when Turkey demanded the immediate expulsion of Öcalan from Syria and the termination of Syrian support to the PKK. As both states mobilized on each side of the border and a war looked increasingly more likely, mediation let to an agreement in which Syria agreed to cease all aid to the PKK. On the same day as the agreement was signed, it was announced that Öcalan was no longer in Syria.[27] He had been in Russia for a week and from Russia he went first to Europe and then Africa, seeking asylum in a number of countries. He was finally captured by Turkish security forced in Kenya in February 1999. Following Öcalan's arrest and imprisonment, the PKK announced that it had given up its armed struggle and scaled down its goal from wanting a separate state to settling for cultural rights within Turkey.[28] After the PKK cease-fire, a period of relative peace began in the southeast. The state of emergency which had been declared in 1987 was lifted in the last remaining provinces in November 2002.

These promising developments coincided with two other significant events. One was a new impetus in the relations between Turkey and the European Union. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the EU gave Turkey candidate status, and this set off a reform process aimed at preparing Turkey for membership. The other event was the landslide victory of the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party, AKP, in the national elections in November 2002. AKP, an off-shoot of the Islamic Welfare party, which was banned in 1997, won 34.4 percent of the votes and 363 out of 550 seats in parliament and could thus form a single-party government.

The AK party approached the Kurdish question with a softer approach than the military and the previous rigidly secular governments. One of the reasons for the victory of the AKP was that it was perceived as an anti-establishment party. In the election

campaign in the Kurdish-populated regions, it also stressed its opposition to the official state ideology and tried to appeal to the Kurds by pointing out that both Kurds and Islamic groups had been marginalized and oppressed by the Kemalist state ideology and the military.[29]

As soon as the new government came into power, it started to work on a very ambitious and radical reform program to meet the membership criteria of the European Union. Many of the reforms that the EU calls for are directly related to the Kurdish issue, and the strongest support in Turkey for joining the Union is found among the Kurdish population. A scientific survey carried out in 2002 showed that a majority of Turks were in favour of EU membership. Answering the question: 'If there were to be a referendum about Turkey's full membership to the EU, would you vote in favour of or against full membership?', 64 percent answered that they would vote in favour. Among those who indicated that they could speak Kurdish and among those who voted for the pro-Kurdish party HADEP, the support was significantly above the average. In the eastern and southeastern provinces, 72 percent of the respondents were in favour of EU membership.[30] Many Kurds have high expectations of the EU and hope that the accession process will put strong pressure on the Turkish state to implement democratic reforms and fully respect human rights.

The democratic conditionality applied by the EU has, indeed, resulted in a number of important legislative reforms, some of which are of particular relevance to the Kurdish population. First of all, the role of the National Security Council (NSC) has been reduced. The NSC is a constitutional body which has served as the channel for the military's influence on political decision-making. Consisting of representatives of both the government and the military, it has been described as 'the institution that really runs the country'.[31] In a political culture where a wide range of issues are being securitized, its jurisdiction has covered almost any area from television station broadcasting hours to stating the substance of laws on terror and capital punishment.[32] Since more or less every expression of Kurdish identity is treated as matter of national security, the NSC has been the key actor in defining Turkey's policy towards the Kurds.[33] Considering the powerful role of the

military in Turkey, the restriction of its powers and the strengthening of civilian control over previously military domains is quite remarkable. In order to meet the requirements stipulated by the EU, the NSC has been transformed from an executive to an advisory body and civilian control of it has increased. It is still too early to evaluate the effects of these reforms. Even if the role of the NSC as a political decision-making body has been restricted, the military still has extensive powers.

Concerning cultural rights, legislative changes were introduced in 2002 allowing for broadcasting in, and the teaching of, Kurdish. A new paragraph was added to the Broadcasting Law saying that 'broadcasts can be made in various languages and dialects Turkish citizens use in everyday life. These broadcasts must not contravene the principles of the republic and the indivisible unity of territory and nation as laid down in the constitution'.[34] Strict time limits were set for these programs. For television it was four hours per week, not exceeding 45 minutes per day. Initially, there was a requirement, which was later removed, that the presenters should wear 'modern clothing'. Programs for children are not allowed. The High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK) which supervises broadcasting in Kurdish, has frequently imposed fines or has suspended or cancelled the license of TV stations. A local TV channel in Diyarbakir was closed for having broadcast two Kurdish love songs, on the grounds that it had thereby violated the principle of the indivisible unity of territory and nation. During the first two years after the new law was passed, only private TV and radio stations broadcast in Kurdish. The state television, TRT, did not broadcast its first programs in Kurdish until June 2004. A new regulation has also made it possible to offer private courses in Kurdish. Only people older than 15 years who have completed basic education are allowed to attend. There are also restrictions concerning the curriculum, the appointment of teachers, the timetable and the attendees. Despite these restrictive regulations, six schools began giving courses in Kurdish in 2004.[35]

The reluctance of Turkish authorities to implement these new regulations shows how firm the opposition still is against cultural diversity and the extent to which Kurdish identity is still being securitized. It remains to be seen what the result of these reforms will be and what importance to ascribe to them. While some

describe them as merely 'cosmetic',[36] others call them 'major steps forward'.[37]

Another question is how far-reaching the demands of the Kurds will be. The European Union has so far accepted that Ankara is not willing to give formal minority status to any other group than Greeks, Jews and Armenians who, as non-Moslems, were recognized as minorities in the Lausanne Treaty. Time will tell whether further democratization and full respect for civil liberties will satisfy the Turkish Kurds or whether they will demand recognized minority status or even some kind of federal state model. Some Kurds say that they want to be equal citizens and not be defined as a minority. The massive oppression of all cultural, civic and political demands labelled as pro-Kurdish means that Kurdish groups have had limited opportunities to openly deliberate and declare political aspirations and agendas. Since it is forbidden to establish political parties on the basis of ethnicity, explicitly 'Kurdish parties' do not exist, but there are parties that can be defined as pro-Kurdish. These have frequently been banned – only to be resurrected some time later under a different name. During the 1990s, six pro-Kurdish parties have been closed down and many of its leaders and supporters have been harassed or imprisoned. Pro-Kurdish parties have regularly been accused of being the PKK's political arm, but even very moderate parties that have maintained a distance from the PKK and advocated solutions to the Kurdish problem within the borders of the republic have been closed down. Although some reforms have been introduced since 1999 with the purpose of making it more difficult for the state to close down political parties, freedom of association is still very restricted in Turkey. Even though Kurds are represented in all political parties from left- to right-wing and from secular to pro-Islamic, there is still a problem of exclusion caused by the 10-percent threshold in national elections. This means that some parties with strong regional support in the southeast have not been able to enter parliament. In the 1995 elections, the pro-Kurdish HADEP won 20 percent of the votes in eight of the 18 provinces in the east and southeast. In Diyarbakir and Hakkari it received around 50 percent. However, it was not successful in western Turkey and was therefore not able to win any seats in parliament.[38]

Success and Disappointment

A major step towards Turkish EU membership was taken in December 2004, when Ankara was given a date for the opening of accession negotiations. The EU Commission concluded that Turkey had implemented the required reforms and thus fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. The initial euphoria over this achievement faded, however, when new obstacles loomed up on the horizon. Opposition to Turkish membership began to be expressed more loudly and more frequently in Europe. Added conditions, for example to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, were imposed on Ankara. Conservative and nationalist groups had all along resisted the reforms that were undertaken, but when the prospect of EU membership seemed slimmer, the criticism became more intense. In 2005, the reform process slowed down considerably. The year before, the PKK had broken its unilateral cease-fire and taken up arms again. A rise of Turkish nationalism in combination with an increased number of PKK attacks led to a deterioration of the situation in the southeast. In a speech in Diyarbakir in 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan promised to handle the Kurdish question with increased democracy rather than military force. This statement was received with enthusiasm among the Kurds and the PKK announced a one-month cease-fire. But the peace was short-lived. The AK party government was under pressure from the military not to give in to 'the terrorists' and later Erdoğan switched to a different language, declaring that 'the security forces will intervene against the pawns of terrorism, no matter if they are women or children'.[39] The government has also been unwilling to lower the 10-percent threshold for entering the parliament, which means that a large proportion of the population is deprived of representation at national level. One obvious risk involved in excluding a large number of Kurds is that it might lead to a radicalization of Kurdish nationalism.

Compatible Identities

It is important to remember that Kurds do not constitute a monolithic group either in terms of political interests or in terms

of identification. The levels of ethnic or national identification vary and so does the level of integration with the Turkish majority population. Many Kurds carry multiple identities. Some identify themselves as Turks whereas others have a Kurdish identity which is defined in opposition to being Turkish. Linguistically, they speak different dialects that are as different from each other grammatically as English and German. Religiously, they are divided into Sunni, Shiia, Alevi and Yezidi. Some live within traditional, tribal structures and others are urbanized.[40] Bruinessen uses the concept of 'potential Kurds' to illustrate that an individual can be a Kurd in varying degrees. Besides those who actually speak Kurdish, there are those who have parents (one or both) who speak Kurdish, there are those have one or more grandparent/s who speak Kurdish and there are those who have more distant ancestors who speak Kurdish. Those 'peripheral Kurds' might choose either to emphasize or to suppress their Kurdishness.[41] Given that collective identities are constructed and changeable, neither Kurdish nor Turkish identities are fixed or static categories. Of crucial importance is whether Turkishness and Kurdishness will develop in the direction of compatible or rival identities.[42] The long period of violent conflict and the hard-line policy adopted since the early 1980s might have led to a hardening of both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism and to an increased tendency to interpret Kurdish and Turkish identity as mutually exclusive categories. According to Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, Turkey has become more ethnically polarized and the Kurdish problem has shifted from the military to the social and political spheres. 'It is not the Turkish state that is confronting the Kurds any longer, but Turks and Kurds confronting each other'.[43] That statement seems to be somewhat contradicted by a recent study on intermarriage between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Although the rate of intermarriage between Kurds and Turks is low, the study shows that the tendency for Turks and Kurds to marry within their own ethnic group (defined by mother tongue) decreased significantly between the early 1960s and the late 1990s. This would indicate that Kurds and Turks have actually grown together somewhat, despite the conflict in the southeast. The study also showed that Kurds intermarry more often than Turks. Almost 10 percent of the married Kurds had a non-Kurdish partner, 8.4

percent of whom were Turks. In Ankara and the larger cities, almost a quarter of the married Kurds had a Turkish partner. It is also worth noticing that although most Kurds do not intermarry with Turks, many of them do not intermarry with non-related Kurds either. In 39.2 of marriages between Kurds, there was also a blood relationship.[44]

The connection between Turkey's domestic problems over Kurdish identity and the developments in northern Iraq can be further problematized if one considers the complexities of ethnic identities. The assumption that Kurdish statehood in northern Iraq is a threat to Turkey since it will fuel separatism in Turkey is, argues Murat Somer, based on a number of presumptions about ethnicity that all need critical evaluation. One such presumption is that Kurdish identity is monolithic all across Turkey and northern Iraq and that, if a Kurdish state in northern Iraq is established, Turkish Kurds would identify more with their Kurdish identity than alternative identities such as class or religious, regional or Turkish national identity. Another presumption behind the idea that Kurdish statehood in northern Iraq is a threat to Turkey is that the Iraqi Kurds would support secessionism in Turkey, which implies that they would be more interested in uniting with their 'ethnic brothers' than in having peace and cooperation with Turkey.[45] Thus, in one sense, Turkish foreign-policy makers who presuppose that Kurdish statehood in Iraq will automatically spread across the border base their fear on an assumption that Kurdish identity is the primary identity for many Turkish Kurds. At the same time, as we will see in the next chapter, the idea that Kurds in Turkey have a strong ethnic identity is firmly rejected in the official foreign-policy discourse.

5

NATION-BUILDING AND DISCOURSE ON DANGER

The conclusions from chapters two and three were that foreign policy can serve as a tool for nation-building and that danger can be instrumental in reproducing the nation. Moreover, danger is not an objective phenomenon; it exists only in relation to the subject that is being threatened. Wearing a headscarf is considered a threat by the Turkish state. *Not* wearing a headscarf is considered a threat by the Iranian state. The reason is obviously that Turkey identifies itself as a secular state, while the Iranian state identifies itself as an Islamic state. Identifying threats to the nation is thus a matter of defining something as a threat to an 'us', thereby, 'contributing to the construction or reproduction of "us".'[1] Consequently, when state actors define something as a danger for the state, they are also bound to express the identity of the state: its values and state-carrying ideology.

This chapter will describe how foreign-policy discourse can serve the purpose of reaffirming national identity. What is discussed here is national identity *as defined by the state* (which does not necessarily correspond with how individuals actually identify themselves). In that sense, national identity equals the idea on which the state is founded. Moreover, it is not foreign-policy discourse in general that will be analyzed but discourse on danger. While assuming that the identification of threats to a nation can play a crucial role in consolidating the state and its political identity, we will analyze Ankara's foreign-policy discourse on terrorism. The Kurdish question is treated as a terrorist issue by the Turkish state and the official terrorist discourse can therefore

expose the state's perception of both the PKK's armed struggle and the Kurdish question in general. The chapter aims at understanding the mental maps that guide Turkish policy makers and at exploring the underlying perceptions behind Turkey's foreign policy towards the Kurdish self-rule region in northern Iraq.

Terrorism is a concept that states reserve for what they consider to be the most vicious of all dangers facing the nation. Acts of violence that are interpreted as acts of terrorism are considered dangerous, not only because of the violence *per se*, but because they are regarded as threats to a way of life or to some fundamental national values. When something is defined as terrorism by a state, it is presented as a threat not only to the potential individual victims but to the nation as a whole. That is why discourse on terrorism can unveil the ideology and the fundamental values underpinning a certain state project. Of interest in this chapter is how terrorism is defined and understood in a Turkish political context. In order to understand the perspective of the foreign-policy makers who are taken to represent the Turkish state, texts published on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have been chosen for this analysis of state discourse. On its website, the MFA provides an extensive description of terrorism; what it is, the roots of the problem, the solutions and so on. In addition to the texts from the MFA, one chapter in a book on Turkish foreign policy by former (1997–2002) Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, is also included in the discourse. This chapter is called 'Nothing can justify terrorism'. The contents of the MFA webpage changes from time to time. The texts used in this chapter were accessed in November 2001 and consist of everything that was published on the website under the headline 'Terrorism', which, when printed, amounts to around 200 pages.[2] Thus the selection of texts is not based on any theoretical definition of terrorism but on what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs places in that category. (Likewise, when the concept 'terrorist' is used in this chapter it merely reflects the MFA's use of the term.) As it turned out, all the texts found under the heading 'terrorism' were concerned with the PKK, separatism and the Kurdish question. No other issues were referred to, either by the Foreign Minister or by the MFA.[3] There was no mention of

'terrorist threats' from Islamists, left-wing extremists, ultra nationalists or any other group.

The 200 pages from the Foreign Ministry's webpage and the chapter from Cem's book make up the discourse which will be analyzed. When treating a body of text as discourse, the issue is not primarily to evaluate whether the content is true or real. Neither is it studied merely as empty verbal ornamentation which either precedes or follows 'real' acts. The text is regarded as an act in its own right which frames and gives a specific meaning to reality. The way reality is perceived and understood sets the limits for what kinds of decisions and policies will be considered adequate, legitimate or even possible. Foreign-policy discourse can thus be seen as an attempt to control reality by describing it. To the extent that the official discourse will dominate over alternative discourses, it can reinforce the existing domestic order and undermine alternative orders. Whether consciously or not, the MFA attempts, by defining and describing the threats to the nation, to establish hegemony for one specific definition of national identity, at the expense of others.

How then, more specifically, can foreign policy discourse on danger serve to maintain and defend a certain state identity? In an analysis of security and US foreign-policy discourse, political scientist David Campbell found that:

a) Contrary to what one might expect, assessments of threat regularly began with reflections on culture, ideology and on the US society in general, that is, on issues 'that more traditional analyses might regard as epiphenomenal'.[4] There was in the discourse a constant reaffirmation of the character of US society', which served to frame and maintain a certain identity and domestic order.[5]

b) One important characteristic of US foreign-policy discourse consisted of the attempts to create homogeneity inside by concealing differences *within*, and transforming them into differences *between*.[6]

c) Thirdly, individuals and groups who challenged the domestic order, or, with Campbell's words; 'resistant elements to a secure

identity on the inside', were linked 'with threats identified and located on the outside'.[7]

The description of the Turkish state's discourse on terrorism will follow the three discursive practices described by Campbell: a) *Reaffirming the character of the domestic society*, b) *Creating homogeneity inside* and c) *Externalizing danger*. Unless something else is explicitly indicated, all quotes in the chapter are from the official webpage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[8]

Reaffirming the Character of the Turkish Society

Turkish official discourse on terrorism is, not surprisingly, concerned with assessing conventional and concrete threats and dangers to which Turkey and its citizens are exposed. Destruction of infrastructure and public equipment, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and human smuggling, organized crime activities, abduction of children and the like are described over several pages. These activities are said to be 'a serious threat to law and order', they 'frighten tourists' and 'embarrass the Turkish government'. They are 'designed to make the region uninhabitable', they are 'weakening the Turkish economy and tarnishing its image', they cause 'material damage', and they threaten to undermine political stability. Another issue discussed is the loss of human life. There are lists of the number of people who have been killed by the PKK, usually divided into different categories: civilian casualties, security forces, public servants, village guards, diplomats and other Turkish nationals who have been assassinated when posted abroad. During a period of 15 years '[m]ore than 5,000 civilians, mostly of Kurdish origin, have been massacred by the terrorists'.

Besides these accounts of more obvious dangers and damage, the discourse is also preoccupied with describing the Turkish society and its ethnic composition – phenomena which do not have any obvious links to the terrorist issue, especially since the existence of any connection between terrorism and the question of Kurdish identity is completely rejected. The fact that these descriptions are part of the discourse indicates, however, that a connection is indeed made between national identity issues and terrorism. Even if it is not explicitly stated that the ideology of the

terrorists threatens the political identity of the state, it is made clear that the terrorists stand for values that are the opposite of the values of the Turkish state. This, in itself, seems to constitute a threat. Sometimes all that is needed to create the perception of a threat is the existence of an alternative identity or an alternative understanding of reality. The mere presence of such an alternative 'exemplifies that different identities are possible, and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be *the* true identity'.[9] Thus, *the* one true identity is reaffirmed and defended in the discourse. This is done by describing the character of the Turkish nation and by rejecting the values that the terrorist are said to promote: racism, ethnic nationalism, and the idea that there exists a Kurdish people that is different from the Turkish people.

It is repeatedly emphasized by the MFA that Turkey is a melting pot and that the 'centuries-long shared way of life' has created a common Turkish identity. The people of Anatolia have a common past. They have fought together in the War of Independence. They have intermarried. The interconnectedness between various ethnic groups is emphasized to the point of saying that it is impossible to determine, for example, if someone is Kurdish or not:

> It is even scientifically impossible to separate people who have lived in a country that for thousands of years has been invaded by various tribes; a country that has seen many civilizations and has been a home for people of different languages, religions and roots. These people are like the sugar in a cup of tea. They have lived together for centuries and are now so intermingled that it is impossible to segregate them.

The image emerging is that of a people whose ethnic differences have completely dissolved and blended into one common, homogeneous Homo Turkus, as it were. As opposed to this, the PKK, allegedly, claims 'that the Kurds in Turkey are of a different race'.

Although the various ethnic groups are said to have melted into one common Turkish identity, it is at the same time recognized that a multitude of different ethnic identities exist in Turkey and they are all accepted and acknowledged. Ethnic belonging is, however, according to this discourse, a private matter and not the concern of the state. Turkey is described as a melting pot, proud of

its great ethnic, cultural and religious heritage. However, the state is envisaged as a unitary structure which does not categorize its citizens along ethnic lines. 'Ethnicity is not a factor in the political geography of Turkey'. Constitutional citizenship is presented as a key concept. The constitutional order in Turkey rejects the allegation that there is such a thing as a separate 'Kurdish people' in Turkey, apart from the 'Turkish people'. The term Turkish refers to being a Turkish citizen and does not, supposedly, reflect ethnicity. Turkish democracy is based on 'nationalism of citizenship'. In opposition to this, it is claimed, the aim of the PKK is to create a model of 'ethnic nationalism'. Ethnic nationalism is rejected because it 'is based on the exclusion of other ethnicities'. Nationalism of citizenship, on the other hand, gives the citizens a supra-ethnic identity, at the same time as it does not reject the ethnic identities of individuals.

> Constitutional citizenship is one of the principles upon which the Turkish state was founded. The Turkish Constitution stipulates that the State and the Nation are indivisible, and that all citizens irrespective of their ethnic, racial or religious origin, are equal before the law.

The questions of minorities are also discussed. It is stated that the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the founding document of the Republic, viewed all Moslems in the newly established state as a whole. The status of minority in the legal sense was reserved for Christians and Jews and was designed to protect their religious rights. The term minority has thus always had this particular meaning in the Republic. It is a status reserved for Greeks, Armenians and Jews. That any part of the Moslem population should be viewed as a minority is said to be 'simply alien' in the Turkish context. The 'Turkish citizens of Kurdish descent' do not constitute a separate community:

> Our citizens of Kurdish ethnic origin are not discriminated against and they feel themselves to be equal members of society. Many have risen to the highest positions in the Republic. They share the same opportunities and the same destiny as the rest of the population.

One may wonder why it is considered relevant to have elaborate declarations about citizenship and national identity in documents dealing with terrorism and state security. One reason might be that the descriptions of the concepts of state and nation are raised as a reaction to frequent claims, especially by Kurds themselves, but also by many others, that PKK terrorism is caused by the Turkish state's oppression of Kurds and a denial of the existence of a Kurdish identity. Explaining the basic values that underpin the Republic might be a defensive response to those accusations. That cannot, however, fully account for the rather lengthy discussions of constitutional and ethnic questions. The connection that is not made explicit between, on the one hand, PKK terrorism and, on the other hand, the value base of the Turkish state, is that the PKK is regarded as a threat to this very value base, that is, the ideological foundation of the Republic. This is sometimes hinted at. The PKK, for example, is said to be trying to 'persuade those citizens of Turkey who are of Kurdish origin and the State of Turkey, to accept the "ethnic nationalism" approach and solutions based on this approach by means of a terrorist campaign'. Thus, terrorism is threatening the melting-pot ideology and the principle of constitutional citizenship and it is in opposition to this 'terrorist ideology' that the state and its political identity are constituted.

Since this discourse is about terrorism and since terrorism refers to the 'separatist-terrorist' activities of the PKK, one would expect that a possible break-up of the country and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the southeast would be the main themes in those texts. The MFA has no doubts about the ultimate goal of the PKK: It seeks the destruction of Turkey's territorial integrity, a division of Turkey along ethnic lines and the establishment of a Kurdish state in the southeast.

One of the most striking aspects of this discourse, however, is the total absence of discussion about the risk of a separation. Even though separatism is defined as one of the most serious threats to the state, the risk that such a split will actually take place is hardly mentioned. And when mentioned, it is in fact dismissed. The MFA declares explicitly that a separate Kurdish state in the southeast is 'wholly unrealistic' and that the people there do not even aspire for statehood anyhow:

Öcalan has himself now accepted that since more than half the Turkish people of Kurdish origin live outside the South-East region, and since half of the people in that region are not of Kurdish origin, the idea of a separate state is wholly unrealistic even if there was such a desire among the people for such a state, which there is not.

Elsewhere it is claimed that the PKK has said that it wants to take over the whole of Turkey and destroy all the existing political parties. Again, however, any such danger is dismissed: 'Needless to say, this terrorist activity has been completely unsuccessful.'

Thus, the state itself explicitly rules out the secession threat. At the same time, the policy in northern Iraq is described as 'legitimate self-defense for its territorial integrity'. The policy is thus justified by the claim that it is defending Turkey against a risk that elsewhere in the same discourse is dismissed.

There are two different ways of interpreting this paradoxical reasoning. One is that there is indeed a fear of a break-up of the territory but that the issue is considered too dangerous to even acknowledge. Instead, it has to be played down and ignored. The other is that Turkish foreign-policy makers do not seriously think that there is any risk of a break-up, but that the presence of danger serves the purpose of consolidating state identity. In the face of a perceived danger for the nation, people will identify even more strongly with the state. This will only happen, of course, if the mass of the population identify with the state in the first place. If discourse is understood as a way of describing reality in a certain way in order to make it materialize, then it is clear from this discourse on terrorism that it tries to reinforce the idea of a united Turkish nation, threatened by a small group of criminal terrorists. If the state can gain power over how danger should be understood and interpreted, the existence of danger will reaffirm the state identity. Another pre-condition is that the inside/outside difference is maintained. In order to enhance national unity, danger must be located in the external realm and be presented as a threat to the whole nation.

Creating Homogeneity Inside

A second discursive practice that can serve to reproduce state identity is to locate difference as existing *between* states instead of *within* the domestic society. In this discourse on terrorism, division between Turkishness and Kurdishness inside Turkey is firmly denied and transformed into inter-state differences. Energetic efforts are made to undermine all ideas of pan-Kurdishness or a trans-national Kurdish identity that would blur the boundaries of the state. The idea of a trans-national Kurdish identity is dismissed as being both unrealistic and a non-existent phenomenon.

The primary message in the texts from the MFA is that there is no such thing as an internal Kurdish problem in Turkey. It is repeatedly stated that PKK terrorism is neither an expression of an ethnic conflict, nor the result of any oppression of the Kurdish population. It is persistently denied that terrorism has any links with the Kurdish issue: 'The point, which is of cardinal importance, is distinguishing between militant Kurdish separatism which resorts systematically to terrorism, and the wider phenomenon of Kurdish ethnicity.'

The PKK is said to represent only 'a small minority of extremist individuals'. It is emphasized that the 'PKK does not enjoy the support of the people of the region' and that the organization is not, by any means, representative of Kurds living in Turkey. All links between terrorism on the one hand, and Kurdish ethnicity or Kurdish discontent on the other hand, is rejected. 'The problem of PKK is purely of a terrorist nature.' By ruling out the existence of any such connection, it is also made clear that an internal ethnic conflict is not, and cannot, be the explanation why terrorism exists in Turkey.

The PKK, we learn, consists of 'a handful of ethnic activist entrepreneurs'. By that description, the PKK members are singled out as deviant cases, isolated from the society at large. Terrorism is disconnected from the domestic political order in Turkey. The PKK rebels are labelled as 'ethnic activist entrepreneurs' since they, allegedly, use terrorism in order to try to 'develop a new identity for their group'. The PKK is thus not a *result* of an ethnic reality, instead it is an organization which tries to *create* and *politicize* an ethnic identity. This reinforces once again that PKK terrorism

is neither provoked by, nor a reflection of, any internal domestic ethnic conflict in Turkish society. Such a conflict – in order to occur - would have to be created first.

In this discourse, there is also reference to the elections in 1995, which are used to prove that there is no widespread Kurdish discontent with the Turkish state. One of the parties that took part in that election was HADEP, a pro-Kurdish party. According to the MFA, the PKK presented the election as a referendum in which the 'ethnic nationalism' of the PKK would be tested against the prevailing 'nationalism of citizenship'. The result was that HADEP could only receive 1/7 of the votes of all Kurdish-origin citizens of Turkey; 6/7 of them voted for other parties. 'This proves that the citizens of Kurdish origin in Turkey reject ethnic nationalism.' Thus, once again, it is underlined that the idea of a unitary nation without ethnic division has indisputable support among the whole population, the Kurds included.

The number of potential PKK members and sympathizers is a sensitive issue. A large numbers of followers would indicate widespread discontent within the nation and a lack of domestic homogeneity.[10] As long as it can be maintained that the separatists constitute an insignificant group of terrorists with very limited support, it can also be denied that there is an ethnic division within the Turkish nation. That is probably why both the Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister Cem repeatedly claim that there are very few PKK followers. As seen above, the MFA talks about a 'handful' of activists, or about 'a small minority of extremist individuals'. Cem talks about four to six thousand terrorists and separatists.[11]

Since the existence of any conflicts or differences between ethnic groups is rejected, what is then the explanation why some people join the PKK? That cultural and political discrimination make people join the 'terrorist organization' is excluded, since the existence of any cultural or political discrimination in Turkey is denied.

> [C]ontrary to the allegations of the PKK, the Kurdish identity in Turkey is not being rejected. The only thing that is rejected is the approach 'that there is a separate 'Kurdish people' in Turkey apart from the 'Turkish people'. Apart from that, 'no one in Turkey is

punished or ostracized when they label themselves as Kurds or when they speak Kurdish.' Similarly, 'allegations that the Kurdish people are not free to be involved in politics are a distortion of the truth.' Every individual is treated equally and has the same rights as everybody else. [N]o person or community in the Turkish Republic is discriminated against.

If people are free to express their Kurdish identity and to be involved in politics, how are we then to understand the existence of the PKK? If the Kurds in Turkey have the same rights as all other citizens and there is no discrimination, why would they join or support a Kurdish separatist movement? One explanation provided by the MFA is that the PKK recruits people who have been 'misled and entrapped'. When Öcalan began giving an ethnic Kurdish dimension to his activities, this dimension 'usually had to be imposed on local populations by violent means, including kidnapping young men at gunpoint and then forcing them to undergo indoctrination and join his movement'. Thus, it is admitted that Kurdish ethnic discontent exists, but only because it has been imposed on people through indoctrination.

Along with force and indoctrination, terrorism is also said to be connected to underdevelopment and backwardness. There are frequent references to the 'Southeastern problem', which has to be distinguished from the non-existent 'Kurdish problem'. Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem, but it has a problem with underdevelopment in the southeast. 'It is no accident that the region in which the PKK operates is also the least economically developed part of Turkey.' Another argument is that the PKK aims to keep the region 'economically and socially backward so as to recruit more militants into its own ranks'. Lack of education is also put forward as a breeding ground for terrorism. That is why the PKK terrorists kill teachers and destroy schools. '[T]hey know that their subversive and perverted ideology could only be harboured among the uneducated.' The main concern is to establish that those who join the PKK do *not* do so for any kind of ethnic reasons. They join because they are misled, indoctrinated, poor and uneducated.

The way reality is defined and constituted in discourse will also decide which kind of solutions are perceived as appropriate and

justified. Once the problem, the preconditions and the context have been represented in a certain way, some solutions will appear as logical, whereas others will not even come up for consideration. Since the terrorist acts are committed by 'a group of extremist individuals' (who have no support from the Kurdish population), the solution to the problem is to eliminate those individuals. Moreover, since terrorism is said to be linked to economic underdevelopment, another solution is economic investments in the southeast.

> To counter PKK activities in the southeast region of the country the government had adopted a two-pronged approach: First, the elimination of PKK terrorists by security operations in strict compliance with the rule of law. Second, active measures to further improve the living standard of the local people who suffer from impaired public service and a slow-down in economic development.

It is claimed that the second strategy has already proven to have the intended effects: 'In those districts of South-eastern Turkey where economic and social development has reached a certain level, terrorism has visibly abated.' Yet, to eliminate the terrorists themselves is also perceived as being of crucial importance. 'Only an unswerving commitment to fight this scourge (regardless of cost) will ensure that the much-touted "New World Order" does not dissolve into a "New World Disorder"'. Thus, Turkey is firmly committed to ensuring peace and security by 'eradicating the PKK terrorists from its midst'. Increased cultural or political rights are obviously never mentioned as a solution to the terrorist problem. If the Kurds enjoy all the rights that non-Kurdish citizens do, talking about granting them rights would not make sense.

The causal link between terrorism and underdevelopment is left unaccounted for. Do people become terrorists simply because they are poor and uneducated? Does poverty make people frustrated and therefore more prone to terrorist activities? And if that were the case, it still remains to be explained why their frustration takes the form of ethnic separatism. If poverty and frustration lead to terrorism, why do people become Kurdish separatists and not left- or right-wing extremists, radical Islamic fundamentalists, ultra-nationalists or something else?

Moreover, if socio-economic underdevelopment is a reason why people support the PKK, the organization should have widespread popular support in the southeastern regions, which is, however, denied: 'PKK does not enjoy the support of the people of the region.' Considering the denial both of the existence of any collective Kurdish identity, and of any support among the population in general for the PKK, there is only one way of interpreting the official explanation: Low socio-economic development makes some individuals more vulnerable to indoctrination, – a vulnerability that the PKK can use in order to impose its 'perverted ideology' on new recruits. Terrorism in the shape of ethnic separatism is thus the result of a combination of lack of development and the methods (force and indoctrination) of the PKK. Why Kurdish resistance to the state arose in the first place remains unaccounted for. It follows from this explanation that there is no need for any change of the political identity of the state in order to embrace more diversity. The way to go is instead to improve the socio-economic situation in the southeast and to eliminate the terrorists.

From the above, we can conclude that not all *differences within* have to be concealed. While the existence of any internal ethnic division is firmly rejected, differences in the level of social and economic development are not, nor is the division between the *modern, western Turkey* and the *backward southeast*. Some differences within are less dangerous than others. Those are differences that are not presumed to threaten the indivisibility of the state and which are thus not defined as threats to national security. For the Turkish state, a secure identity presupposes ethnic homogeneity but not socio-economic homogeneity. Ethnic diversity can be partly disarmed if transformed into social and economic diversity. Economic and social cleavages are indeed presented as problematic, but not so much *per se*, but because they, presumably, lead some people to resort to 'ethnic terrorism'.

One attempt to undermine the idea of a Pan-Kurdish identity is displayed in the way people are labelled. Kurds are regularly referred to as 'citizens of Kurdish origin' or as 'Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic descent'. Only occasionally are they referred to merely as Kurds. By using these terms, the official non-ethnic definition of citizenship is emphasized. Calling somebody a Kurd

could amount to putting ethnic identity above civic belonging to the state and it could indicate that there were two types of citizens in Turkey: Turks and Kurds.

The effort to create homogeneity inside is thus made by denying the existence a collective Kurdish identity that transcends state borders and by trying to conceal any Turkish-Kurdish cleavage within Turkey.

Externalizing Danger

For the Turkish state, the PKK fighters and supporters constitute 'resistant elements to a secure identity'. In order to transform internal divisions that could undermine domestic unity, the PKK has to be located on the outside. If the problem can be presented as emanating from outside rather than from within Turkish society, the domestic social order remains immaculate. Terrorism is thus described as the result of the collaboration between external powers and a distinct group of extremists, delimited and disconnected from the rest of the Turkish people.

Apart from stressing that the terrorists are very few in number, most of them are also, according to the former Foreign Minister, foreigners: 'If you add them all up, you would only be looking at about 4–5 thousand terrorists and separatists. What is more, the majority is from northern Iraq, Syria and Iran as opposed to being Turkish nationals.'[12]

Four basic factors are presented that enable the PKK to continue to exist. At least three of them explicitly point at external factors as preconditions for PKK activities. The first is the support 'given by some neighbouring countries'. The second is 'income from illicit drug smuggling'. Thirdly, the PKK survives because it can continue its activities in Western Europe by exploiting the freedom of expression and other democratic rights. And fourthly, the PKK exists because of the large sums of money collected from Turkish citizens living abroad.

By placing the roots of terrorism outside the borders, rather than within, the internal struggles around the question of Kurdish identity can continue to be avoided. The conflict in the southeast is not, according to the official story, between the people and the security forces. The two sides in the conflict are instead 'the

security forces on one hand and a highly organized terrorist group, which receives political support from Western Europe and logistic support from our Eastern/South Eastern neighbours'.

> All the people of our country and the whole world should know that the PKK terrorist organization has nothing to do with the 'Kurdish identity'. Its leaders are in it for personal gain and have been hired by antidemocratic forces outside the country to upset peace and security in the region.

The main explanation of the existence of terrorism in Turkey is thus the support 'by neighbours who have an interest in destabilizing Turkey'.

Concluding Remarks

Turkey's policy towards northern Iraq cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration the state's attempts to solidify a certain domestic identity. This discourse displays the connection between danger, foreign policy and nation-building. It is generally believed by most researchers and observers that what Ankara fears most of all is that the situation in northern Iraq will be contagious so that the activities and the achievements of the Kurds in Iraq might inspire the Kurds of Turkey to try to emulate them. What is especially threatening is the prospect of a fully or semi-independent Kurdish state which, through some kind of domino effect, might lead to the same development in southeastern Turkey. What is interesting about the official texts analyzed above is that there is hardly any mention of the risk of a parcelling-up of a separate Kurdish state from Turkish territory. And when, once or twice, the issue is mentioned, it is immediately dismissed. Many other dangers and threats are described at length, but despite the fact that the theme of the text is *separatist* terrorism, the question of a potential split-up of the country is treated as a non-issue. The separatist-terrorists are thus considered dangerous for many reasons, but *not* because they might achieve their ultimate goal: separation.

Rather than assessing the actual risk of disintegration, the texts are pre-occupied with defending the state identity. What seem to be at stake are the domestic socio-political order and the

ideological foundation of the state project. Efforts to homogenize inside the border and to locate danger on the other side of the border are clearly part of the foreign-policy discourse. Although is true that the PKK has been provided with protection and support by other states, it is undeniable that there is ethnic discontent within Turkey. In order to downplay differences *within* and transform them into differences *between*, that fact is, however, ignored.

6

ENABLING AND THWARTING *DE FACTO* KURDISH STATEHOOD

This chapter describes Turkey's policy towards northern Iraq from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The purpose is to show how Ankara tried to protect what were perceived as national interests, while at the same time trying to cope with the unintended consequences of its realist, interest-protecting policy. With its policy towards the Kurdish region in Iraq, Ankara risked not only to undermine Iraqi territorial integrity and the potential for establishing a centralized Iraqi state in the future. Its policy also challenged the very foundation of the Turkish state, built on an ideology of territorial absolutism and the political irrelevance of ethnicity. Ankara was thus forced to carry out a balancing act that would allow state interests to be defended without too much damage being inflicted on state identity.

The Creation of *de facto* Kurdish Self-rule in Northern Iraq

The Kurds in northern Iraq gained *de facto* independence as an unintended consequence of the 1991 Gulf War in which Iraq was defeated. In the aftermath of the war, the Kurds attempted to rise up against the regime in Baghdad. The uprising failed, however, and over 1.5 million Iraqi Kurds, escaping the advancing Iraqi army, left their homes and fled towards the Turkish and Iranian borders. About one million of them fled to Iran and half a million to Turkey, which, initially, closed its border. In the face of international pressure, the refugees were, however, allowed into Turkey. Ankara was anxious to avoid a repetition of the refugee crisis in 1988, when around 60,000 Iraqi Kurds came to Turkey to

escape the Iraqi regime's Anfal operations, in which as many 150,000–200,000 Kurds were brutally massacred or killed in chemical attacks.[1] On that occasion, the Turkish authorities became the target of heavy criticism, mainly from Western European countries concerning conditions in the refugee camps. Turkey, which had not been prepared for such a massive influx of people, complained about the lack of support from Western states and especially about the unwillingness of European governments to accept any refugees for resettlement.[2] In response to an erupting refugee crisis which had the potential of being even more disruptive than the one in 1988, UN Security Council Resolution 688 was adopted and Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was launched. Resolution 688 condemned the repression of Iraqi civilians and mentioned particularly the Kurdish population. OPC was a tri-party arrangement between Washington, Ankara and London that enabled US and British planes to fly regularly over northern Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein's forces from entering the region. These flights took off from Incirlik airbase in southeast Turkey and permission for the operation had to be prolonged every six months by the Turkish Parliament. These measures led to the creation of a safe haven and a no-fly zone in northern Iraq, making it possible for the refugees to return home.[3] After the withdrawal of the Iraqi army from the region and with the protection provided by the surveillance flights, the Kurds in northern Iraq could live in relative safety.

What happened, however, was that not only the military, but the whole Iraqi state 'rolled back' from the Kurdish region in the north, leaving behind a political and administrative vacuum. Although formally still under Iraqi sovereignty, the region was in effect cut off from the rest of Iraq. The central government in Baghdad imposed an economic embargo on the Kurdish region. The state stopped paying wages to all public employees and cut off funds for the running of public institutions. Trade was stopped and all banks were closed.[4] These moves were not foreseen when Resolution 688 was adopted and to Ankara they came as an unwelcome surprise. As stressed by a Turkish official, there were no legal impediments preventing Baghdad from providing the provinces in the north with health care and other services. The area was still under Iraqi sovereignty and from a Turkish

perspective, the government of Iraq had the right and even the obligation to extend public services to the Kurdish region.[5]

The withdrawal of the Iraqi central administration left an empty space which the people living in the north had to fill themselves. Although it led to hardships for the population, it also gave the Kurds an opportunity to build up their own administrative and political infrastructure. UN development programs and many international NGOs were contributing to the improvement of economic and social living conditions and there were budding civil and political liberties. Even though the first years of self-rule were marked by conflicts and civil warfare between the two ruling Kurdish parties, the situation improved in the mid-1990s and quite soon people in this part of Iraq were generally far better off than their compatriots in the rest of the country.[6] The Kurdish self-rule which was established acquired some of the characteristics of a recognized nation-state. It had control over a delimited territory and the leaders of the Iraqi Kurds in the north established independent external relations. They began meeting and negotiating with foreign governments beyond any control or influence from Baghdad, and they established representations in several foreign states. Ankara, although forced to deal with the situation, was very careful to stress that there was no such thing as an emerging Kurdish state on its southeast border. According to one Turkish official, Turkish foreign policy makers regard the three provinces in northern Iraq as part and parcel of Iraq: 'If Iraq can not exercise its sovereignty there, [...] it is a temporary situation which unfolded after 1991. But as far as we are concerned, that part of Iraq is a territory of the Republic of Iraq and it should remain so.'[7]

The first step towards creating a Kurdish regional administration was the elections held in May 1992. These elections were organized by the Kurdistan Front, which had been formed in 1988 as an umbrella organization for various Kurdish political groups, including the two main parties: the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, PUK, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP. The final result of the elections was that KDP had gained 50.8 percent and PUK 49.2 percent of the votes.[8] The elections led to the convening of an Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly and the setting up of a single administration.[9] Basically, the outcome of the elections was a 50–

50 power-sharing agreement that made the administration ineffective and unable to act without the consent of the KDP and the PUK. The Kurdish self-rule was thus, in effect, divided into two separate systems in which neither of the two parties was willing to surrender power to the common institutions.[10] Growing tensions between the KDP and the PUK escalated into an armed conflict between the two sides in the spring of 1994. Despite efforts, by France and later by the USA, to mediate a peace, the fighting continued. In 1996, KDP leader Barzani did something that no one would have expected, given the atrocities committed by the Iraqi regime against the Kurds. He allied himself with Saddam Hussein. In a joint operation, the KDP and the Iraqi Army forced the PUK to retreat to the mountains along the Iranian border. KDP's victory, however, did not last very long. PUK launched a successful counter-attack a couple of months later and took back most of what it had lost.[11]

Ankara's reactions to the attempts to set up a democratic, single Kurdish regional administration and to the outbreak of clashes were marked by ambivalence. On the one hand, instability and intra-Kurdish fighting between the KDP and the PUK created problems since instability was, according to a Turkish official, to the benefit of the PKK. 'Whenever the KDP and the PUK fight [...] it is always to the advantage of the PKK.'[12] There was also a risk that military clashes could result in a new refugee crisis. On the other hand, Ankara did not want the efforts to co-operate and build common institutions to be too successful, since that could fuel Kurdish aspirations for statehood and prove that these aspirations were realistic. Ankara thought that a democratization process in northern Iraq could make it even more difficult to reintegrate the region into the rest of Iraq and was consequently hostile to the elections held in 1992 and to the overall attempts to create separate democratic institutions in the self-rule region. 'We are not', stated one Turkish official, 'recognizing the so-called government they established'.[13] Referring to discussions held between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds, in which the latter repeated that they did not want separation, but that they wanted to live in a democratic Iraq, another Turkish official described Ankara's message to the Kurds:

[Y]ou can not achieve a democratic Iraq by dividing your country. And democracy is not something that can be transplanted into one corner of the country and isolated there. Democracy is something [that has] to grow from the roots in all parts of the country. So, by saying that you have democratic institutions in your area, in the final analysis, does not mean too much. The goal is to have similar institutions, similar approach, similar understanding in all of Iraq.[14]

Thus the democratic initiatives taken in northern Iraq did not receive any support from Turkey. NGOs that wanted to assist the elections were not even allowed to enter northern Iraq from Turkey.[15] To go beyond the existing constitution of Iraq and look for separate solutions for the Kurdish region was something that Ankara firmly opposed, arguing instead that the goal had to be to reintegrate the region into Iraq, not to set it off on a separate track.

Looking at the developments in northern Iraq during the 1990s, we may conclude that the fact that the Kurds got the opportunity to rule themselves on a protected territory and to develop independent external relations was, at least partly, an effect (although unintended) of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey actively promoted the initiatives to create a safe haven and a no-fly zone in northern Iraq.[16] Turkey also maintained continuous contacts with the Kurdish political leaders and contributed to the economic survival of the Kurdish *de facto* state. Revenues from cross-border trade with Turkey were crucial to the economy of the Kurdish region.[17] The Turkish Foreign Ministry has not denied its inst- rumental role in bringing about this fertile ground for the Kurdish self-rule, although Ankara would obviously not agree that the conditions that came to prevail in the north were potentially paving the way for independence. Nevertheless, Ankara officially acknowledged its own role in the developments that took place in northern Iraq, stating that: 'One must remember that the level of security, democracy, freedom and economic prosperity the Iraqis are enjoying in the north today are largely due to Turkey's protective umbrella.'[18] The Foreign Ministry described Turkey's contribution as consisting of the protection from prosecution by hosting Operation Provide Comfort, thus enforcing the no-fly zone; the efforts, mainly through the Ankara Process, to stop

armed conflicts between Kurdish groups; and the support to the
northern Iraqi local economy.[19]

Thus, during the 1990s, a situation which Ankara would strongly
have wanted to avoid became a reality in northern Iraq. In order to
change this reality, Turkish policy makers felt compelled to act in
such a way that they ran the risk of maintaining it, instead of
undermining it. Turkey's policy towards northern Iraq can be
described as a parallel process of violating and maintaining.
Although the aim was to restore the integrity and sovereignty of
Iraq, Ankara, paradoxically, ended up both violating Iraq's territory
and getting involved in Iraqi internal affairs.

Fighting the PKK on Iraqi Territory

When the power vacuum evolved in northern Iraq, Ankara
discerned two main threats to the Turkish state. First, the PKK
was able to benefit from the absence of the Iraqi army and
intensify its raids into Turkish territory. Secondly, Ankara saw a
risk that the Iraqi Kurds would seize the opportunity to declare
independence and try to establish a Kurdish state. Ankara tried to
protect its national interests by military incursions into Iraqi
territory with the aim of eliminating the PKK, killing the rebels
and destroying their bases. In order to block the establishment of a
Kurdish state, and in order to co-operate in the fight against the
PKK, Ankara also established formal and regular relations with the
leaders of the Iraqi Kurds.

Turkey had already started to carry out cross-border operations
into northern Iraq in the early 1980s and continued with these
during the eight-year-long war between Iraq and Iran, when Iraq
was not able to control the northern, Kurdish part of its territory.
During this period, the governments of Turkey and Iraq had an
agreement allowing the Turkish military to make frequent
incursions into northern Iraq when in hot pursuit of PKK
guerilla.[20] But from the early 1990s, Baghdad began to disapprove
of Turkey's incursions, claiming that they were violating its
territorial integrity. In a letter to the UN Security Council, the Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz described the large-scale
offensive which took place in 1997 as 'a blatant and serious
violation of the bases of international law and the UN Charter'.[21]

Iraq also condemned Turkey for extending the mandate of Operation Northern Watch, which in 1997 became the new name for what was previously called Operation Provide Comfort. Iraq claimed that Operation Northern Watch had no legal basis.[22] Criticism was also voiced in Europe and from inside Turkey. The EU and individual European states accused Turkey of violating principles of sovereignty and integrity.[23] In 1995, in the aftermath of a large-scale military incursion into northern Iraq, targeting PKK fighters, the then chairman of Turkey's pro-Kurdish Democracy and Change Party (DDP) said: 'Under internationally accepted agreements, an army crossing another country's border is called an occupation. The Russian army's entry into Grozny is not different than the Turkish army's entry into Zakho. They try to defend the inside of the country from the outside. This is unacceptable.'[24]

According to the KDP's former representative in Ankara, extensive cooperation between the Turkish General Staff and the two Kurdish parties in northern Iraq started in 1992. In October 1992, Turkey sent some 20,000 troops into northern Iraq to uproot the PKK from its bases in the area – an operation which was supported by the Iraqi Kurds.[25] Later on, however, Turkey conducted major operations which were carried out solely on the Turkish military's own initiative.[26] On 20 March 1995, Turkey sent in 35,000 troops in what was described in a daily Turkish newspaper as 'the country's biggest military expedition in history'. A month later, Turkish forces had moved 30 kilometres into Iraq along the entire length of the Iraqi-Turkish border. They had secured control of the city of Zakhu as well as the stretch between Zakhu and the Syrian border.[27] By early May, the invasion was moving towards its end and most units involved had withdrawn. It was reported that 568 PKK guerillas had died and that much of PKK's infrastructure in the region was destroyed.[28] When the operation started, there were an estimated 5,000 PKK guerillas in northern Iraq. The majority of them had managed to escape the Turkish forces by fleeing either to other parts of Kurdish controlled northern Iraq, or to Iran and Syria or even into Turkey.[29] An even larger incursion took place on 14 May 1997, when 50,000 troops were reported to have entered Iraq, and in

October the same year Turkish forces once again crossed the border.[30]

In the mid-1990s, major military operations of this kind took place once or twice a year. The Iraqi Kurds were critical of them since they sometimes resulted in civilian casualties. After 1997, Turkey gave up large-scale military operations. From then on the Turkish military continued to enter the region but in small numbers. Turkish soldiers, usually mountain commandos, crossed the border from time to time, usually after having received information about PKK strongholds in the mountains. They stayed for a few days and then returned. A closer cooperation between the Turkish military and the KDP (which controlled the area on the other side of the Turkish border, while PUK controlled an area further south, bordering on Iran) developed after 1997, consisting mainly of the exchange of information and sometimes joint military operations targeting PKK rebels.[31]

In 1995–97, during the time of the large-scale operations, Turkish troops usually stayed in Iraq for one or two months. In addition to these incursions, the Turkish army was rotating in and out of northern Iraq throughout the 1990s and it is difficult to know exactly how many times the Turkish army crossed the border.[32] The TMF, Turkish Military Forces, had authorization from the Parliament to conduct these kinds of limited operations whenever they were considered necessary.[33] It was thus the military that decided when and how often the Turkish army crossed the border.

During 1994 the *Boundary and Security Bulletin*[34] reports the following border crossings by the Turkish military: On 12 January, Turkish security forces crossed into Iraq, advancing 5 km over the border, with helicopter support, in search of PKK guerrillas. Later in the same issue, the bulletin writes that the Turkish Air Force had carried out a raid into northern Iraq, inflicting 'heavy losses' on the PKK terrorists in the Zala camp. There is no mention of exactly when this happened, but the media reports that the *Boundary and Security Bulletin* refers to date from 28 January. On 30 January, a cross-border raid was carried out by Turkish jets on the Kurdish guerillas. Some time later, the Turkish Armed Forces carried out an air operation on the Mezi and Keryaderi regions of northern Iraq, close to the border with Turkey. Heavy losses were

inflicted on the 'terrorists'. No precise date is given, but the sources quoted by the *Boundary and Security Bulletin* date from 6 February.[35] On 4 May, Turkish aircraft were reported to have bombed several villages in Iraqi Kurdistan. Later the same month, 80 PKK members were reported to have been killed when Turkish forces attacked PKK bases in the Mayzi region of northern Iraq in response to intelligence reports of a group of 500–600 'terrorists' gathering to cross into Turkey.[36] In late July, the Turkish Air Force carried out a raid on Kurdish 'terrorists' based in Iraq, hitting a group of 100 'terrorists' at an ammunition dump, killing 70 of them and destroying the dump. Turkish military sources confirmed on 5 September that the air force had carried out a cross-border operation against a group of 'terrorists' preparing to cross into Turkey. Turkish reports indicated 51 killed and 74 wounded among the group.[37] Turkish media sources reported on 12 December that an air operation had been carried out against two shelters of the 'separatist terrorist organisation' in the Al Madinah region of northern Iraq, using air force planes and Cobra helicopters. The Turks claimed that heavy losses were inflicted.[38] All in all, Turkish forces seemed to have entered Iraq territory nine times in 1994.[39] This is obviously not a complete account of all cross-border operations from 1991 to 2003 but only a description of what took place during one, randomly chosen, year. Nevertheless, it gives an idea of the extent and character of the operations.

An ever more remarkable violation of Iraq's integrity than the military incursions was Turkey's small but permanent military presence in northern Iraq. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has confirmed that Turkish soldiers were stationed in northern Iraq after the introduction of Operation Northern Watch in 1997. In a speech in March 2003, just about a week after the invasion of Iraq began, Turkey's representative to the UN said: 'it is common knowledge that elements of Turkish Armed Forces are stationed in northern Iraq. And, they were sent there not yesterday but years before in the context of "Operation Northern Watch"'.[40] The foreign ministry does not give any numbers and estimates given by other sources vary. In 2002, Reuters reported that Turkey had 5,000 troops in the region.[41] According to one researcher, 8,000 troops remained inside Iraq when the large incursion in 1997 was

over.[42] A leader within the KDP said, in 2005, that there were not, and never had been, more than 1300 Turkish troops stationed in Iraq.[43]

Defending Iraqi Integrity

Although they were deemed necessary for self-defense purposes, these repeated incursions and the presence on Iraqi territory were obviously problematic for a state built on an ideology of territorial *status quo*. Justifying its policy by questioning the legitimacy of the territorial demarcations and the Turkish-Iraqi border was not possible for Turkish foreign-policy makers. That would have been tantamount to undermining the ground on which they themselves were standing. Instead, various verbal and symbolic practices were used to maintain the sanctity of the border. First, Ankara actively and continuously declared its commitment to Iraqi territorial integrity and sovereignty. Secondly, Turkish officials and politicians insisted that the violations of Iraq's territory were, in fact, not violations since the situation in northern Iraq was a *sui generis* situation to which normal rules of interstate interaction were not applicable.

Thus, while the Turkish army violated Iraqi territory on the ground, the government and the Foreign Ministry in Ankara persistently asseverated their respect for Iraqi sovereignty. Even after a decade or more of continuous transgressions of the Iraqi border, Turkey's policy remained the same: the territorial integrity of Iraq must not be violated. Neither the location nor the legitimacy of the existing border was questioned. The Foreign Ministry never hinted that the border should be re-negotiated or that it had lost its importance. There were no official Turkish claims on historical rights to the territory on the other side of the border. The official view from Ankara was that Turkey's presence in Iraq was, in fact, aimed at protecting Iraq's territorial integrity, almost as if Turkey violated the border *in order* to defend it. According to Özdem Sanberk, a former Foreign Undersecretary, 'Turkey was sitting in northern Iraq in order to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity'.[44] Similar statements have been made by Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and others.[45]

In order to maintain the respect for the border, Ankara gave a certain interpretation of its incursions into and military presence in Iraq. The motivations given for the infringements of Iraqi territory were that they were necessary acts of self-defense. In 1995, Turkey's permanent representative to the UN, commenting on the military operation which took place that year, said that since terrorists attacked Turkey and then escaped into northern Iraq, using the area as a safe haven, Turkey 'had no choice' but to enter northern Iraq.[46] In official statements, Turkey repeated over and over again that the sending of troops into Iraq should not be taken as a sign of Turkish claims on that territory. Süleyman Demirel, president at the time of the large incursion in 1995, said about that operation that it did not aim 'at northern Iraqi territory but was against the armed bandits who are stationed in that land. It is not an invasion but it is an anti-terrorist operation.'[47] One official dismissed the frequent protests made by Baghdad over the Turkish military operations: 'I don't think they really, sincerely [are] taking Turkey's military operations as an infringement or intervention into their territorial integrity or their sovereignty. I don't think they seriously complain about it, because when they complain, they are making a connection with [the] no-fly zone and the Northern Watch Operation.'[48] According to this official, the Iraqi protests were empty rhetoric. What Baghdad was really complaining about was the no-fly zone and Operation Northern Watch which, although Turkey was involved, were mainly operated by the USA and Britain.

The Foreign Ministry stressed that the prevailing situation, in which the central government in Baghdad had no control over the northern part of its territory, was a temporary one and that it was a *sui generis* situation because of the power vacuum. It 'is a very important principle', said one Turkish official, that 'we see the situation in northern Iraq as an extraordinary situation and every arrangement realized in northern Iraq as temporary'.[49] In Ankara's security perceptions, Turkey was facing a vicious terrorist threat and in order to protect the state and its citizens, the Turkish Army had to fight the PKK and also, if necessary, pursue the rebels across the border. Since the Iraqi government and Iraqi forces were not present and had no authority over northern Iraq, Turkey had to take measures. 'Nobody can expect Turkey not to do

anything', said the official quoted above, adding that if the government of Iraq had been present in northern Iraq, Turkey would have solved the security problem as a bilateral issue by cooperating with Iraq.[50]

That northern Iraq was still under the sovereign rule of the Iraqi central government was emphasized in other ways as well, for example in 2001, when Ankara announced it had plans to open a second border gate with Iraq and made a point of declaring that the Iraqi administration, and not the *peshmergas* of the KDP (as in the case of the already existing border gate), would be in charge of it. After a visit by Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Loğoğlu to Baghdad in June 2001, Turkish newspapers reported that discussions had taken place between the two governments concerning a new border gate. It was reported that Iraq would be solely responsible for the management, monitoring and protection of the Iraqi side of the gate. This was described as an attempt to reinforce the sovereignty of the Baghdad Administration in the region.[51] According to a Turkish daily, one 'reason for Turkey to open a direct border gate has been to give a message to the Kurds and in particular the KDP that Iraq's sovereignty could not be infringed and that Turkey's interlocutor is the central authority in Baghdad'.[52] In the same context, Turkish officials were quoted as saying that Ankara did not consider northern Iraq as 'the lands of Massoud Barzani, these are the lands of Iraq and our counterpart is Baghdad regarding the construction of the second border gate'.[53] Furthermore, in 2001, Turkey introduced Iraq visa requirements for Turks even if they were only crossing into northern Iraq.[54] Since Baghdad had no control over the Iraqi side of the Turkish-Iraqi border, and since the Iraqi Kurds would not stop Turkish citizens from crossing the border and entering into northern Iraq, it seems as if Turkey introduced the visa requirements only to reinforce the principle that northern Iraq was not an independent territory where the authority of Baghdad could be ignored. This was also the way the Foreign Ministry in Ankara explained why foreigners could not be allowed to travel from Turkey into the KDP-controlled region without an Iraqi visa: 'you are entering from Turkey into the territory of Iraq, therefore [...] we can not let you out of Turkey without a proper visa'.[55] Foreigners had to enter northern Iraq via either Syria or Iran, although in the late 1990s it

was possible to cross the border from Turkey. These statements and decisions did not carry much practical importance. A second border gate was never opened and to require an Iraqi visa for travellers might just have been an excuse for keeping foreigners out of Iraqi Kurdistan. They were nevertheless symbolically significant statements in the sense that they were used in order to reinforce the principle of Iraqi sovereignty over the whole of its territory.

Involvement with the Iraqi Kurds

In the early 1990s Ankara established formal relations with the KDP and its leader Massoud Barzani and with the PUK and its leader Jalal Talabani. Up till then, Turkey had carefully avoided having contacts, at least openly, with those parties since that was considered to be in conflict with the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring state. The initiative to make these contacts was taken by the then President Turgut Özal and they were highly controversial domestically. The military believed that, after these contacts had been established, Turkey would no longer be in a position to expect Iraq not to interfere in its own Kurdish problem.[56]

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1991, both the KDP and the PUK were invited to Ankara to meet with President Özal. In order to maintain these contacts it was seen as necessary to establish permanent KDP and PUK representation offices in the Turkish capital. A few months later, however, in October 1991, the KPD decided to withdraw its newly opened representation as a protest against the Turkish incursions into northern Iraq since these, according to KDP, resulted in civilian casualties and damage. In order to mend fences with the KDP, Özal invited Barzani to come to Turkey in February 1992. Eight years later, the representative of KDP in Ankara recalled how he was asked to come from London, where he was based, to Turkey to arrange for the meeting on a temporary basis. However, what was supposed to be a temporary arrangement soon turned into something permanent.[57]

After they had been established, the representations were in regular contacts with the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In response to a question about how often he was in contact with the Foreign

Ministry, the representative of the KDP said, 'it could be almost on a daily basis sometimes. Whenever it is necessary we are in contact, but it is regular'. During those contacts a wide range of issues were discussed: security matters, political developments in the region, relations with neighbouring countries and with Europe, etc.[58]

Apart from the permanent representations, Ankara also had meetings with the leaders of the northern Iraqi Kurds. The closest contacts were with Massoud Barzani who paid six official visits to Ankara between 1992 and 2001. When the Kurdish leaders visited Ankara they were always received by the top political leadership such as the Prime Minister, the President, the Foreign Minister and high-ranking military and intelligence officials.

There were two main reasons why the Turkish government established relations with the Iraqi Kurds. First, the Turkish army needed their cooperation in the fight against the PKK. Secondly, Ankara was anxious to make sure that the Kurds did not declare independence or make any unilateral moves against the unity of the Iraqi state. Even though Turkish policy-makers did not like it, a state-like entity gradually emerged in northern Iraq after 1991 and Ankara had to adjust to this. Since the Iraqi central government had withdrawn from Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish foreign policy makers had to interact with the Kurdish parties if they wanted to have any say over the developments taking place there. Ankara's aim was to convince the Kurdish leaders not to act on their own and to maintain a dialogue with the central authority. A Turkish official said: 'We are urging the Kurdish parties, and also the central government, to solve their problems within Iraq'.[59] The central regime in Baghdad complained about Ankara's contacts with the KDP and the PUK. In response, Baghdad was told that Ankara was interacting with the Iraqi Kurds as leaders of two Iraqi political parties, not as representatives of the Kurdish region.[60]

Reaffirming Baghdad's Authority

The relations between the Turkish state and the KDP and PUK constituted a dilemma since they were an acknowledgement of the Kurdish self-rule and could be seen as interference in Iraqi affairs, thus undermining the boundary between the two entities Turkey

and Iraq. As David McDowall concludes, even if 'Ankara withheld *de jure* recognition of the Kurdish government, its reliance on Iraqi Kurds implied *de facto* acceptance of realities'.[61] While pursuing its contacts with Barzani and Talabani, Ankara ran the risk of granting them implicit status or recognition as political leaders representing a *de facto* Kurdish state. Obviously, Ankara was anxious to avoid that and was therefore always very careful to settle the status of the Kurdish leaders. When Barzani in May 2001 went to Turkey and was received by the then Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, four main concerns were raised during the meeting. The first issue was about reaffirming 'how he [Barzani] is being "defined" in Turkey', a senior Turkish official is reported to have said. And the same official is quoted as saying: 'We told them that he is seen as a political party leader in Iraq, in order not to create a misunderstanding on his title and mission'. The second concern Ankara raised was about repeating Turkey's 'respect for the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq, again, in order not to create a false impression'.[62] Thus, Ankara emphasized that Barzani is a 'leader of a political party in Iraq', not a representative of an autonomous Kurdish region. The 'false impression' that Ankara did not want to create was that its own contacts with Barzani implied that northern Iraq was a separate entity challenging the integrity and unity of Iraq by having independent relations with foreign states. One Turkish official defined the Kurdish leaders as follows:

> We don't recognize them as political partners. There is nothing political about them [...] they are the elements at the moment filling the power vacuum and with whom we have to cooperate in the fight against PKK.[63]

By such a definition Barzani and Talabani were stripped of even semi-official status and of any kind of recognition as political leaders representing a legitimate Kurdish administration.

The status of the KDP and PUK representation offices in Ankara was also a sensitive issue. When the representation of the KDP organized a reception and invited a number of European diplomats, concern was raised, especially in military circles, and the KDP was blamed for acting as a diplomatic mission.[64]

During the 1990s and at least until the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was a possibility that the existing situation in northern Iraq would transform itself into a permanent reality. The likelihood of such a scenario was, of course, increasing with time. Ankara feared that in the Kurdish region a generation would grow up which did not feel any sense of belonging to the rest of Iraq.[65] The longer Kurdish self-rule continued to prevail, the more likely it was that it would become more and more established. When asked if the *de facto* situation may not eventually become both permanent and legitimized, a Turkish official admitted such a risk: 'Not in terms of legitimization, but in terms of people getting used to this'. He did, however, deny that Turkey was granting the Iraqi Kurds a kind of recognition by co-operating directly with them:

> No, no [...] we tell them and we treat them as – Mr Barzani is the chairman of the Kurdish Democatic Party of Iraq. Mr Talabani is the chairman or the president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. That's it. [...] if the impression we give outside is that Turkey is sort of recognizing a different entity there, a separate entity there, that's something we have to look into very carefully because it is not the intention at all. [...] We repeat to them and to everybody, Erbil, Sulemanya, Dohuk are integral part of Iraq. There is a power vacuum there. There are problems there. These problems need to be resolved within Iraq, by the Iraqis [...] We want to encourage Baghdad and them to solve this problem among themselves.[66]

Ankara's message to the KDP and PUK was that they should not take their problems outside, but should solve them together with the central government. When Barzani and Talabani were received officially in Ankara, 'taking their problems outside' was, however, exactly what they were doing. They were, in effect, acting on their own and beyond the reach of Baghdad. If Turkish foreign-policy makers had completely avoided interference in Iraqi politics and had shunned all direct contacts with the Kurdish leaders, then they would not have had any influence over their choices and actions. On the other hand, by having official contacts with the Kurds, Ankara might have gradually undermined Iraqi sovereignty. And the longer the contacts continued, the more the Kurdish leaders appeared as statesmen and the more likely it seemed that the

situation would turn into something permanent and, in the long run, pave the way for a Kurdish state.

A Hidden Agenda?

Is it possible that Turkey's foreign policy towards northern Iraq was, in fact, not aimed at preserving the present border? Was there instead a hidden irredentist agenda, an intention to occupy and incorporate northern Iraq into Turkey? Such a conclusion does not seem likely. To preserve the territorial *status quo* and thus the existing borders is considered a matter of survival by Ankara. An annexation of northern Iraq would have been like opening up a can of worms that Ankara would much rather keep closed. Fear of disintegration permeates the security thinking of the Turkish state and any moves that indicate, even if only potentially, that the present borders are up for discussion are considered threatening.

The dilemma for Ankara was that both the military incursions and the political relations with the KDP and PUK challenged the status of the border between the two states. If foreign policy is defined as a political practice which reproduces the state by constantly maintaining the boundaries between domestic and foreign, Turkey's policy towards northern Iraq risked having the opposite effect, namely, blurring the sanctity of the border, undermining Iraqi sovereignty and, inadvertently, encouraging the emergence of Kurdish statehood. In order to avoid those unintended consequences, the Foreign Ministry and the government tried to maintain the meaning of the border as a divider and definer of both the Turkish and the Iraqi states.

Ankara and the Turkomans

Ankara's policy towards the Turkoman population in northern Iraq has also been marked by a balancing act of protecting what are perceived as Turkish national interests while at the same upholding the official identity of the Turkish nation-state. State ideology in Turkey is antipathetic towards the concept of ethnic minorities. 'A unitary state does not take interest in ethnic identities', declares the Foreign Ministry, which also continuously insists that ethnic identities are not collective but individual and that Turkish identity is a national, not an ethnic identity.[67] In this

context, support to the Turkomans has to be carefully framed. It would be awkward for Ankara to propagate the rights of a 'Turkoman ethnic minority' in Iraq. At the same time, however, it has been important for Ankara to promote the political status of the Turkomans in order to demonstrate that northern Iraq does not belong only to the Kurds and that Kirkuk is a not just a Kurdish city. The Turkomans are put forward by Ankara as a counter-weight to Kurdish hegemony. Moreover, the safety of the Turkomans has been one of the arguments by which Ankara has justified having forces in Iraq. Following the invasion in 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned of the risk of persecution of the Turkomans and claimed that any Turkish force which might enter into northern Iraq would not be assigned for combat. They would go in for purely humanitarian reasons.[68]

The plight of the Turkoman people is frequently depicted in the Turkish media and assaults on Turkomans cause strong concerns. In 2003, when Kurdish *peshmerga* entered Kirkuk, Turkish television showed how Kurds were looting the homes and businesses of the Turkoman residents of the city, and the leader of the Iraqi Turkoman Front was quoted as urging the Turkish army to enter Kirkuk to ease the fear of the Turkomans. The Foreign Ministry warns of a risk of ethnic cleansing and claims that injustices have been imposed on the Turkomans throughout history.[69] Just like the Kurds, the Turkomans have been persecuted in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Turkomans as well as Kurds were targeted in the Iraqi counter-offensive against the Kurdish uprising in the spring of 1991. They have also suffered from hostilities by Kurds. In 1959, there was a massacre of Turkomans by Kurds in Kirkuk.[70] While acknowledging that there is a special feeling of brotherhood and affinity with the Turkomans, one Turkish official says that the Turkish state gives humanitarian assistance but does not otherwise treat the Turkomans differently than the Kurds or any other group in Iraq. 'We are trying to provide some assistance, some material assistance to them, so at least they can be raised to the welfare level of the Kurds in northern Iraq.'[71] This official said that the Turkomans have been neglected both by international NGOs and by the Kurdish authorities and therefore they needed help. He emphasized, however, that although the Iraqi Turkomans are of Turkic origin, and Turkey therefore has some kind of

psychological and cultural responsibility for them, they are, above all, Iraqi citizen and they should stay and prosper 'in their own lands'. Addressing the same issue, one MP from the AK party stressed that the Turkish government promotes the rights of the Turkomans, but not any kind of minority rights, or special political rights. Turkey wants them to have *'equal* rights'.[72] This was an important point for Turkish policy makers to make, since they are against the concept of minorities and are often criticized for supporting ethnic Turks in Iraq while they would strongly reject any outside support from foreign governments to ethnic groups in Turkey.

One reason for Ankara to be careful about its relations with the Turkomans was that they were creating concerns in Baghdad with whom Ankara, all through the 1990s, tried to normalize its bilateral relations. The Iraqi government was suspicious about the relations between Ankara and the Turkomans, believing that Ankara could use the latter to justify a reoccupation of Mosul.[73]

Besides humanitarian assistance, Ankara has also tried to boost the political influence of the Turkomans. In 1996, they were made part of the peace efforts within the framework of the Ankara process. The Ankara process was initiated by Turkey, the USA and Britain to put an end to the fighting between the KDP and the PUK. One ingredient of this peace effort was the creation of a Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) to monitor the cease-fire. The PMF was made up of Turkomans and Assyrians with training and logistics provided by Turkey.[74] Also, when a Turkoman convention was held in Erbil in November 2000, 46 foreign journalists were allowed to enter from Turkey into northern Iraq something which they were never allowed to do otherwise.[75] Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Ankara has continued to be a supporter of the political status of the Turkomans. On the same day as the Turkish Parliament rejected the motion to allow US troops into Turkish territory (on 1 March 2003), there was a meeting of Iraqi opposition groups in northern Iraq. The fact that the Turkomans were not included among the opposition groups was heavily criticized in Turkey. The Turkish Foreign Ministry even presents that as one reason why the Parliament rejected the motion.[76]

According to many Turkomans, Ankara has, on the one hand, been helpful in bringing their problems to the agenda, both in

Baghdad and internationally. On the other hand, some think that Turkey could have done more and spoken up more, both against the KDP and against Baghdad.[77] The former representative of the Iraqi Turkoman Front in Ankara said, during his time in office there, that the Turkomans in Iraq survive because of Ankara. At the same time, he added, it is very important for Ankara to have good relations with the KDP and with Baghdad and, comparatively, the strategic value of the Turkomans to Turkey is very limited: 'We have no power, no people in the high-ranking bureaucracy and no geopolitical importance'.[78]

The Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF) is an umbrella organization for various Turkoman groups and parties with close connections with Ankara. It was established in the mid-1990s with the support of Turkey.[79] Critics of the ITF, notably the Iraqi Kurds, says that not only is the organization financed by Ankara, it also takes orders from Ankara and is no more than an instrument for Turkey to secure its interests in northern Iraq.[80] One reason why the USA, since 2003, has been strongly against the presence of the Turkish army in northern Iraq is that the Turks, allegedly, were organizing and arming the Turkomans.[81]

To the Turkoman community, the close links with Ankara represent a two-edged sword. While they need protection, they also run the risk of being dismissed as lackeys of Turkey. Not only the ITF, but the whole Turkoman community runs the risk of being targeted by this criticism. Even if many Turkomans appreciate Turkish support, most of them do not want Turkey to intervene in Iraq, and certainly not under the pretext that they have to protect the Turkomans.[82] Whereas some Turkomans are pro-Turkish, many were happy with the Kurdish self-rule and did not want Turkey to interfere. After Baghdad lost control over northern Iraq in 1991, the Turkomans gained many rights that they had lacked under Saddam Hussein's rule. They could have their own schools, with instruction in their own language. They got their own television and radio stations, newspapers, political parties and a cultural centre.[83] Shortly before the US-led invasion, a BBC reporter visited merchants and residents in a Turkoman neighbourhood in Erbil and talked about their opinions on Turkey intervening in Iraq. The reporter concluded that, although it was impossible to carry out a reliable opinion poll, his strong

impression was that there were not many ordinary Turkomans in northern Iraq who wanted to see the Turkish army march in to protect them.[84] The Turkoman population in Iraq is not a homogeneous group and far from all of them support the Iraqi Turkoman Front, which consists predominately of Sunnis but also of some secular Shiites. Most Shiites, however, support the Turkoman Islamic Union or other Iraqi Shiite parties.[85]

To conclude, there are several reasons for Ankara's concern for the Turkoman's situation. One is that there is a feeling of cultural closeness, which has also been visible in Turkey's support for the Turks of Bulgaria or for the Turkish Cypriots. This kind of 'ethnic solidarity' contradicts the officially declared non-ethnic definition of who is a Turk, but is nevertheless a fact. Another reason is that Ankara wants to be able to exert influence in northern Iraq through the Iraqi Turkoman Front and to counter-balance the power of the Kurds. Yet another reason is that Ankara wants to make a point of the fact that northern Iraq is not inhabited by Kurds alone but by other ethnic groups as well. Thus the idea of a 'Kurdish' state can be questioned, as can the idea of 'ethnic states' in general. Ankara wants to undermine all attempts to split Iraq into sub-states based on ethnicity; that is why it is important to emphasize that northern Iraq is ethnically mixed.

Ankara on Iraq's Future

The insistence, before 2003, that the Kurdish self-rule was something temporary begged the question of what would come after it. During the period of Kurdish self-rule, prior to the fall of the Ba'ath regime and before the reconstruction of Iraq began, Ankara stressed that the future of Iraq was in the hands of the Iraqis and that no one else had the right to intervene in those decisions. At the same time, it was clear that Ankara had preferences and that there were certain limits for what it could accept. The protection of Iraq's territorial integrity and political unity were the corner stones of Turkey's policy. When stressing that the future of Iraq should be in the hands of the Iraqis, the main point that Ankara wanted to make was that the future of Iraq should be in the hands of the Iraqi population *as a whole* and that no single group had the right to make decisions concerning the

structure of the Iraqi state. Obviously, this meant that the Kurds, according to Ankara, had no right to break away from Iraq, but it was also a reflection of Turkish state ideology: In a unitary state, all decisions are taken according to the majority principle, all citizens have equal rights and the notion of minorities with special rights is rejected.

Nevertheless, Turkish foreign-policy makers, although favouring a unitary state rather than a federation, still emphasized that they did not have any rights to decide on the matter: 'Nobody has a say on that because it is an internal matter of Iraq. If they will change the political system, whether they will opt for, a monarchy, or a federal system, is their own problem'.[86] The acceptance of whatever political system the Iraqi population would decide on had, however, one limitation: a split-up of the state into two or more independent states was not considered acceptable. 'That is not a political system. That is a separation. [...] We are very much against that.'[87]

The Foreign Ministry's standpoint was that as long as a decision to establish a federative state would be taken by all Iraqis together, and not as a unilateral action by one group, Turkey would not raise any objections to a federation.[88] While acknowledging that Ankara should not determine the future of Iraq, the Foreign Ministry nevertheless offered its 'friendly advice':

> We think that an administrative structure along ethnic and religious lines would not be a good idea, because it would strengthen separatist and centrifugal forces and in the long-run may cause fragmentation of the country.[89]

In its foreign-policy formula towards Iraq, the Foreign Ministry affirms the Turkish state ideology. Domestic concerns about centrifugal forces were translated into foreign policy. While fearing a federation along ethnic lines in Iraq, Ankara also had to defend another basic principle of Turkish foreign policy, namely, non-involvement in the domestic affairs of its neighbours. The result was a mixture of various attempts to have influence while at the same time paying symbolic and verbal tribute to Iraqi sovereignty.

Other Actors on the Domestic Scene

The official foreign policy has not been without contestants and its main protagonists, the Foreign Ministry and the military, have not been the only actors on the stage. During the initial years of the 1990s, Turgut Özal deviated from the traditional foreign policy path in some respects. Alongside his much more open approach to the Kurdish issue domestically, he advocated an active involvement in northern Iraq. As mentioned earlier, he established formal relations with the Iraqi Kurds, a move which created controversy, especially with the military.[90] To have contacts with Kurds in neighbouring countries had until then been taboo. Özal, however, wanted Turkey to have more control over what happened in northern Iraq and to avoid making enemies with the Iraqi Kurdish parties: 'we should try to keep them under our spell as much as possible and even try to assume the role of their guarantors'.[91] Turgut Özal was also accused of conducting foreign policy without consulting and informing the military or the Foreign Ministry. Within a period of two months, three senior officials, the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Chief of the Armed Forces, resigned, allegedly because of Özal's leadership style and his personalized way of handling the Gulf crisis.[92] It has been argued, however, that even if Özal's methods were unorthodox, the objectives were all traditional. The close contacts with the Iraqi Kurds seemed to be part of a strategy aimed at co-opting the Iraqi Kurds, convincing them not to establish an independent state, and isolating the PKK.[93]

Some right-wing, Turkish nationalists resent the loss of Mosul and Kirkuk, claiming that they were unjustly taken away from Turkey. The head of one of the main Turkish think-tanks, argued (prior to the invasion) that Turkey should give military support to the Turkomans in northern Iraq in order to help them protect themselves. He also argued that the Turkish army should be allowed to create a security zone and stay in northern Iraq for a long time, since the only way to destroy the PKK would be 'a steady and prolonged war in northern Iraq with the Turkish army'.[94] Politicians from the mainstream parties have also, occasionally, given irredentist hints. President Demirel, President Özal and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit have made statements

resenting that Mosul and Kirkuk were not granted to Turkey in the 1920s, that Turkey had the right to establish a security zone along the border in northern Iraq, or that the border should be revised.[95] None of this has, however, become official policy. The Foreign Ministry, the military and successive governments have continued to uphold the principles and objectives of traditional Kemalist foreign policy.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime entailed the risk of changes in the territorial status quo and made a dismemberment of Iraq a distinct possibility. The fact that Turkey was now governed by the pro-Islamic AK party led to some speculations concerning a possible change of direction in Turkey's foreign policy. Some thought that the new government might seek a more active role in the Middle East and that it would try to develop closer ties with its Moslem neighbours. Whether change or continuity is the best way to describe Turkey's policy towards northern Iraq since 2003 will be discussed in the next chapter.

7

AFTER THE INVASION

With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the conditions under which Turkish foreign-policy makers had to manoeuvre changed drastically. First, a profound transformation of the Iraqi state and its political structure began. This meant that the Kurdish self-rule could develop in any direction, towards complete integration into a centralized Iraqi state or towards full independence or towards something in between these two opposites. Secondly, in the national elections in November 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party had gained almost two-thirds of the seats in the parliament and had formed a single-party government. Turkey was thus led by a party with Islamic roots, which caused a great deal of unease within the traditional secular civilian and military elite. The purpose of this chapter is to describe developments in Iraq after the invasion in 2003 and Ankara's reactions to the events that have taken place there. Central issues which will be addressed are whether Turkey's foreign policy changed after March 2003 compared to the 1991–2003 period and how Turkish foreign-policy makers carried out the double task of defending state identity and protecting state interests in a changed political context.

   The Kurdish self-rule had been in place for twelve years when the USA and Britain went into Iraq with the declared ambition of ousting the existing regime in Baghdad and creating a new, democratic state. One might have expected Ankara to welcome the invasion since Turkish foreign-policy makers were always very anxious to stress that the self-rule situation was a temporary one, and that Iraqi sovereignty over its territory had to be restored. Until March 2003, time was working against Ankara. The situation

that Turkish officials insisted was a temporary one was gradually
consolidating itself. The younger generation of Kurds in northern
Iraq, who went to school after the withdrawal of the central
administration, had not even learned Arabic and like most of the
Kurds in the region they did not cherish the idea of being
reintegrated into Iraq again.

The invasion seemed to bring an opportunity to put an end to
the incremental consolidation of Kurdish self-rule and a chance to
restore Iraqi sovereignty. Turkey was, however, not in favour of an
invasion. Prior to the outbreak of the war, Ankara urged Baghdad
to allow weapon inspections and to co-operate with the UN in
order to avoid being invaded. The then Prime Minister, Abdullah
Gül, said in early March that he had left 'no stone unturned in
search of a peaceful solution'.[1] The main reason for Ankara's
position was a fear that the war would encourage Iraqi Kurds to
break away completely, take control over the oil fields in Kirkuk
and Mosul, and declare independence. There were also worries
about a new influx of refugees and about political turmoil.
Moreover, public opinion was very strongly against a war. Opinion
polls showed that over 90 percent of the population was against an
invasion. Many Turks opposed a war on a neighbouring, Moslem
country and feared that that Saddam Hussein might retaliate
against Turkey, using chemical and biological weapons.

When the USA and Britain went ahead and decided to attack
Iraq, despite failing to get a UN resolution that would authorize
the war, Washington was hoping, and even planning for
permission to open a northern front against Iraq from Turkey. An
initial proposal by the Turkish government to allow the United
States to deploy around 60,000 troops, 225 warplanes and 65
helicopters on Turkish territory was, however, turned down by the
parliament by a narrow margin.[2] This decision was regarded as
risky by many Turks, who worried that Turkey, by denying access
to American troops, would lose any opportunity to have a say over
the future of Iraq. Apart from a multi-billion-dollar aid package,
the deal between the USA and Turkey would also have allowed
Turkey to send a substantial number of troops to northern Iraq as
a precaution against the establishment of an independent Kurdish
state and to prevent a potential refugee flow.[3] Without a deal,
Washington would not look favourably on Turkey sending troops

across the border. Since Turkey was highly concerned about what was going to happen in Iraq in the aftermath of an invasion, having a military presence there was considered crucial, especially if the worst-case scenario were to occur, that is, if the Kurds took control over Kirkuk and Mosul and declared independence. Throughout the 1990s, the USA had turned a blind eye on Turkey's large-scale incursions into northern Iraq.[4] Some voices claimed, however, that if and when a war broke out, Turkey would intervene in northern Iraq, with or without US permission[5]

It was on 1 March 2003, 20 days before the invasion, that the Turkish parliament rejected the government's proposal. There were actually 264 votes in favour of the resolution, 250 against and 19 abstentions, but it required the approval of an absolute majority in order to be authorized.[6] Even though almost two-thirds of the members of parliament represented the ruling AK party, the government's ability to push hard for its proposal was limited. This has been explained by the fact that the supporters of the AK party was a rather disparate group consisting of those who shared the party leadership's moderate view of Islam, those who were more religious and conservative, and those who had voted for the AKP as a protest against the establishment parties and their inability to root out corruption. The government, torn between the obvious advantages of supporting the USA and the massive opposition in Turkish society, had repeatedly made it clear to Washington, prior to the vote, that it could not guarantee that it would win over its own deputies.[7] Domestically, the parliament's rejection was described by many as a victory for Turkish democracy since it reflected the will of the people. Almost every organization was against a war, especially the more Islamic ones which represented a large part of the AK party constituency.[8]

Externally, the rejection strained relations with the USA and complicated the preparations for war. US warships were waiting off the Turkish coast and Washington had to consider whether to abandon the northern front option or not.[9] A few days after the parliament's decision, there were reports that the ruling AK party was considering making a new bid for the deployment of US troops. If a war was inevitable, some analysts thought that Turkey would be better off co-operating in order not to forfeit its chance to enter northern Iraq.[10] On 5 March, Turkey's military chief

declared that the army shared the government's view that US troops should be allowed to strike Iraq from Turkey.[11] It was becoming more and more obvious that Turkey had a great deal to lose by denying the USA requests for support. If the war was going to take place in any case, Turkey's position would mean that it would have to face the economic losses that a war might entail without the substantial aid package offered by the USA It would have a hard time entering northern Iraq with its troops to secure what were considered vital national interests; to prevent Kurdish independence, to contain a potential refugee flow and to protect the Turkoman population. Already at the time of the first vote in parliament, the Turkish security elite, according to Mustafa Kibaroğlu, thought that the deal that had been worked out was the best that Ankara could get:

> By opening its territory to US troops, Turkey would become an active member of the 'coalition of the willing' and have a seat at the table around which the future of Iraq would be shaped. Turkey would have the leverage to prevent any development that would lead to an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Turkey would also have a voice in securing proper representation for the Turkomans. In addition, the $ 6 billion deal, together with other credits, would boost the economy.[12]

In the negotiations between Turkish and US diplomats, the Turkish side wanted a written pledge of economic assistance and guarantees that the Iraqi Kurds would not be allowed to establish their own state.[13] Although the US government repeatedly stated its opposition to Kurdish independence, Ankara continued to be suspicious of Washington's intentions.[14] Even though the government was prepared to go ahead despite its suspicions, many of the MPs from the ruling AK party were not. They were not convinced that issues of vital importance to Turkey, such as the territorial integrity of Iraq, the elimination of the PKK, the status of northern Iraq, the situation of the Turkomans etc., would be sufficiently considered by the USA. The fact that the USA was not willing to sign a written agreement with the Turkish government made the MPs even less convinced. They wanted every point of the agreement to be on paper.[15] The USA, for its part, was

concerned about what would happen if Turkey unilaterally sent its armed forces into northern Iraq. Turkey had on several occasions made it clear that the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would be seen as a *casus belli*.[16]

By mid-March Turkey had placed tanks, artillery and thousands of troops along the Iraqi border and the entire border area was declared a military zone that was off limits to reporters.[17] Ankara stated its intentions of sending in troops to stop a possible influx of refugees from Iraq and to prevent any attempts by Iraqi Kurds to break away from Iraq if the country fragmented during the war.[18] Although Ankara gave assurances to both the USA and the KDP/PUK leaders that its troops would only be there for humanitarian purposes, the plans caused tensions between Turkey and the Kurds. While Turkey feared that the Iraqi Kurds would try to set up their own state, the Iraqi Kurds, for their part, feared that Turkey would take advantage of the war to invade northern Iraq, destroy the regional administration and challenge the Kurdish self-rule. The Iraqi Kurdish leaders declared they would not accept Turkish troops in Iraq and said they would regard the Americans as liberators but the Turks as invaders. Large demonstrations were held in northern Iraq against Turkey's plans for military intervention. Turkish flags were burned and strong anti-Turkish feelings were expressed.[19] The USA feared that if Turkish troops went into Iraq, it might lead to clashes between Turks and Kurds, and that a war within the war might break out. A unilateral Turkish incursion might also have been regarded as a provocation by neighbouring countries like Iran, and in such a scenario, US soldiers might have become entangled in a wider regional conflict.[20]

As the war preparations intensified, so did the speculations about if and when the Turkish government would re-submit a motion to parliament about US-troop deployment. Question marks were raised as to whether there would even be time for a new vote before the outbreak of the war. While the USA continued to wait for a decision by Turkey, reports came in mid-March that the USA was moving ten navy ships out of the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, from where missiles could be launched without going over Turkey.[21] Around the same time, Turkey was hardening its position, saying that the USA would not

even be allowed to use Turkish airspace without approval from the Turkish parliament. This was problematic for the USA, which had counted on using its warplanes at Incirlik air base in the south of Turkey. The USA had also planned to fly troops directly into northern Iraq if Turkey refused to accept them on its territory.[22]

When a new motion was finally submitted to parliament on 20 March, on the same day as the war began, it no longer involved troops on the ground but only rights to use Turkish air space. The parliament voted in favour of it, so warplanes were allowed to conduct bombing missions and to land Special Forces in northern Iraq. On the same day as Turkey opened its airspace to US warplanes, some 1,000 Turkish troops crossed the border into Iraq, a move that was accepted by the USA and Britain and described by the USA as 'very light' and by Britain as 'consistent with a border-policing operation'.[23] Apart from that limited number of troops, Turkey did not enter northern Iraq, even if Ankara did not rule out the possibility of operations later on. Ankara was particularly nervous that the Kurds, in return for their loyal and enthusiastic help to the US forces, would want a stake in the oil fields.

Both the KDP and the PUK were eager to co-operate with the USA and lend their support. At the end of March-early April, Kurdish *peshmerga*, under the command of US forces, crossed the frontline that had divided the Kurdish controlled area from the territory under Baghdad's control since 1991, and approached Kirkuk.[24] The USA maintained its position that Turkey had no legitimate reason to enter Iraq and stated that such a move could be justified only if and when it was needed, either in order to stop a refugee flow, or if concrete security threats to Turkey arose.[25] The White House envoy to Iraqi opposition groups visited Turkey with the purpose of convincing Ankara that it should stay out of northern Iraq and assured Turkish' officials that the Kurds would not seize Kirkuk unilaterally.[26] Ankara's fears increased when, in early April 2003, Kurdish *peshmerga*, supported by a small number of US special forces and backed by US air strikes, entered Kirkuk and Mosul.[27] Many Iraqi Kurds regard Kirkuk as part of the Kurdish homeland and nurture dreams of returning to homes that they were forced to leave as a result of Saddam Husseins's

Arabization program, which aimed at moving Kurds out of Kirkuk and surrounding areas and replacing them with Arabs.

Following the take-over of Kirkuk and Mosul, the Turkish media were filled with images of triumphant Kurds, celebrating in the streets, and the Turkish government warned, again, that Turkey would not accept a Kurdish seizure of the cities. The USA gave assurances to Ankara that the Kurds would not stay in control and offered to let Turkey send military observers to Kirkuk and Mosul to make sure that the Kurdish fighters withdrew as soon as more American troops arrived.[28] A few days later, to the relief of Ankara, US troops began to move into Mosul and Kirkuk. Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül announced that, for the time being, there was no reason for the Turkish Army to go in.[29]

Turkish–US relations, which had been chilly ever since the refusal to allow US troops to deploy on Turkish territory, came under even heavier pressure in July 2003 when the American army detained 11 Turkish officers, along with 19 members of the Iraqi Turkoman Front, in Suleymaniya in northern Iraq. These officers were accused of plotting to assassinate the Kurdish mayor of Kirkul – an accusation that was denied by Turkey.[30] In a country that sees itself as a long-term and loyal ally of the USA, this incident led to strong reactions and hurt feelings. The soldiers were released two days after their arrest. In Turkey, the incident was interpreted by some as an indicator of the USA not wanting the Turkish military in northern Iraq. Political commentator Mehmet Ali Birand thought an incident of this kind was expected, considering that American officials had said for months that there was no need for a Turkish military presence in Iraq.[31] Clearly, the USA was suspicious of the activities of the Turkish Army in northern Iraq, and especially of its relations with the Turkomans.

After this incident, the presence of Turkish forces in northern Iraq was further restricted. The reluctance of the Iraqi Kurds and the USA to fight against or disarm the PKK was difficult for Ankara to digest, given all the proud declarations from Washington about 'fighting terrorism'. Ankara suspected that the USA was more interested in going along with the Iraqi Kurds' preference for a political solution to the PKK's presence in Iraq than in supporting Turkey's 'terrorist struggle'. The Kurds believed that a full amnesty should be given to the rebels to make it

possible for them to leave the mountains and return to life in Turkey.[32] In July 2003, the Turkish Parliament passed a temporary amnesty law to let PKK fighters surrender without being punished. However, the amnesty was restricted to those who had not killed Turkish military personnel, police or other officials. Before the law expired in February 2004, around 650 PKK fighters took advantage of it, but a majority chose not to surrender.[33] PKK activities in Iraq continued to be a thorny issue between Washington and Ankara. In 2004, the PKK called off the cease-fire which it had announced in 1999 and since then clashes have taken place occasionally. In spring 2006, the Turkish media reported that 40,000 troops were going to be sent to the Southeast, in addition to the around 250,000 troops already there, to stop PKK insurgents infiltrating from northern Iraq. Ankara claims there are some 3,000–4,000 PKK rebel fighters in Iraq and demands 'tangible support' from the USA.[34]

In the summer of 2003, the question of sending Turkish peace-keeping troops to Iraq began to be discussed. The US Army was in need of reinforcements and, as in so many other cases, the symbolic-strategic value of Turkey as a Moslem country was considered useful in advancing the argument that the invasion of Iraq was not a Western occupation. For Turkey, this was an opportunity to improve its relations with the USA and to increase its chances of having a say over the political and economic restructuring of Iraq by showing its willingness to cooperate. In October, the Turkish parliament voted in favour of sending troops but as soon as the decision was taken it became apparent that Turkish soldiers were not welcome in Iraq. The Iraqi Governing Council was firmly against Turkey, or any other neighbouring country, sending troops. Faced with this reaction, the Turkish government declared, that without an invitation from the Iraqi people, it would not send any peacekeepers.[35] The most vehement objections came from the Iraqi Kurds. KDP leader Barzani even threatened to quit the Governing Council if Turkey were to send troops.[36]

In January 2005, elections were held in Iraq to choose representatives for the Transitional National Assembly. The result was a success for the Kurds, who were able to overcome mutual hostilities and unite around one common list. The voter turnout in

the Kurdish region was almost 85 percent, which was much higher than in the rest of country. The Kurdistan Alliance List (comprising the most important parties and organisations in Iraqi Kurdistan) gained 75 of a total of 275 seats.[37] By comparison, the parties representing Sunni Arabs only gained 17 seats.[38] Many of them did not participate in the elections following calls for a boycott by religious leaders, or because they were afraid of threats by insurgents. Thus the Kurds, who make up 15 to 20 percent of the Iraqi population, won 27 percent of the seats in the Assembly while the Sunni Arab minority, which is the same size as the Kurdish, won only 6 percent of the seats. In the elections in the Kirkuk Governorate, which were held at the same time as the national election, the Kurds won 26 seats, which is about 60 percent of the total number of seats. Turkomans won 9 and Sunni Arabs 6 seats. The result, obviously, gave leverage to Kurdish aspirations for control over the city.[39]

Ankara's reaction to the elections was far from enthusiastic. The Foreign Ministry claimed that the voting procedure had been manipulated. Consequently, the Transitional Assembly would 'not reflect the true proportionality of various segments of the Iraqi society'.[40] According to a Turkish official, many Turkomans were hindered from voting. They were not allowed to go to the ballot boxes, and ballot boxes containing Turkoman votes were stolen. The Foreign Ministry specifically mentioned Kirkuk as one province in which the election result had been distorted. Despite these alleged irregularities, Ankara concluded that the elections and the political process that was taking place in Iraq should go ahead, since any alternative was considered far more detrimental. Thus, despite its criticism, Ankara chose to support the elections.[41]

Obviously, Ankara had several incentives to support the political transformation process in Iraq. If it were to fail, there would be a risk of instability and conflict, and of a withdrawal of the Kurds from participation in the reconstruction of Iraq. In line with its insistence on Kurdish participation in Iraqi national politics, Ankara also welcomed the election in April 2005 of Jalal Talabani as President of Iraq but was less pleased with Barzani being elected President of the Kurdish region by the Kurdistan National Assembly in June the same year. A spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry dismissed the election of Barzani and said that

appointing a president for the Kurdish region did not carry much
meaning, since a constitution and an administrative system for Iraq
had not yet been decided on.[42]

The success of the Kurds in the Iraqi elections was both
reassuring and disturbing from Ankara's perspective. On the one
hand, Ankara has always urged the Kurds to participate in Iraqi
politics at the central level. The gains the Kurds made gave them
stronger incentives to take part in the national political process.
Ankara's aim of anchoring the Kurds in Iraq thus looked more
likely to be successful thanks to the election results. On the other
hand, the leverage gained by the Kurds through their good results
might increase the likelihood that they would be able to enforce
ideas that Ankara regards as detrimental to Turkey's security, such
as a far-reaching federal system and Kurdish control over Kirkuk.

Kurdish Aspirations and Turkish Sensitivities

One of Turkey's main concerns after the invasion of Iraq was that
the Iraqi Kurds would take over the role of being the closest ally of
the USA in the region. The whole-hearted support from the Kurds
in combination with Turkey's opposition to the war increased
those concerns. In an interview in a Turkish daily, former
President Süleyman Demirel explained that he did not believe that
an independent Kurdish state would be established in northern
Iraq. He did, however, think that 'the US has to give something to
them [the Iraqi Kurds] as they had to use *peshmerga* during the
invasion of Mosul and Kirkuk as they could not open a northern
front from Turkey'.[43] There was indeed a widespread perception in
Turkey that the USA was now favouring the Kurds and that this
would be to the detriment of Turkey. Americans were said to be
'sensitive to the Kurdish demands'.[44] It was claimed that the USA
administration 'holds the Kurds in high esteem'.[45] Since the Kurds
wanted the Turkish Army out of Iraq, the direct and close relations
between the USA and the Iraqi Kurds could, it was assumed, result
in Turkey not being able to protect its interests. Turkey was all of a
sudden 'deprived by the United States [...] of the ability to
undertake military initiatives in a geographic zone it sees as vital
for its security'.[46] Ankara has in fact always been skeptical about
US intentions in northern Iraq and has suspected that the

Americans might be nurturing plans for setting up a Kurdish state. After the invasion, there were claims that the USA was not doing enough to discourage Kurdish demands for autonomy and for an expanded territory.[47] Even if the USA declared that it was against a split of Iraq and an independent Kurdish state, there were worries in Turkey that Washington's policy might change if the violence in Iraq continued. There were also worries that Washington, in order to accommodate the Kurds, would want all Turkish troops to leave northern Iraq, while at the same time the US Army and the *peshmergas* were not doing enough to put an end to the activities of the PKK.[48]

Since the political reconstruction process in Baghdad began, the Kurds have been engaged in intense negotiations over how much autonomy they will have in the future Iraq. The Kurdish leaders have repeatedly declared that they intend to remain in a united Iraq and they have participated in the efforts to find common solutions for the political future of the country. The question is how much the Kurds are willing to compromise, and what they will do in case of a prolonged civil war or if their demands for autonomy are not met. In the aftermath of the invasion, Peter W. Galbraith, a former US ambassador who follows Iraqi politics closely, concluded that few Kurds would choose to remain part of Iraq if they had a real choice. After twelve years of separation, the rest of Iraq has become a foreign land to the younger generation, according to Galbraith. As for the older generation, Iraq is mostly associated with repression and genocide.[49] A foreign journalist has put it this way: 'Young Kurds, especially, have spent their adult lives in a de facto independent state, do not speak Arabic, and wonder why their leaders are messing around in chaotic Baghdad.'[50]

For Turkish foreign-policy makers, these developments made the reintegration of the Kurds into Iraq all the more urgent. From Turkey's point of view, the Kurds had to realize that they were no longer secluded, that the time of the no-fly zone was over, that a Kurd was actually the President of Iraq, and that the Kurds should behave as Iraqis.[51]

In conjunction with the national elections in January 2005, an informal referendum was held in the Kurdish region about the future status of Iraqi Kurdistan. The result showed that 98 percent wanted independence.[52] In comparison with the rest of Iraq, the

parts under Kurdish self-rule continued, even after the invasion, to be relatively stable and safe. It cannot be ruled out that if the turmoil in Iraq gets even worse, the Kurds might, at some point, opt for secession. Massoud Barzani has stated that Kurdistan's demands concerning, for example, the status of Kirkuk, federalism and the status of the *peshmerga* were, and will be, the basis of its support for the transitional government and the reconstruction process. Barzani has also declared that if the Kurdish people agree to stay within the framework of Iraq, the other people should be grateful to them.[53]

The most profound consequence of the Iraqi invasion for Turkish foreign-policy makers was that they were forced to play a much more passive role than before. From being in a position to define the status of the PUK/KDP leaders, Turkish officials were now relegated to a position where they mainly had to wait and see what role the Kurdish leaders would be able to carve out for themselves. Although in a long-term perspective, relations with Ankara will be important to the Iraqi Kurds, cooperation with the USA became much more crucial in the short term when the transformation of the Iraqi state and its constitution was taking place.

Federalism

Since the invasion, Ankara has continued to make the same declarations concerning the structure of the Iraqi state as it had done during the self-rule period. The message is still that the future of Iraq must be decided by the Iraqi people as a whole and that no single group has the right to act or take decisions on its own. As long as that principle is respected, Turkish policy makers declare that they have nothing to say about how Iraq should be administered. The bottom line in those statements it that it is unacceptable to Ankara for the Iraqi Kurds to declare independence, or make other decisions about the status of the Kurdish region without involving the rest of the Iraqi population in the decision-making procedure (knowing, of course, that a majority of the Iraqi population would not support Kurdish secession).

Ankara might have preferred Iraq to become a centralized state, but it was clear from the outset that that was not an option. The alternatives at hand were not a federation vs. a unitary, centralized state. When the transformation process began in Iraq, discussions evolved around the *degree* of decentralization and *type* of federation. Although different concepts and labels were used, there were mainly two different federative models on the agenda. One, usually referred to as provincial or territorially-based federalism, was propagated by those who opposed a division into one Kurdish region in the north, one Shiia Arab region in the south and one Sunni Arab region in the middle, believing that this would lead to a disintegration of Iraq. The advocates of territorially-based federalism suggested that a federation should be based either on the 18 provinces into which Iraq was already divided, or on some other administrative units as long as they did not correspond with ethnic or sectarian divisions. With this model, each province would have some degree of autonomy within a federative framework.[54] Many Turkomans and Arabs in the provinces where Kurds are in a majority favoured this model since they believed it would restore majority rule over the Kurds.[55] It seemed, in fact, that the main motivation for those who propagated territorially-based federalism was less a fondness for their own brand of federalism than a dislike of a federalism along ethnic lines.

The other model, often referred to as regional federalism or ethnic federalism, was what the Kurds were striving for. They already had autonomy over three provinces in the north and preferred to bring all provinces with a substantial Kurdish population into one region, thus putting an end to the division of the Kurdish people into different administrative units.[56] The five Kurdish members of the Governing Council suggested that Kurdish autonomy should be expanded from the three provinces that had been under self-rule to include the province of Tamaim around Kirkuk and parts of the ethnically-mixed provinces of Ninevah and Diyala.[57] According to Massoud Barzani, the Kurds would never accept less than the areas they already controlled and also hoped 'for other regions of Kurdistan, which before the liberation of Iraq were subjected to demographic changes'.[58] Kurdish demands for federation also included the right to control

the oil in what they regarded as their region, exclusive taxation powers and the right to maintain their own military.[59]

In the negotiations that took place during the summer of 2005 over a new constitution, the question of federalism became the most difficult one to reach an agreement on. The Shiia Arab and Kurdish leaders argued in favour of a federation. The Sunni delegates opposed it. A draft constitution, which had been written by the Shiia and the Kurds before the Sunnis entered the negotiations, gave extensive power to the provinces. One of the most controversial paragraphs was the one that allowed provinces to join into regions.[60] This left the door open for an addition of more provinces to the Kurdish region in the north. What the Sunnis were even more concerned about, however, was that the Shiites would establish a super-region in the south comprising some nine or so provinces in which the Shiites are in a majority.[61] The consequences feared by the Sunni Iraqis was that the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south would form their own regions, while the Sunni population would be left in the middle on land with virtually no natural resources. Iraq's oil wealth is concentrated in the south and the north of the country.

The draft constitution, which was approved by voters in a referendum in October 2005, created a federal system with a weak central authority and extensive powers for the provinces. Not surprisingly, it was warmly embraced by most Kurds. First of all, the paragraph that allows for one or more of the 18 provinces to hold a referendum and decide to form a region makes it possible to consolidate the de-facto Kurdish region that has existed since 1991. Some Sunni Arabs believe that the right for provinces to combine into bigger entities provides an opening for break-away regions both in the north and in the south.[62] Certainly, there are many Kurds who hope that a federation in which the predominantly Kurdish provinces form a region will be the first step towards independence some time in the future. Another issue of importance for the Kurds is that the constitution makes the regional government 'responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organisation of the internal security forces for the region such as the police, security forces and guards of the region' (Article 120). This allowed the Kurds to keep their own *peshmerga* forces.

Even though the constitution was approved in the referendum, the constitutional process is not finalized. The Sunni Arabs have been promised that it will be possible to make changes to the document. The constitution has also been criticized for being vague and ambiguous and in need of substantial revision. According to Ankara, there are sixty issues in the constitution which require changes.[63]

Ankara's official position on Iraqi state structure is, as stated above, that it should be worked out by the Iraqis themselves and that neither Turkey nor any other external actor has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Iraq. Ankara has, nevertheless, made its preferences clear. A federation along ethnic lines would, according to Ankara, be very dangerous since it might lead to a deepening of ethnic and religious divisions and, ultimately, to a break-up of Iraq. As long as it is not a question of 'ethnic federalism', Turkish foreign-policy makers have said that they do not oppose a federal solution.[64] Ankara became more open towards the idea of a federative Iraq after the invasion, probably due to the fact that some kind of federal solution seemed to be the only way to keep Iraq together as one state.[65] Turkish policy preferences may have been adjusted to fit the changing realities, but the Foreign Ministry has, actually, defended the same basic principles both before and after the invasion. That the Iraqi people have the right to decide whatever political system they prefer, even a federation, was Ankara's policy prior to the invasion as well.[66] Neither before nor after the invasion did plans for decentralization of power and the creation of autonomous provinces create much stir in Ankara. What caused concern, before the invasion as well as after, was any structural set-up that might deepen and segment ethnic and/or sectarian divisions. Basically, however, Ankara's only really strong concern was to avoid a break-up of Iraq, resulting in an independent Kurdish state. Moreover, whatever path Iraq takes, it is far from clear that Ankara has either the intention or the option (especially given its aspiration for EU membership) to do anything more than to voice its protests. Although Turkey, even after the invasion, has kept some troops in the area where the PKK is active, the Turkish Army did not intervene even when the Kurds took over Kirkuk from the Iraqi government forces.[67] It has also been argued that 'Ankara is realistic enough to understand that

the emergence of a federal entity along some combination of ethnic and sectarian lines is a distinct possibility under a new Iraqi government'.[68] Instead of trying to stop something that might turn out to be more or less inevitable anyway, the policy makers in Ankara seem to be following a rather cautious path, attempting to nudge the Iraq transformation in a, for them, preferred direction, rather than making attempts to completely reverse it.

Concerning the Kurdish military forces, Ankara's opinion was that Iraq should have a national military under unified command. The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that: 'It is not a healthy thing for a country to have armed militias all over the country', but added that 'this is a question to be dealt with in the long run',[69] which indicated an acceptance for keeping the *peshmergas* during a temporary time period. The American administrator of Iraq also tried to put pressure on the Kurds to take part in a unified Iraqi army. The Kurdish demand for maintaining the *peshmerga* forces was, however, met when the interim Iraqi government and the occupation authorities, in June 2004, declared all militia groups illegal but made an exception for the *peshmerga*. They were allowed to form specialized units under the command of the Kurdish regional government.[70] The new constitution stipulates that the regions are responsible for organizing their own security force.

Kirkuk

The most controversial issue for Ankara, however, is Kirkuk. The Kurds regard Kirkuk as a Kurdish city in which they became a minority only after having been systematically expelled by the Ba'ath regime as part of its Arabization policy. Following the monarchy period, which ended in 1958, a series of Arabization campaigns took place with the aim of changing the balance of the population. Many Kurds and Turkomans were driven out of Kirkuk and its surroundings and tens of thousands of Arabs were brought in. Moreover, non-Arabs were pressed to register as Arabs in the decennial censuses that were carried out. In the last reliable census from 1957, Turkomans constituted the largest group in Kirkuk town, while the Kurds predominated in the surrounding countryside.[71]

Following the fall of the Ba'ath regime those who had been forced to leave during the previous decenniums started to come back in big numbers and the status of the city within the new Iraq became highly sensitive. A demographic battle over the ethnic composition of Kirkuk began after Kurdish *peshmerga* troops entered the city in April 2003. Tens of thousands of Kurds have arrived in Kirkuk since then.[72] Non-Kurdish residents claim that the KDP and the PUK have encouraged people to move to the city, regardless of whether they actually originated from there or not, and that many Kurds from other places, even from other countries, have moved in. This has been denied by the Kurds who instead claimed that they had actually tried to prevent a mass return.[73] Since the takeover of Kirkuk in 2003, the Kurds have been adamant that the 'imported' Arabs who have arrived after 1958 have to leave. Many indigenous Arabs and Turkomans, on the other hand, argue that the Arab 'newcomers' have a right to stay. Non-Kurds share a common fear of being marginalized in the Kurdish region and if the Arabs stay that would help to minimize Kurdish dominance.[74]

The Kurdish quest for hegemony in Kirkuk has manifested itself in the re-naming of streets and institutions, the flying of the Kurdish flag at various places in the city and the seizure of public buildings. Kurdish parties have taken control of the city's security forces and police. They have placed people loyal to themselves in key positions in the civil service, paying their salaries out of the budget of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Thus they have come to dominate both the civil and security services.[75]

The objective of the Kurdish parties is to incorporate Kirkuk into the federal Kurdish region, preferably as its capital. The Kirkuk province would then be added to the three provinces that today make up the Kurdish region: Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymaniah.[76] Massoud Barzani has declared he wants Kirkuk to become an example of ethnic, religious and national coexistence, but only 'after Kirkuk's identity is fixed as [part of] Kurdistan'.[77] For the Turkomans, such a move would be unacceptable. They do not, on the other hand, want to remain under the control of the central government either. Instead, they want Kirkuk to have a special status as a federal region which is governed neither by Baghdad nor by the Kurdish regional government. Some Arabs

agree with the Turkomans about the status of the province, whereas others would prefer to be governed by the central government.[78]

Thanks to their success in the January 2005 general elections, the Kurds had a good deal of influence over the new Iraqi constitution when it was written in 2005. The constitution contains a paragraph, inserted on the initiative of the Kurds, which stipulates that a 'normalization' process should take place in Kirkuk. This means, essentially, a reversal of previous Arabization programs. Expelled Kurds should be allowed to be repatriated while the Arab 'newcomers' should be, if not forced, at least strongly encouraged to go back to their places of origin. In December 2007, a local referendum is supposed to take place to decide the future of Kirkuk. By then, the Kurds count on being in a clear demographic majority and, consequently, they expect that the result of the referendum will be that the citizens of Kirkuk choose to be incorporated into the Kurdish region.[79]

For the other ethnic groups, the paragraph on Kirkus's future is a reflection of the Kurds' success in imposing their own agenda during the drafting of the constitution and does not represent an agreement based on consensus. Even if the Kurds have constitutional backing for their demands on a referendum before the end of 2007, it might not be possible to proceed with these plans without causing a major conflict. Leaders of the Turkoman and Arab communities have indicated that they may boycott the referendum and/or reject the result. Apart from the non-Kurdish local communities, significant parts of the Iraqi central government as well as the neighbouring states oppose the holding of a referendum and an incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan.[80]

Kirkuk has a substantial oil wealth, which is the main reason why its future status has become such an explosive issue. The Kurds claim that they want Kirkuk not for the oil, but because they have historical rights to the city. Nevertheless, during the drafting process of the constitution in 2005, when the question of ownership of the country's natural resources was debated, they argued that natural resources should belong to the regions. The Kurds declared that Kirkuk's oil belongs to Kurdistan, but that they were willing to share the revenues with all Iraqis.[81]

The constitution stipulates, however, that the oil is the property of all the people of Iraq. According to Article 111, the federal government will administer the oil extracted from current fields in cooperation with the producing regions and provinces, and the revenues are to be shared by all provinces, based on the size of the population. The ownership issue remains ambiguous, however, since the paragraph only refers to *current* fields. This has been taken to mean that the revenues from old oil fields will be shared nationally but that revenues from *new* fields will be kept by the region or province where it is found.[82] Such a demand had also been raised by the Kurdish parties during the negotiations. The Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government wrote in an article in the Financial Times in August 2005 that 'Kurdistan must have full ownership of our currently unexploited natural resources, to consolidate our development and ensure that we never again suffer the predations of a genocidal regime in Baghdad'.[83] Due to the vagueness of the constitution, the right to ownership of future discoveries is still disputed. Despite the unclear legal situation, the Kurdish Regional Government has gone ahead and signed contracts with foreign companies that have begun to explore new oil wells inside the Kurdish region.[84] Kurdish officials argue that they have the right to sign exploration agreements with foreign companies since other parts of the constitution give regional governments all powers not explicitly granted to the federal government. The central government says the issue has yet to be resolved and that this should be done through negotiations.[85]

Ankara is firmly opposed to Kurdish demands for control over Kirkuk. The oilfields around Kirkuk contain around 15 percent of Iraq's oil and it is generally believed that they could provide the economic basis for far-reaching Kurdish autonomy and could potentially be the economic platform that makes Kurdish statehood possible.[86] That is the main reason why an incorporation of Kirkuk into the Kurdish region is unacceptable to Turkish policy makers, who argue that the oilfields belong to 'the Iraqi population as a whole'.[87] A Kurdish autonomous region with control over the Kirkuk oil is seen by Ankara as the embryo of what could become an economically sustainable independent state.

On a visit to the USA in 2006, the Secretary-General of Turkey's National Security Council, Yiğit Alpoğan, described Kirkuk as the

'lynchpin' of Iraq and argued that if it is attached to the Kurdish region, it will be difficult to hold Iraq together. The Turkish position is that the constitution should be revised concerning the holding of a referendum or that the referendum should be postponed. If a referendum actually takes place in 2007, not only the people of Kirkuk, but all Iraqis should have the right to vote, according to Alpoğan.[88] To Ankara, Kirkuk is an Iraqi, not a Kurdish city. The Foreign Ministry has made it very clear that Turkey is sensitive about the preservation of the 'pluralist character' of Kirkuk.[89] Both Ankara and the Iraqi Turkoman Front claim that the Kurds, under the pretext of reversing the Arabization policy of the Ba'ath party, have brought in many more Kurds to Kirkuk than were ever expelled, and that these demographic manipulations were washed by the Americans.[90] The Iraqi Turkoman Front, which has strong connections with Ankara, argues that if Iraq becomes a federation, Kirkuk, like Baghdad, should be an autonomous city governed by a rotating leadership in which representatives of all the different ethnic communities should take turns in governing the city.[91] From Ankara, it is likewise emphasized that no single community should be allowed to dominate Kirkuk.[92]

Different Context – Same Policy

Although the political context in the region changed profoundly with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and although Turkey was now led by a mildly Islamic government, Ankara's policy remained basically unchanged after March 2003. The unity and sovereignty of Iraq and the prevention of Kurdish independence are still the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq. The most important reason why Turkish foreign-policy makers opposed the invasion in the first place was that they feared it could lead to a political turmoil, which might provide the Iraqi Kurds with an opportunity to break away and declare independence. When negotiations took place between the AK party government and its US counterpart about opening a northern front against Iraq and allowing American troops on Turkish territory, one of Ankara's conditions was that they would be given a written assurance that

the integrity of Iraq would be protected against any potential attempts at secession.

Ankara's priorities were certainly different than those of the United States. While the first priority of the USA was to get rid of Saddam Hussein, Turkey, in the words of a Turkish editorial, 'wanted to see the Saddam Hussein dictatorial regime remain intact simply to preserve the national unity of Iraq and thus prevent Kurdish secessionism'.[93] Even if Turkey did not cherish the idea of being neighbour to a dictatorial regime, it is obvious that avoiding a Kurdish secessionist move was more important than getting rid of Saddam Hussein. Being against the invasion was consistent with Turkey's policy towards Iraq ever since the emergence of Kurdish self-rule in northern Iraq. And on this issue the government and the military took the same stance. The military, as the main defender of the traditional *status quo* oriented foreign policy, was also concerned about the negative effects of a war in Iraq and hoped that it could be avoided.[94] When it was clear that this was not the case, the military declared that it supported the government's view that the USA should be allowed to use Turkish territory.

The AK party government has taken the same uncompromising stand as the military and previous governments against a Kurdish state on northern Iraqi territory. As the sectarian and ethnic fault lines have deepened in Iraq, the Turkish Foreign Minister has sternly warned the Iraqi Kurds that if they opt for independence, neighbouring countries will not just stand by and watch.[95] Turkey's strong opposition to Kurdish control over Kirkuk is ultimately about preventing a Kurdish state, and the promotion of Turkoman rights is also an attempt to undermine the idea of a state based on collective Kurdish ethnic identity.

On the issue of federalism, it is sometimes claimed that Ankara now accepts a federal system in Iraq and that Ankara's red lines have become pink. This is, however, not so much a result of a changed policy as of the emergence of a new reality over which Turkey has had very limited influence. Although the first preference for Turkish foreign-policy makers would have been a centralized Iraqi state, they have never claimed that a federal system is unacceptable in the way that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan or a Kurdish seizure of Kirkuk are. Ankara's position is

that a federation along ethnic or sectarian lines is likely to lead to instability and possibly disintegration, and this view has remained unchanged. Turkish officials have, however, acknowledged that they have no say over Iraqi constitutional affairs. That is, as long as the country does not break apart.

Even if Ankara's policy towards Iraq is still based on the same principles today as it was before 2003, it is nevertheless a fact that Turkey has been forced to accept a number of developments which have reduced its influence over the future of the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey was not able to prevent the entry of Kurdish *peshmerga* forces into Kirkuk. Turkey has also had to accept that its military presence in northern Iraq has been substantially reduced, that the US Army has not moved against the PKK, that the Kurds have gained increased importance as political actors and that the Kurdish *peshmerga* has been allowed to retain weapons captured from the Iraqi Army. Turkey's policy may be the same, but its role in northern Iraq has been marginalized.[96]

The contacts between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds continued after March 2003. The PUK and the KDP kept their representations in Ankara and maintained their contacts with the Turkish Foreign Ministry.[97] Naturally, because of the changes in Iraq after March 2003, the relations between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have changed in some ways. First of all, the PUK and KDP leadership are not only present in the Kurdish region in the north but are also part of the central administration in Baghdad. When, for example, Jalal Talabani visited Ankara in November 2003, he came as the Interim President of the Iraq Governing Council and not just as a leader of an Iraqi political party, a status that Ankara had emphasized on all his previous visits. Thus, since 2003, Ankara has had relations with the Iraqi Kurds on two different levels, sometimes as representatives of the central government, sometimes as representatives of the regional government. Secondly, the leverage of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders increased after the end of Saddam Hussein's regime and they were able to strengthen their position vis-à-vis Turkey. Soon after the invasion, Washington announced that it did not tolerate Turkey's military involvement in northern Iraq. Several developments occurred which proved to the Iraqi Kurds that they did not have to host any overwhelming fears of a Turkish intervention which

could put an end to the semi-independent status they had gained during the 1990s. As mentioned above, not even when Kirkuk fell to US and Kurdish forces was the Turkish Army able to respond. In order to benefit from its increasingly important economic interests in northern Iraq, Ankara was also forced to consider that Kurdish officials in the Iraq Governing Council had considerable influence in allowing Turkish companies to operate in the Kurdish provinces as well as in other parts of Iraq.[98] The crucial factor for Ankara is, however, not the increased power of the Iraqi Kurds *per se*. Interacting with the Kurdish leaders as representatives of the central government in Baghdad is a far less sensitive issue to Ankara than interacting with them when they represent the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The PKK remains in northern Iraq, but since the US government is no longer willing to turn a blind eye if Turkish troops enter Iraq, Ankara has had to rely on American troops and the *peshmergas* to contain the PKK for them. There are strong doubts in Ankara concerning the US Army's commitment to fight the PKK, especially given the overwhelming task of keeping the rest of Iraq from descending into complete chaos. Turkish policy makers do not think that the USA is doing enough to combat the PKK. Prime Minister Erdoğan has declared that he has not ruled out the possibility that Turkey, for security reasons, might have to enter Iraq.[99] Thus, even if the new situation restricted the manoeuvrability of the Turkish army, Ankara keeps up the same rhetoric. The bottom line of this rhetoric is that Turkey has the right to defend itself against terrorism and to send troops across the border if that turns out to be necessary. Despite these warnings, Ankara has so far been sticking to its traditional cautious policy.

CONCLUSIONS

Turkey's interest in northern Iraq must be seen in the light of the unhappy co-existence between Kurdish ethnic identity on the one hand, and Turkish state ideology on the other. Kurdish self-rule in northern Iraq is a challenge to the ideological foundation of the Turkish state, that is, to the idea of the unitary nation-state in which ethnicity is an irrelevant phenomenon in the public and political sphere. The mere option of an alternative model being established in Iraq is perceived as a threat by Ankara.

Whether a change of the Iraqi state structure would actually trigger a domino effect inside Turkey and result in secession and a break-up of the country is, oddly enough, never explicitly analyzed in the official discourse. It is as if the risk of contagious effects is taken for granted and considered so obvious that it does not need to be explained. It is, however, difficult to see that there is any automatic causal mechanism predicting that, if Iraq were to be divided or if a federal model based on ethnicity were to be consolidated, this would necessarily increase the likelihood of the same transformation of the Turkish state. And even if Turkey were to make some constitutional changes and adopt federative elements in its state structure, it is still an open question whether that would increase or decrease the stability of the state. But for the disciples of the Kemalist ideology, defending the *idea* of the state, and defending its physical existence, often amount to the same thing. To many of them, discussing alternatives to the present state structure is not regarded as a legitimate expression of a different opinion but as a subversive act. An event that took place in the fall of 2004 can serve as an example. At that time, a report on minorities and cultural rights in Turkey was prepared by

a sub-committee of the autonomous 'Human Rights Advisory Board'. The report criticized Turkey for putting reservations on international conventions on minority rights and called for a revision of the Constitution so that cultural rights could be expanded. This caused a great deal of controversy and a heated debate followed. At the centre of the inflamed debate was the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne, which has a next-to-sacred status in official discourse. The authors of the report claimed that Turkey's practice since 1923 has not been in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty. Although the Treaty grants minority status only to non-Moslem groups, it nevertheless stipulates that all Turkish citizens should be free to use the language they wish in commercial life, open and closed meetings and in all press and broadcasting institutions. According to the report, the whole debate about broadcasting and education in Kurdish would have been irrelevant if the Lausanne Treaty had only been properly implemented. This was obviously an attempt to advocate minority rights, not in opposition to, but in the name of, the Lausanne Treaty. Nevertheless, the report was criticized by the media, the President, government ministers, the Chief of Staff and other high-ranking state officials. Most critics of the report dismissed it with the argument that there cannot be any compromises concerning the unitary structure of the state. That a report like this can stir up such strong feelings demonstrates how issues concerning national identity are still explosive. But it also shows that, while there are many staunch defenders of the present order, there are also attempts to redefine and challenge the *status quo*. The struggle is continuing about basic values such as what it means to be Turkish and to belong to the Turkish nation.

This book has analyzed the connections between foreign policy and the domestic political and social order. The way in which a state defines its place in the world and its national interests is a reflection of internal struggles, in which different groups compete over the power to define the character of the nation and the principles on which it should be based. Future change, or lack of change, in Turkish foreign policy will thus very much depend on internal developments. The direction of Turkey's policy towards Iraq, especially northern Iraq, will be contingent on how some domestic political issues are dealt with in the near future.

Questions of minority rights, ethnic diversity and Kurdish identity are crucial. As long as the concerns about the unity and indivisibility of the state remain as strong as they are at present, it is difficult to see how Ankara would be open to any major readjustments of its policy. The fear of separatism and centrifugal forces at home makes it very difficult for Turkish policy makers to accept certain developments in Iraq, such as a break-up of the country or extensive autonomy for an enlarged Kurdish region which includes Kirkuk. If these fears diminish inside Turkey, increased flexibility in its foreign policy towards Iraq seems more likely. Foreign-policy changes will go hand in hand with changes in domestic politics.

Developments in Iraq might, however, be beyond Ankara's control. If the Kurdish region in northern Iraq gradually moves towards independence, Turkey may not be able to do anything about it without paying a price which is much too high. A military invasion of northern Iraq with the aim of blocking Kurdish independence would damage, maybe even put a complete stop to, the EU-accession process. Ankara might simply be forced to accept the unacceptable. Moreover, it is far from obvious that the emergence of a Kurdish state in Iraq would have negative implications for Turkey as long as such a state emerged as a result of a peaceful process. If the preparation for EU membership leads to a more democratic society, in which civil and political rights are fully respected, there is no reason to take for granted that Kurds in southeastern Turkey would be interested in independence.

The policy towards Iraq is also contingent on the over-all development of Turkey's foreign relations. Predictions and speculations about the direction in which Turkey is moving are frequent: Will it become fully integrated into Europe, or will it turn in the opposite direction and develop closer bonds with its Moslem neighbours in the Middle East? Another speculation, popular in the mid-1990s, was that Turkey would turn towards the Turkic republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus and take on a leading role in that region. Yet another possibility is that Turkey will become more inward-looking and aloof, or that it will prioritize its 'strategic partnership' with the USA, or maybe even try to establish closer links with Russia.

While domestic political conditions will shape foreign policy, domestic politics will, in turn, be shaped by developments outside Turkey. External factors – most importantly whether or not the EU will open its doors to Turkey – will have an impact on the distribution of power and influence among domestic actors. Full membership of the European Union has been the main foreign-policy goal for over four decades. As long as uncertainty prevails concerning the outcome of that process, Turkey is kept in a kind of limbo, and so is its policy towards the Middle East. Even though Turkey's traditional strategy of non-involvement in the Middle East was replaced by a more active policy after the end of the Cold War, it is still EU membership that is the top priority. The only development that could make Turkey seriously search for other options would be if it is rejected, fully or partly, by the EU.[1]

A US diplomat who had just arrived in Ankara in the late 1990s described how his impression of Turkish foreign policy was that it has two different faces, one towards the Middle East and another, very different one, towards Europe, or the West. Towards the Middle East, the policy is more in line with the traditional, realist paradigm in which security and military strength are at the top of the agenda. The policy towards the West corresponds better with liberal theories emphasizing the importance of interdependency, economic integration and negotiations without threats of use of force.[2] Obviously, interstate relations are different in the Middle East compared to those in Europe. Being located right in the middle, Turkey might be more or less forced to play two different games. The entanglement with the European Union has put pressure on Ankara to implement political and economic reforms aimed at creating a more stable and open market, to put an end to abuses of human rights and to reduce the influence of the military in politics. The mode of interaction in Europe is based on negotiations rather than on military threats. Relations between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours may not be constantly hostile, but threats of military intervention occur from time to time. The PKK issue has soured relations, with Syria in particular but also with Iran and Iraq for many years. And the presence of the Turkish Army on Iraqi territory is but one example of how military power shapes inter-state relations in the region.

In Europe, borders are becoming more and more porous and penetrable. The nation-state is in a state of transformation with power transferred both upwards to supra-national institutions in Brussels and downwards to sub-national regions. In the Middle East, however, there are few signs of similar developments taking place. Turkey, located between the two regions with their different logics, is, in some ways, closer to the rationale that prevails in the Middle East. A case in point is Turkey's strong commitment to national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

If and when Turkey becomes an EU member, many of these basic principles will have to be reconsidered. The traditional foreign policy contains ideas that will not always be easy to reconcile with participation in the European integration project. While entrenched principles prescribe a move towards the West and integration with Western institutions, they also emphasize the importance of national independence and sovereignty. When facing a Western institution such as the European Union, which is developing an increased number of supra-national traits, integration with the West will be difficult to combine with rigid insistence on national sovereignty. There is no reason to believe that Turkey would not be able to handle the adjustment, but it will require an ideological transformation. Turkey's concern about enforcing one national identity above all others has to give way to an acceptance of overlapping identities, meaning that people can have a regional, a national and a European identity simultaneously and that the regional and/or the European identity might even take precedence over the national. Many Kurds might choose to identify themselves as citizens of Europe and as Kurds, rather than to identify with a Turkish nation. Ankara's policy towards northern Iraq – the strong objections to Kurdish self-rule and the insistence that Iraq remains intact – is not primarily based on concern about the unity and sovereignty of Iraq but ultimately on concern about the unity and sovereignty of Turkey. If and when Turkey becomes more closely integrated into the EU, this uncompromising commitment to a unitary state where 'state and nation are indivisible', will be difficult to maintain. Sub-national actors will have increased possibilities to by-pass Ankara, and national sovereignty will, in many areas, have to be relocated to Brussels.

According to a foreigner travelling in northern Iraq around the time of the US invasion, it was possible from time to time to hear ingenious individuals express the bold idea that it would be a good thing if Turkey were to be admitted into the European Union because then Iraqi Kurdistan could break away from Iraq, become a part of Turkey and thereby join the Union too. Although prophesies like these are more entertaining than realistic, they raise the issue of how eventual Turkish membership of the Union would affect both Kurdish aspirations for an independent state as well as Turkish fears of these aspirations. Most Kurds in Turkey believe that EU membership would significantly improve their situation and protect their cultural and political rights. But what would the implications be for trans-national Kurdish contacts in the Middle East? Even today, the Kurds are cut off from each other by being included in separate state-building projects. This separation could be even more cemented if Turkey enters the EU, since the Union is firm about securing its outer boundaries. The Eastern enlargement in 2004 meant that new members that became frontier states, such as Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, had to step up their control along the Union's new external borders. If Turkey enters the Union, there will certainly be a reinforcement of the borders towards Iraq, Iran and Syria. Considering that Turkey is a major transit country for people trying to get into Europe from Asia and the Middle East, the EU will demand tight control of Turkey's eastern borders. The Kurds will thus be divided, not only by present nation-states borders, but also by the external border of the European Union. That would render any prospects of a Greater Kurdistan; the union of all Kurds in a common state, even more unlikely than they look today, which, in turn, would reduce Ankara's security concerns. While such a development could improve the situation for the Kurds in Turkey, it would work against any pan-Kurdish dreams and aspirations.

One conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the coming-to-power of a pro-Islamic government has not changed the basic parameters of the Kemalist foreign policy, at least not as concerns the Kurds in Iraq. The continuity of the policy towards northern Iraq after the AKP's victory in the 2002 elections parallels the lack of change in Ankara's EU policy. If anything, the new government pursued the long-term goal of joining the EU

with even more enthusiasm and success than most of its predecessors. The Islamic leaning AKP represents a segment of society which, for the last couple of decades, has challenged the official ideology and has presented different ideas about relations both with the West and with the Middle East. Earlier Islamic parties in which the AKP has its roots have been anti-EU and have advocated closer relations with the Islamic world. Since the AKP came to power and took over the task of leading the country, ideology seems to have given in to state tradition, at least in the foreign-policy area. In fact, more or less all the basic features of the policy towards Iraq remain unaltered. However, on the issue of federation, there has been a minor policy change. With time, Ankara has become increasingly more open to the idea of Iraq becoming a federative state. During the Iraqi transformation process, the weakness, or even lack, of a common Iraqi identity among the citizens was indisputably exposed. The first elections held after the invasion clearly showed that people voted along ethnic lines, and federation soon emerged as the only realistic alternative to disintegration. Thus, Ankara's policy can be understood as an adjustment to an inevitable reality rather than an ideological shift. And again, the main priority remains the same: to preserve the unity of Iraq.

Turkey's future relations with the EU will have important repercussions on Ankara's policies towards other regions and states. This is because the membership issue is so intimately interlinked with domestic politics; furthermore, since EU membership is the most highly prioritized foreign-policy goal, policies towards other regions will be dependent on what happens in the relationship with the Union. As two Turkish scholars argue, Turkey's Middle-East policy has been 'based on its interpretation of how any such involvement would affect its higher-priority West-oriented goal'.[3] EU membership would imply increased democratization, extended cultural and political rights for the Kurds and reduced political influence for the military. Moreover, the traditional Kemalist elite would probably lose more and more of its monopoly on defining the official ideology. This would certainly affect many aspects of Turkey's foreign policy, especially those that are linked to the Kurdish issue. If Turkey is *not* fully integrated into the EU, its direction will be more uncertain. Turkey

might then readjust its priorities, but at the same time, a reform process has begun and may very well continue, with or without a yes from the European Union. Therefore, provided that the developments taking place now are not interrupted and provided that the security-obsessed foreign policy does not prevail, more openness towards the developments in northern Iraq can be expected in the future.

At the same time, Turkey's policy is a reflection of its nation-building project, which is still unsettled and disputed. As long as there is fundamental disagreement over national identity issues in Turkey, the political status of the Kurds in Iraq will remain a source of insecurity for Turkish foreign-policy makers, who will continue to be on the alert until the day, if it ever comes, when the Iraqi Kurds are (re)integrated into a stable and united Iraq.

NOTES

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

[1] Babil, 16 October 2002, quoted in Raphaeli (2004), p. 1.
[2] Picard (2006), p. 75.
[3] Interview with senior official, Ankara, 20 July 2000.
[4] Brandell (2006), p. 205.
[5] Jørum (2008 forthcoming), referring to Herb (1999: 24; Newman 2000: 18).

Chapter 2

NATION-BUILDING AND FOREIGN POLICY

[1] The expression 'a stateless nation' illustrates the perservence of the idea that there are objectively existing nations which all, ideally, should have their own state.
[2] Verney (2002), p. 99.
[3] Bloom (1990), pp. 55–6.
[4] Pye (1962), p. 52.
[5] Kymlicka (1998), pp. 32, 212; Cizre Sakallioğlu (1996), p. 6.
[6] Bloom (1990), pp. 79–82.
[7] Bloom (1990), pp. 73–4.
[8] Bloom (1990), p. 93.
[9] Rygiel (1998), p. 107.
[10] Lapid (2001), p. 14.
[11] Brown (2001), p. 119. For a review article of 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', see Checkel (1998).
[12] Haas (2001), p. 24.
[13] Brandell (2002), pp. 2–3.

[14] Campbell (1990), p. 264.

[15] See Dodds (1994), pp. 186–93.

[16] For a discussion of foreign policy as a representational practice see Dodds (1994), pp. 187–9.

[17] Jacobsson (1997), pp. 31–2.

[18] Dodds (1994), p. 187.

[19] Campbell (1992), p. 11.

[20] Campbell (1990), p. 266.

[21] McSweeney (1999), p. 22.

[22] Dodds (1994), pp. 191–2; Campbell (1992), p. 12; Connolly (1989), pp. 334–5; McSweeney (1999), p. 2.

[23] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), pp. 23–4.

[24] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), pp. 124–5.

[25] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), p. 120.

[26] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), pp. 7–8.

[27] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), p. 119.

[28] Wilson and Donnan (1998), p. 8.

[29] Wilson and Donnan (1998), p. 8.

Chapter 3

DEFINING AND DEFENDING THE TURKISH NATION

[1] Köker (2002), p. 2

[2] In an interview with Armenia's President Robert Kocharian, prominent Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand questions the motives for wanting recognition of an Armenian genocide. When Kochanian responds that recognition of an Armenian genocide will never result in Armenia's demand for land, Mr. Birand says: 'Turkey does not trust you and you do not trust Turkey either. Turkey is worried. There exists an article in your Constitution and in the statutes of the Tashnak Party. You state that you will not demand any compensation or any land, what matters is that we recognize the genocide. Imagine someone else is appointed to the presidency. Then your successor might say. "That promise was given by Kocharian not by myself. Now that you had recognized the genocide, you should pay compensation and give us some land."' Mr. Birand also questions why the Armenian Parliament does not officially declare that they would not demand any compensation or land from Turkey. What adds to Turkey's discomfort is that the Armenian parliament has not yet approved the border agreement with Turkey. See *Turkish Daily News*, 1 February 2001. Another, and closely related reason

for Turkey's sensitivity about the Armenian issue is, to quote political scientist Étienne Copeaux, that a recognition of 'the genocide would be to recognize that a very large number of Armenians used to live in Anatolia. Therefore, it would mean there is a multi-cultural Anatolia. But, as we can see today with the issue of the Kurds, the Turkish state is envisaged as a uni-cultural state, a state with a single culture, a single language. So [to recognize the Armenian genocide] would mean Turkey should offer concessions not only to Kurds but also to other nationalities that still live in Turkey'. Copeaux is quoted by Gorilovskaya in the journal *Mother Jones*, 23 April 2004.

[3] McDowall (2004), p. 7. I will, in chapter 6, argue that the border with Iraq has the same inviolable status as the other borders.

[4] Hale (2000), p. 225.

[5] Hale (2000), p. 45.

[6] Çandar (2004), p. 57.

[7] Cem (2001), p. 117.

[8] *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* (1992), p. 86.

[9] Tunander (1995).

[10] Hale (2000), pp. 15–6; Zürcher (1997), p. 12.

[11] Karpat (1973), pp. 8–9.

[12] Zürcher (1997), p. 21.

[13] Hourani (1974), p. 72

[14] Zürcher (1997), p. 29; Hale (2000), p. 23

[15] Hourani (1974), p. 73; Karpat (1974), p. 95.

[16] Hourani (1974), p. 73; Zürcher (1997), pp. 41, 59–64. For a detailed desciption of the reforms from the 1820s to the 1870s, see Zürcher (1997), pp. 38–79.

[17] Yılmaz (2006), p. 31.

[18] Karpat (1973), pp. 86–7.

[19] Rooke (2006), p. 132.

[20] Karpat (1973), p. 86

[21] Karpat (1973), pp. 87–8.

[22] Quataert (2000), pp. 186–7.

[23] Karpat (1973), pp. 91–2.

[24] Karpat (1973), p. 8.

[25] Hourani (1974), p. 75.

[26] Hale (2000), p. 16.

[27] Hale (2000), p. 29.

[28] Zürcher (1997), pp. 83–94.

[29] Karpat (1973), pp. 84–5.

[30] Karpat (1973), pp. 106–7.

[31] Hanioğlu (1995), pp. 200–3; Hanioğlu (2001), pp. 305–6.

32 Hanioğlu (1995), p. 209; Hanioğlu (2001), pp. 296–7.

33 Hanioğlu, (2001), pp. 296, 301.

34 Hanioğlu (2001), pp. 301–2.

35 Karpat (1973), p. 111.

36 Hale (2000), p. 32; Hanioğlu (2001), p. 300.

37 Zürcher (1997), pp. 109, 114; Hale (2000), pp. 33–4.

38 Lewis (1968), pp. 344–6.

39 Hanioğlu (2001), pp. 295–6.

40 Lewis (1968), pp. 349–51.

41 Lewis (1968), p. 352; Zürcher (1997), p. 135.

42 Yılmaz (2006), pp. 35–6; Hale (2000), p. 46.

43 Zürcher (1997), p. 153; Hale (2000), p. 45; Yılmaz (2006), p. 36.

44 Kirişci and Winrow (1997), pp. 75–8.

45 Somer (2004a), p. 247.

46 Gökalp (1968), p. 12.

47 Gökalp (1968), p. 15.

48 Gökalp (1968), p. 16.

49 For a discussion on this debate see Somer (2005b), pp. 73–90.

50 İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarik (2000), p. 195.

51 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5.

52 This figure is given by the Turkish Embassy in Washington. Andrews, quoted in Kirişci and Winrow (1997), p. 119, mentions as many as 49 different ethnic groups.

53 Kirişci and Sampson (1998), pp. 4–15.

54 Robins (2003), pp. 383–4.

55 Poulton (1997), p. 219.

56 The National Pact was a short document that laid down the principles and aims of the nationalist resistance movement. The resistance movement persuaded the Ottoman government to hold elections for the parliament in October 1919. Members and sympathizers of the movement managed to win most of the seats and in January 1920, the parliament unanimously adopted the National Pact. For Mustafa Kemal, the National Pact defined and set the boundaries for the new Turkish nation. See Kirişci and Winrow (1997), pp. 77 and 92.

57 Hale (2000), pp. 47–59.

58 Robins (1992), p. 81.

59 Shaw and Kural Shaw (1976–77), p. 376; Çelik (1999), p. 119 ff.; Kirişci (1996), p. 38.

60 Gunter (1993), p. 302: Kirişci and Winrow (1997), p. 167.

61 Köker (2002), p. 3.

62 The Kurdish Workers Party. In 2002, the PKK changed its name to KADEK, the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress. In 2003 the

group changed its name again to Kongra-Gel (Kurdistan Peoples Congress). It is still, however, usually referred to as the PKK.

63 Altıntay and Kancı (2007 forthcoming).

64 See for example *Turkish Daily News*, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 16 August 2001.

65 *Turkish Daily News*, 4 January 2002, editorial.

66 *Turkish Daily News*, 8 August 2001.

67 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), p. 25.

68 Somer (2004b), pp. 339–40

69 Cizre Sakallıoğlu (1996), p. 1.

70 Somer (2004a), p. 252.

71 Çandar (2004), p. 53.

Chapter 4

Kurdish Identity in the Turkish Republic

1 McDowall (2005), p. 144.

2 McDowall (2004), pp. 143, 405–12.

3 Mango (1999), p. 16.

4 McDowall (2005), p. 1.

5 McDowall (2004), p. 144.

6 Jung and Piccoli (2001), pp. 122–3.

7 Watts (2000), pp. 11–16; Kirişci and Winrow (1997), pp. 98–9.

8 Watts (2000), pp. 17–27. The numbers Watts presents are taken from military sources. According to McDowall (2004, p. 209) it was estimated that some 40,000 Kurds perished, although he adds that that figure might be exaggerated.

9 Watts (2000), pp. 6–10. Quote from p. 10.

10 Kadıoğlu (1998), p. 186.

11 McDowall (2004), p. 207.

12 Cem (2001), p. 115.

13 Mango (1999), p. 22.

14 Jung and Piccoli (2001), p. 60; Kadıoğlu (1998), p. 186.

15 Yeğen (1996), pp. 220–6.

16 Zürcher (1997), pp. 276–7.

17 Zürcher (1997), pp. 292–4, 324.

18 McDowall (2004), pp. 426–7.

19 Jung and Piccoli (2001), p. 124.

20 Zürcher (1997), p. 325.

21 McDowall (2004), pp. 423–8; Kirişci and Winrow (1997), pp. 129–31; Zürcher (1997), p. 325.

[22] Zürcher (1997), p. 326.

[23] Robins (1991), p. 33; Kirişci and Winrow (1997), p. 131; McDowall (2004), p. 426.

[24] Gurbey (2005), pp. 140–1.

[25] McDowall (2004), pp. 432–3.

[26] Somer (2004a), pp. 246–9.

[27] Jørum (2006), pp. 162–3.

[28] Gurbey (2005), p. 142

[29] Yavuz and Özcan (2006), pp. 108-9 ; *Middle East Report Online*, 31 August 2005.

[30] Çarkoğlu (2003), pp. 172–9.

[31] Çandar (1999), p. 131.

[32] Cizre Sakallioğlu (1997), p. 158.

[33] According to Gurbey (2005), p. 139, the NSC 'makes Turkey's Kurdish policy, and the military is its instrument to implement it'.

[34] Gurbey (2005), p. 155.

[35] European Commission (2004).

[36] Bozarslan (2005), p. 133.

[37] Somer (2004b), p. 332.

[38] Kirişci and Winrow (1997), p. 148.

[39] *The Economist*, 12 April 2006; *Middle East Report Online*, 31 August 2005.

[40] Yavuz (2004), p. 126; McDowall (2004), p. 9.

[41] Somer (2005a), p. 117.

[42] For a discussion on rival and compatible identities, see Somer (2004b).

[43] Yavuz and Özcan (2006), p. 103.

[44] Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2002), pp. 417–32. Among the Turks, only 2 percent were married to somebody from another ethnic group and 1.4 percent of them had a Kurdish partner. Blood relations were found in 20.5 percent of marriages between Turks.

[45] Somer (2005a), pp. 113–4.

Chapter 5

NATION-BUILDING AND DISCOURSE ON DANGER

[1] Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), p. 120.

[2] Some texts, which are just repetitions of previous texts, have been left out. By November 2006 most of the texts which were accessed (at

www.mfa.gov.tr) in November 2001 were no longer available. (The author keeps the printed pages.)

3 Under the heading 'Foreign Policy' there were a number of sub-headings, one of which was 'Main Issues'. Under this sub-heading, eleven different topics were presented, one of which was Terrorism. (The others were 'Cyprus', 'Turkey and the EU', 'Turkey's Security and its Relations with NATO', 'Armenian Allegations', 'Energy issues', 'Turkish Straits', 'Water issues', 'Arms Control and Disarmament', 'Turks Living Abroad' and 'Human Rights').

4 Campbell (1990), p. 271.

5 Campbell (1990), p. 272.

6 Campbell (1990), p. 271 ff.

7 Campbell (1990), p. 277; Campbell (1992), p. 75

8 www.mfa.gov.tr (accessed 15 November 2001).

9 Campbell (1992), p. 3.

10 A similar point is made by McDowall (2004), p. 416, who points out that it is of importance for Ankara to warn of the danger of Kurdish separatism while, at the same time, it is important to deny the actual extent of it.

11 Cem (2001), p. 115.

12 Cem (2001), p. 115.

Chapter 6

ENABLING AND THWARTING DE FACTO KURDISH STATEHOOD

1 McDowall (2004), pp. 357–61.

2 Kirişci and Winrow (1997), p. 158.

3 Kirişci (1996), p. 22; Kirişci (2004), p. 291.

4 Graham-Brown (1999), pp. 110, 213, 222, 223; McDowall (2004), p. 378.

5 Interview with senior official, Ankara, 20 July 2000.

6 According to *Turkish Daily News*, 29 June 2001, the foreign diplomats who have visited the region 'say it is ironic to see one part of Iraq and its 4 million people in the north enjoy all these rights and have democratic institutions whereas the centre and south of the country still live under an iron rule'. For similar reports see *Turkish Daily News*, 29 October 2002 and *The New York Times*, 28 July 2002.

7 Interview with senior official, Ankara, 20 July 2000.

8 This was the result after the reallocation to the KDP and the PUK of votes from smaller parties which had not reached the 7 percent threshold for entering parliament. See Graham-Brown (1999), pp. 219–20.

9 Robins (2003), p. 325.

10 Graham-Brown (1999), pp. 220–2.

11 Gunter (1999), pp. 67–87.

12 Interview with senior official, Ankara, 18 July 2000.

13 Interview with senior official, Ankara, 18 July 2000.

14 Interview with senior official, Ankara, 20 July 2000.

15 Interview with senior US diplomat, Ankara, 1 December 2000.

16 Kirişci (1994–95), pp. 44–50.

17 *Turkish Daily News* reported on 1 November 2001 that '[a]t least 100 trucks bring Iraqi crude oil across the border to Turkey every day'. KDP took dues on the Iraqi oil sold to Turkey and charges on traffic across the Habur border gate. See McDowall (2004), pp. 389–90; Kirişci (1996), p. 31 and Graham-Brown (1999), pp. 224, 228.

18 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), 'What is Turkey's Iraq Policy?.'

19 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), 'What is Turkey's Iraq Policy?.'

20 Gunter (1999), p. 118.

21 Aziz's letter is quoted in *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 43, May 1997. See also *Turkish Daily News*, 26 October 2001 which reported that Iraq had asked the UN 'to ban Turkish incursions in north' and demanded that '[t]he United Nations should shoulder its responsibility and demand the Turkish government to stop immediately its military aggression against Iraq'.

22 *Turkish Daily News*, 28 June 2001.

23 *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 41, March and April 1995.

24 *Turkish Daily News*, 10 April 1995.

25 Kirişci and Winrow (1997), p. 163.

26 Interview with Safeen M. Dizayee, representative of the KDP in Ankara, 30 November 2000.

27 Roberts (1995), p. 59.

28 *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 3:2 (Summer 1995), p. 15.

29 Roberts (1995), p. 59.

30 Gunter (1998), p. 38.

31 Interview with Safeen M. Dizayee, representative of the KDP in Ankara, 30 November 30 2000.

32 Interview with senior US diplomat, Ankara, 1 December 2000.

33 Interview with senior official, Ankara, 18 July 2000.

[34] *Boundary and Security Bulletin* is published by the International Boundaries Research Unit at Durham University in the UK. In every issue there is a summary of international news concerning border issues.

[35] *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 2:1 (April 1994).

[36] *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 2:2 (July 1994).

[37] *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 2:3 (October 1994).

[38] *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 2:4 (January 1995).

[39] Whether *Boundary and Security Bulletin* provides a complete list of all incidents is not clear. There may of course have been crossings that were not reported in media.

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[50] Interview with senior official, Ankara, 18 July 2000.

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[52] *Turkish Daily News*, 30 August 2001.

[53] *Turkish Daily News*, 19 June 2001. See also the issue on 20 June 2001.

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[60] Interview with senior official, Ankara, 18 July 2000.

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[93] Aykan (1996), p. 347.

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Chapter 7

AFTER THE INVASION

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[3] Park (2003), p. 4; *Turkish Daily News*, 8 March 2003.

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Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS

[1] A partial rejection could be some kind of restricted membership whereby permanent exceptions are imposed on Turkey. So far exceptions concerning access to the structural funds and the freedom of movement for people have been discussed.

[2] Compare Kirişci (2004a), p. 2, who argues that 'Turkey sits right on the fault line between Europe's "Kantian" world and the "Hobbesian" one of the Middle East'.

[3] Criss and Pinar (1997), p. 3.

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